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ABSTRACT           
   
Counterinsurgency (COIN) is a long process that even great powers 
struggle with. Nevertheless, South Korea as a middle power was successful with 
COINs in Vietnam and Iraq. What were the drivers for the Republic of Korea 
(ROK) military's success? This dissertation maintains that the unusual nature of 
missions coupled with political/socio-cultural advantages are sufficient conditions 
for success of the middle power COIN. COIN missions are seen as unusual to 
middle powers. A rare mission stimulates military forces to fight harder because 
they recognize this mission as an opportunity to increase their national prestige. 
COIN mission success is also more probable for middle powers because their 
forces make the best of their country's political/socio-cultural advantages.  
The ROK military's COINs are optimal cases to test these hypotheses. The 
ROK military's COIN in Vietnam was an extremely rare mission, which increased 
its enthusiasm. This enthusiasm was converted into appropriate capabilities. By 
identifying battleground dynamics, the ROK forces initially chose an enemy-
oriented approach based upon the method of company-led tactical base, and then 
later introduced a population-led method. South Korea's political/socio-cultural 
advantages also contributed to its military success in Vietnam. The Confucius 
culture that South Koreans and Vietnamese shared allowed the ROK forces to win 
the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese population.  
The mission in Iraq was also a rare and important one for national prestige. 
Accordingly, South Korean forces were equipped with pride and were 
enthusiastic about missions in Arbil. They changed their organization from a rigid 
  ii 
one to a more flexible one by strengthening civil-military units. The ROK military 
possessed the ability to choose a population-centric approach. South Korea's 
political and cultural climate also served as an advantage to accomplish COIN in 
Iraq. The culture of Jung allowed ROK soldiers to sincerely help the local Iraqis.  
This project contributes to developing a theory of the middle power COIN. 
The findings also generate security policy implications of how to deal with 
contingent situations led by the collapse of the North Korean regime and how to 
redefine the ROK military strategy for the future. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
COIN is a complex effort that integrates the full range of civilian and 
military agencies. It is often more population-centric (focused on 
securing and controlling a given population or populations) than enemy-
centric (focused on defeating a particular enemy group). Note that this 
does not mean that COIN is less violent than any other conflict: on the 
contrary, like any other form of warfare it always involves loss of life. It is 
an extremely difficult undertaking, is often highly controversial 
politically, involves a series of ambiguous events that are extremely 
difficult to interpret, and often requires vastly more resources and time 
than initially anticipated.  
– U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide, January 2009 
 
There has been growing concern about counterinsurgency (COIN) in the  
world, particularly because the U.S. lost the COIN mission in Vietnam 
historically, and also because the U.S. currently struggles with COIN in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. COIN is more difficult and requires more time than 
conventional war because various factors other than kinetic weapons, such as 
political and cultural variables, affect the trajectory of COIN success, which has 
led great powers to lose COIN in history. Nevertheless, the Republic of Korea 
(ROK) made great COIN achievements in Vietnam and Iraq. Thus, this study is 
aimed at tracing the underlying logic of the ROK COIN success.  
I. The Korean Peninsula and the ROK Military Doctrine 
In a celebration speech for Armed Forces Day on October 1, 2009, 
President Lee Myung-Bak emphasized that the ROK military has to prepare for 
global threats as well as national threats.
1
 The Republic of Korea (ROK) currently 
                                                 
1
 President Speech on October 1, 2009, in the Office of the Republic of Korea  
President (Cheong Wa Dae), 
http://www.president.go.kr/kr./president/speech/speech_list.php (Accessed  
February 26, 2010).    
  2 
seeks an outward-seeking national strategy due to the growth of internal resources 
and the growing demand of unconventional warfare from the changing 
international environment. The ROK military strategy, however, still focuses on 
an inward-oriented conventional war with the North Korean army (state actor‟s 
forces). The ROK Ministry of Defense lacks a special office or command that 
assumes the center role of unconventional missions.
2
 Major exercises are based on 
the operations necessary to effectively carry out traditional war campaigns. There 
are only two exercises that are related to promoting the military‟s unconventional 
missions among thirteen major exercises that the ROK Ministry of National 
Defense (MND) introduced in the Defense White Paper 2008. 
The ROK military has paid a tremendous attention to the conventional 
threat from the North Korean military on the peninsula ever since the Korean War. 
Three foundations have driven the ROK military‟s overemphasis on conventional 
war: 1) historical foundation (the experience of the Korean War), 2) structural 
foundation (the last frontier of the Cold War), and 3) military organizational 
culture (officers‟ overemphasis on conventional war).  
First, the two Koreas experienced a harsh symmetric war during the Korean 
War. The Korean War led to about 2.5 million casualties. The Korean society had 
to struggle to rebuild its infrastructure decimated by war for a long time. Thus, 
this historic event pushed its military to see conventional war as the most 
important mission. Furthermore, despite the official end of the Cold War in 1991, 
                                                 
2
 The ROK Ministry of National Defense, The Defense White Paper 2008, (Seoul:  
Daehan Planning Printing Co., 2008), 362-3. 
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the Korean peninsula is still a legacy of the Cold War.
3
 More important, the 
historical and structural factors forced the ROK military to fully arm itself with 
modern conventional weapons and doctrine to prevent conventional war against 
North Korea and defeat it when it occurs. As a result, the conventional way of 
fighting experienced in the Korean War is firmly embedded in the ROK military 
organizational culture.
4
  
         As a consequence, the ROK military has considered external security on the 
Korean peninsula its routine mission. By the same token, it has paid less attention 
to unconventional warfare or asymmetric warfare. In the meantime, international 
politics forced Seoul to engage in unconventional warfare in Vietnam and Iraq. 
These missions were not routine works but unusual tasks assigned to the ROK 
military.  
II. The ROK Military’s Performance in Vietnam and Iraq 
         The ROK military conducted COIN operations in Vietnam and Iraq. COIN 
is recognized as a difficult task even to great powers. Despite the difficult nature 
of COIN, the ROK military, a middle power, achieved remarkably successful 
                                                 
3
 Democratic South Korea and Communist North Korea are still fighting with  
each other in the last-remnant battlefield of the Cold War. In this vein, the longest  
Cold War in the world has been on the Korean peninsula; long tension between  
democracy in the South and communism in the North has existed for over 60  
years. This structure has embedded the conventional way of fighting logic in  
Korean society. 
4
 Korean officers prefer the study of traditional war and see asymmetric warfare  
as secondary. Their Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) is based on the 
traditional North Korean threat and they resist the current SOP‟s innovation. This  
conventional war-oriented posture of the ROK military organization causes the  
inward military strategy to continue to dominate, and in doing so, it clashes with  
the ROK outward national strategy.  
  4 
outcomes in these two unusual missions. It might be difficult to accept that the 
Vietnam War and the Iraq War could be successful politically or strategically. 
However, there are successful accounts on a tactical level within this strategic 
quagmire. The ROK military effectively suppressed the Viet Cong in its area of 
responsibility. It also played an influential role in stabilizing the city of Arbil in 
Iraq, which is under the control of the Kurdish government, by gaining the hearts 
and minds of the local Kurdish population. In this vein, the ROK COIN forces 
were substantial players.
5
  
III. Research Question and Its Significance 
          The ROK military‟s missions in Vietnam and Iraq offer interesting 
empirical cases in the sense that the ROK military which has heavily engaged in 
conventional warfare achieved remarkable successes in unconventional missions. 
What were the drivers for the ROK military‟s success in these missions? To put it 
another way, what made the ROK military fight well in its unusual COIN 
missions in Vietnam and in Iraq?  
         This puzzle is not only interesting but also important on both scholarly and 
policy dimensions. The scholarly dimension encourages examination of the 
potential to extend the role of non-great powers for international security simply 
                                                 
5
 Newnham (2008) argues that other countries‟ coalitions with the U.S. in the Iraq 
War were mostly driven by economic and security incentives; the U.S. provided 
its partners with economic and military aid. In addition, the participation of 
Eastern European countries in the Iraq War was intended to obtain U.S. support 
against a Russian resurgence. This statement presupposes that they are not major 
players but symbolic players. Randall Newnham, “Coalition of the Bribed and 
Bullied? U.S. Economic Linkage and the Iraq War Coalition,” International 
Studies Review 9, no. 2 (2008): 183-200.  
  5 
beyond external security on the Korean peninsula. The cases of the ROK military 
show that non-great powers are able to play a significant role in managing COIN 
rather than participate in great powers‟ affairs only symbolically or with political 
or economic incentives. In particular, this puzzle asks International Relations (IR) 
scholars to recognize the extended role of middle powers in the world managed 
mostly by great powers.  
         The puzzle also aids in devising appropriate policies for the future. 
Instability in North Korea can be considered an international security problem as 
well as a regional security problem in North East Asia in the sense that the DPRK 
(Democratic People‟s Republic of Korea) possesses nuclear weapons. The North 
Korean Regime leader, Kim Jong Il, is often reported to be in bad health.
6
 Thus, 
the United States and the ROK are concerned with the potential collapse of the 
nuclear-armed Kim regime. Both countries together have developed Operational 
Plan (OPLAN) 5029, preparing for such a collapse.
7
 QDR Report 2010, issued by 
the U.S. Department of Defense, shows that the collapse of a WMD-armed state, 
such as North Korea, is the US‟s most troubling concern.8  
Despite their concerns, the U.S. and the ROK currently do not have detailed 
plans or scenarios for how to restabilize uncertain security on the Korean 
peninsula when and if the North Korean regime collapses. Although OPLAN 
                                                 
6
 The Economist, “Kim Jong Il or Kim Jong Well?” September 13, 2008, 49.  
7
 The Korea Herald, “N.K. blasts S.Korean-U.S. scenario on emergency,” March 
30, 2010, at 
http://www.koreaherald.com/national/Detail.jsp?newsMLId=20091109000075 
(Accessed on June 3, 2010).  
8
 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington 
DC, 2010), 9.  
  6 
5029 recently has been improved from a conceptual plan to an executable plan, it 
is far from a plan to deal with the COIN task on the Korean peninsula.
9
 A power 
transitional period in North Korea, however, is likely to promote sudden 
insurgencies similar to insurgencies in Vietnam and Iraq. In this vein, lessons 
from Vietnam and Iraq may shed light on how to deal with contingent situations 
on the Korean peninsula.  
          This puzzle is also important for the other policy implication: the future 
strategy of the ROK military. Lessons from Vietnam and Iraq need to be 
integrated into ROK military planning and doctrine to achieve other similar 
missions in the world. These external missions‟ successes would be crucial for 
Seoul‟s external strategy.  
Moreover, changing international security environments will tend to 
increase opportunities for the ROK military to engage in unconventional external 
missions, considering the alliance relationship between Seoul and Washington. A 
large scale kinetic fight between great powers has been declining in the post-Cold 
War era. By contrast, non-state actors have been the center stage in international 
security in the post-911 era. Under the changing international environment in the 
post-911 era, the U.S. will have to engage in more unconventional operations 
drawn from failing or ill-functioning states.  
Thus, South Korea, as both a growing middle power and a reliable ally of 
the U.S., will also have to engage in more of these different missions. As a 
                                                 
9
 The Hankyoreh, “Editorial: An alliance feeding regional conflict,” October 11, 
2010, at http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_editorial/443213.html 
(Accessed on November 26, 2010). 
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consequence, the “demand” vis-à-vis unconventional warfare will increase in the 
coming years. Successes in Vietnam and Iraq must be integrated into doctrinal 
and strategic levels for the military for their future challenges.  
IV. Drivers for Mission Successes of the ROK Military 
While conventional warfare has been the ROK military‟s normal mission, 
unconventional warfare, particularly COIN, was its rare mission. Conventional 
warfare is intended to destroy enemy infrastructure required for continuous 
military operations (the logic of destruction), whereas counterinsurgency is 
intended to gain security in the region (the logic of protection). In addition, 
conventional warfare is large scale violence between two opposing military forces, 
whereas there are four actors in counterinsurgency: COIN forces (state actors), 
their population, insurgent groups (non-state actors), and their population. 
These different natures of COIN compel COIN forces to struggle with 
adaptation costs. For success, it is crucially important to minimize adaptation 
costs in the first phase of COIN. Conventionally and heavily armed military 
soldiers from great powers take a longer time to adjust to unconventional missions, 
leading to increased adaptation costs. At the same time, the first-impression 
tactics end in failure because COIN forces tend to lose the opportunity in the first 
phase to make overall situations on the battleground favorable to them.  
Two axes contributed to helping the ROK military reduce the adaptation 
costs in Vietnam and Iraq: the logic of rare missions and positional advantages. 
First, the COIN mission which was unusually important rendered the ROK 
military more willing and capable to effectively cope with its crucial missions 
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which were expected to contribute to national prestige and maximize national 
utilities. The ROK military‟s mission in Vietnam had been its first ever overseas 
military operation. The ROK military‟s mission in Iraq was the most important 
overseas operation in around 30 years after its participation in the Vietnam 
conflict. More importantly, it was the first major activity for South Korea as a 
growing middle power. Thus, both missions in Vietnam and Iraq were important, 
and so the ROK military was eager for the challenge. Since both unusual missions 
were considered as highly important to increase national prestige, the ROK COIN 
forces were equipped with high morale and pride. Moreover, their high degree of 
willingness was converted to a high degree of capability by dispatching the 
ROK‟s best units/soldiers to the new missions.  
The other axis of the ROK COIN success was drawn from several 
positional advantages that South Korea had. First, the ROK military which came 
from non-great power was seen less as an occupier in both Vietnam and Iraq. 
Second, the ROK military‟s fighting experience against communist partisan 
groups in the early 1950s also helped its success in Vietnam and Iraq in two ways. 
The ROK forces better understood the different nature of COIN, and by doing so, 
they reduced adaptation costs in developing tactics appropriate for fighting 
guerillas. They also better understood the local population‟s desire for security 
based on the ROK‟s prior experience. Third, unlike a weak power, South Korea 
was equipped with an organized military which offered enough resources to 
manage COIN. Finally, South Korea was better positioned for cultural 
understanding. The ROK COIN forces understood Vietnam‟s Confucius culture. 
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Furthermore, South Korea also has a community ethic similar to Iraqis and unlike 
Western countries‟ emphasis on individualism. These cultural alignments made 
the ROK military‟s missions conducive to success.  
By reducing the adaptation costs, particularly driven by crucial missions 
and positional advantages, the ROK military was able to adopt appropriate tactical 
options. The South Korean military first adopted an enemy-centered approach and 
later introduced population-centered activities in Vietnam because insurgent 
groups were dominant in the area. By contrast, the South Korean military adopted 
a population-centered approach because insurgent groups were less strong in the 
area. In a nutshell, the nature of unusually important missions and positional 
advantages, taken together, were sufficient conditions for COIN success.  
V. Plan of the Dissertation 
In chapter 2, I will review the extant literature on COIN. In the literature 
review, first of all, I examine the differences between conventional warfare and 
unconventional warfare (particularly COIN). COIN is different from conventional 
warfare particularly in terms of the number of players. Conventional warfare is a 
large-scale kinetic fight between opposing regular forces which represent 
contending countries. When it comes to COIN, however, there are other actors 
who affect the trajectory of success beyond military or militant actors. What 
makes COIN different from conventional warfare is that the state actors – COIN 
forces – not only have to fight against non-state actors – guerillas – but also need 
to understand the impacts on local and domestic populations. The success of 
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COIN is significantly affected by the interplay among four actors – COIN forces, 
their population, insurgent groups, and their population.  
Second, using four actors, I will review the literature on COIN. The 
literature review is intended to shed light on a more comprehensive theoretical 
framework. Hypotheses on COIN remedies learned from the literature review are 
used as basic tools for the comprehensive framework. The COIN literature on the 
four actors boils down to two big general remedies vis-à-vis COIN. COIN 
remedies based on both COIN forces and insurgent groups are enemy-centered 
approaches. In contrast, population-oriented approaches highlight both one‟s own 
domestic population and the host country‟s population. 
The identification of caveats or missing points in the current COIN 
literature can add to the comprehensive framework. Current literature is outcome-
oriented, not process-oriented. It rarely examines the impact of the interplay 
among the four actors on COIN effectiveness from the viewpoint of process. 
Moreover, most literature focuses exclusively on the role of great-powers. By 
doing so, it takes non-great powers as merely symbolic players for COIN.  
In chapter 2, I will also create a framework to explain the ROK military‟s 
successes in Vietnam and Iraq. South Korean COIN forces were not a symbolic 
player but a substantial / reliable player in Vietnam and Iraq. I argue that there are 
two strategies in COIN. The first strategy is initially an enemy-based remedy 
followed by a population-oriented approach. The second strategy is initially 
population-centered supported by an enemy-oriented method. Both strategies 
require time to work with local populations as well as respond to battleground 
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situations for COIN success. Similarly, they show that combined approaches are 
more likely to be effective in managing COIN. What matters most is that the 
tempo of both processes is important.  
I argue that the minimization of adaptation costs for the ROK COIN forces 
worked because of two logics: the nature of missions (rare and crucial tasks) and 
positional advantages (political and socio-cultural merits of South Korea). The 
crucial natures of missions in Vietnam and Iraq increased willingness and 
capability of the ROK COIN forces, and by doing so, the ROK military was able 
to minimize adaptation costs. Equally important, political and socio-cultural 
positions of South Korea, such as better understanding the Confucius tradition, 
gave the ROK military an advantage in COIN. Using these two logics, I will 
propose three general hypotheses. The latter part of Chapter 2 details 
methodology and measurement which will be used to test a proposed theoretical 
framework. That framework is process tracing.  
In chapter 3, I will test the proposed theoretical framework empirically with 
the case of the ROK COIN in Vietnam. I start with Chapter 3 by providing an 
overview of the Vietnam conflict that the ROK military joined in COIN activities. 
This overview will be followed by assessment of the ROK military‟s success in 
Vietnam. This assessment will be used to confirm the outcome of the dependent 
variable – the mission‟s success or failure.  
Additionally, I will examine how much the ROK military displayed by a 
high degree of willingness and capability in its attempt to fulfill its mission. This 
allowed the ROK military to adopt the first process option: the initial use of an 
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enemy-oriented approach and the later use of a population-based approach. 
Furthermore, using process tracing, I will trace how high morale was transferred 
to a high degree of capability. Finally, the function of political and socio-cultural 
advantages that South Korea possessed, such as a cultural alignment between 
South Korea and Vietnam, will be explored.  
In chapter 4, the case of the ROK COIN in Iraq will be explored. I start by 
providing an overview of the Iraq conflict that the ROK military joined in COIN 
activities. Then, I will assess the ROK COIN forces‟ success in Iraq. The 
assessment will be followed by the examination of two key variables (willingness 
and capability) under the logic of the rare mission. I will investigate how the ROK 
military initially adopted a population-centered approach and the supportive use 
of an enemy-based approach. Finally, the function of political and socio-cultural 
advantages that South Korea possessed, such as community-based society similar 
to Iraq, will be explored. 
The concluding chapter will discuss scholarly and policy implications of the 
project findings. When it comes to IR scholarly implication, it will be discussed 
what South Korea‟s success tells us about the enhanced role of a middle power in 
COIN. When it comes to policy implications, two important policies will be 
produced: Asian security and the ROK‟s future military strategy. For example, if 
there is a violent power transition in the North Korean regime leadership, the 
ROK will require an effective political/military policy to deal with this 
contingency.   
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The findings will show that if this happens, the major player should be the 
ROK military rather than external militaries because it will be best able to cope 
with an unstable North. Second, the findings will also show that the ROK 
military‟s remarkable achievements in Vietnam and Iraq need to be developed on 
a strategic and doctrinal level to deal with unconventional missions elsewhere. I 
will conclude with some thoughts about the directions of future research on 
middle power COINs, the management of the post- Kim regime situation, and 
future military strategy of South Korea.  
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND ANALYTICAL 
FRAMEWORK 
I. Literature Review of Counterinsurgency 
A. Conventional Warfare vs. Counterinsurgency 
Before discussing the distinction between conventional warfare and COIN, 
the general concept of insurgency and COIN needs to be described.
10
 What is 
insurgency? The U.S. military Field Manual conceptualizes an insurgency as “an 
organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through 
the use of subversion and armed conflict.”11 Similarly, U.S. Government 
Counterinsurgency Guide defines an insurgency as “the organized use of 
subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a 
region.”12 Insurgents‟ organized movement implies that they do not accept the 
state as a legitimate political entity. Thus, COIN is inherently different from 
conventional war, which can be defined as large-scale organized violence 
between states. 
What is COIN? The U.S. military Field Manual defines COIN as “political, 
economic, military, paramilitary, psychological, and civic actions taken by a 
government to defeat an insurgency.”13 Similarly, Field Manual stresses that 
                                                 
10
 I summarize the difference between conventional and COIN operations in my 
published article. Kil-Joo Ban, “The ROK as a Middle Power: Its Role in 
Counterinsurgency,” Asian Politics and Policy 3, no. 2 (2011), 228-9. 
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 U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency 
(Headquarters Department of the Army, 2006), 1-1. 
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 U.S. Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative, U.S. Government 
Counterinsurgency Guide, January 2009, 6.  
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 Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency, 1-1.  
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COIN forces “understand the broader strategic context within which they are 
operating.”14 U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide conceptualizes COIN as 
“comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to simultaneously defeat and 
contain insurgency and address its root causes.”15 U.S. Government COIN Guide 
recognizes the distinction between conventional war and COIN. It defines COIN 
as “the blend of comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to 
simultaneously contain insurgency and address its root causes.”16 
COIN is different from conventional warfare in two big dimensions: its 
inherent nature and tactical actions. The nature of conventional warfare and COIN 
can be distinguished over four categories: actors, a managing logic, a goal, and a 
battleground situation (see Table 1).  
Table 1  
The Inherent Distinction between Conventional Warfare and COIN 
Categories Conventional Warfare COIN 
Actors Two or more regular armies Four 
Logic Destruction  Protection  
Goal 
Territorial control 
The expansion of the sphere of 
influence 
Maintaining security 
State building 
Functioning state 
Battleground 
Clear 
Easy to identify enemy 
- Regular and uniformed armies 
- Clear battlefield  
Murky  
Hard to identify 
- Various guerillas  
- No specific battleground  
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 Ibid., 1-15.  
15
 U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide, 12.  
16
 U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide, 2.  
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There are only two players in conventional warfare, whereas there are four 
players in COIN.
17
 The number of players in COIN is different from the number 
in conventional warfare. Conventional warfare is large- scale violence between 
two opposing military forces which stand for their countries. However, there are 
four actors in COIN: COIN forces (state actors), their population, insurgent 
groups (non-state actors), and their population. 
A difference in the number of players leads to other key distinctions. First, 
the logic in COIN is opposite from the one in conventional warfare. Since 
conventional warfare is a kinetic fight between heavily armed regular forces, it is 
intended to destroy the infrastructure of the adversary which is required for 
continuous military operations. Thus, the logic of destruction dominates 
conventional warfare. Galula (1964) states that “the strategy of conventional war 
warfare prescribes the conquest of the enemy‟s territory, the destruction of his 
forces.”18 In contrast to conventional warfare, he argues that “a victory [in COIN] 
is not the destruction.”19 Since a local and/or domestic population affects the 
trajectory of mission success, COIN is intended to maintain and build overall 
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 America‟s commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, traces the 
logical difference between conventional war and counterinsurgency, particularly 
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18
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Praeger Security International, 1964), 50-60. 
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 Ibid., 54. 
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infrastructure in an attempt to gain security in the region. Thus, the logic of 
protection works in COIN. In addition, regular big forces which represent their 
countries have to fight against non-state insurgent groups.
20
 Thus, the nature of 
actors is inherently different.  
Second, COIN has a different goal from conventional warfare. 
Conventional warfare is intended to gain territorial control on the battlefield and 
to expand the sphere of influence. However, COIN has a long-term goal of 
maintaining security on the battleground. In many aspects, COIN is related to 
state building rather than state destruction. Third, COIN has different battleground 
situations from conventional warfare. Battlefield situations in conventional 
warfare are relatively tangible and visible. It is easy to identify an enemy because 
opposing enemy soldiers wear military uniforms. In contrast, battleground 
situations in COIN are relatively intangible and invisible. It is difficult to identify 
insurgents because they do not wear uniforms. Moreover, since they often live 
with a local population at the same place, it is extremely difficult to tell the 
difference between insurgents and civilian residents while managing COIN. To 
put it another way, there is neither clear nor specified battlegrounds in COIN.  
The aforementioned inherent distinction renders the process of conducting 
COIN operations different from carrying out a conventional war. This can be 
described under four categories: effective approach, key assets, military 
organization, and applicability of remedies to other warfare (see Table 2). First, 
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 Galula (1964) defines asymmetry in a revolutionary war as “the disproportion 
of strength” between counterinsurgent forces and insurgent groups. Ibid., 3. 
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military forces that conduct conventional warfare have to rely on an enemy-based 
approach in their attempt to neutralize the enemy‟s military capability. This is not 
an option but a necessary approach for both opposing military forces which have 
to conduct large-scale conventional operations. In contrast, COIN forces need to 
carefully focus on two approaches – enemy-centered or population-centered 
approach – depending on battleground situations. Which one is adopted will 
seriously affect the overall trajectory of mission success.  
Second, since conventional warfare relies on an enemy-centered approach 
against regular armies, the military forces have to be equipped with technological 
equipment/weapons and a large number of soldiers for mission success. Kinetic 
power and firepower are crucial for winning conventional warfare: the stronger, 
the better. Unlike conventional warfare, there are more actors involved in 
unconventional operations. COIN actors are population and non-state fighters. 
Thus, COIN forces cannot achieve a successful outcome only with firepower. 
Firepower is simply one of many assets that COIN forces have to possess. Rather 
than heavy weapons, COIN forces need small weapons for small scale operations, 
such as jungle operations. They also need to understand the culture surrounding 
the battleground which is embedded in a local population. The infrastructure 
building capability is often more important than physical fighting capability for 
COIN forces.  
Third, organizational setting of COIN forces should be different from 
conventional military forces‟. In conventional warfare, a top-down setting is more 
effective for success. The military organization needs to be hierarchically 
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arranged in order to carry out large scale operations and a variety of 
units/platforms. By the same token, unified command is always recommended, 
and the role of the highest military commander is more important. In contrast, a 
bottom-up setting is often more effective for COIN forces. Unified command is 
maintained but a differentiated sub-organization is also needed. The role of on-
scene commanders, such as junior officers is often more important because COIN 
forces carry out their mission on a small unit basis.  
Table 2  
The Tactical Distinction between Conventional Warfare and COIN 
Categories Conventional Warfare COIN 
Effective  
Approach 
No option 
- Enemy-centered remedy  
Options 
- Enemy-centered remedy 
- Population-centered remedy  
Assets 
Kinetic power and firepower  
- Big weapons and large army 
Various assets 
- Light equipment 
- Cultural understanding 
- Infrastructure building ability 
Organization  
Top-down approach 
- Hierarchical organization 
- Unified command 
Bottom-up approach 
- Less hierarchical 
organization  
- Unified but separate activities  
Persistency 
of remedies 
Persistent  
- Applicability of one SOP 
- Inflexibility   
Less persistent  
- Less applicability of 
remedies 
- The crucial nature of 
flexibility 
 
Finally, there is a difference between COIN and conventional warfare in 
terms of applicability.
21
 In most cases, Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) 
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 Nagl (2006) makes the distinction between conventional warfare (persistent 
military strategy) and counterinsurgency (situational/adaptable military strategy) 
in terms of the application of experience to other warfare. John A. Nagl, 
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used for conventional warfare can be applied to other conventional warfare 
management because the phases of warfare are persistent. In this vein, 
consistency is better to cope with conventional warfare. In contrast, COIN forces 
have to confront different types of warfare in every COIN mission because the 
phases of warfare are not persistent. Thus, flexibilities vis-à-vis organization, 
tactics, or strategies are mandatory rather than optional for mission success.  
The two axes of distinction – inherent nature and required remedy – 
fundamentally spring from the different number of players who affect the 
trajectory of mission success, which I described in the first item of Table 1. As a 
consequence, the extant COIN literature can be categorized according to these 
four actors.  
B. The Extant COIN Literature: Four Actors of COIN 
The special nature of COIN has encouraged scholars to examine many 
types of remedies to better deal with it, particularly according to four actors-based 
analyses: COIN forces, insurgent groups, local population, and domestic 
population. The first school examines COIN forces‟ capacity: military weapons / 
their size, doctrine / organization, the use of local forces or allies, soldiers‟ will to 
fight, and proper intelligence. Some examine which weapons are more effective 
for unconventional warfare. Dunlap (2008) stresses the effectiveness of traditional 
technological weapons, such as air strike, for reducing violence on the COIN 
battleground.
22
 By contrast, Bennett (1988) stresses the effectiveness of small 
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arms for anti-partisan soldiers.
23
 Likewise, Nawroz and Grau (1995) support the 
importance of small weapons. They contend that the Soviet Army lost the Afghan 
War because it relied on large weapons, such as artillery and air strikes, rather 
than small weapons for close combat.
24
 The proper troop size is also considered. 
Quinlivan (2005) asserts that if COIN aims at stabilization, the troop size needs to 
be determined by the size of the population and the territory.
25
 
Some stress the importance of doctrine or organization. Avant (1993) 
contends that successful COIN requires doctrine that highlights unity of command 
and the minimum use of force.
26
 In terms of organization, Nagl (2002) stresses 
that the military organization should be a learning institution for effective 
COIN.
27
 Similarly, McMichael (1989) argues that the Soviet Army lost the 
Afghan War due to its slow learning process.
28
 
As we can see in the recent COIN efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the 
COIN leader country mobilizes other forces – indigenous forces or allies. The 
effectiveness of indigenous forces or allies is often dubious. Byman (2006) argues 
that local forces are mostly effective but often cause more problems because they 
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have different interests than the COIN leading country, and soldiers of allies have 
poor leadership.
29
 Pottier (2005) acknowledges the effectiveness of indigenous 
forces, but at the same time, he points out that it took a long time to train the 
native forces.
30
 Gortzak (2009) also argues that indigenous forces can be effective 
if great powers understand society on the battleground, and there are good junior 
officers in indigenous forces.
31
 
This school also regards soldiers‟ will to fight as vital. Mack (1975) 
examines COIN forces‟ lack of willingness to fight, particularly interest 
asymmetry. He argues that the big actor, COIN forces from great powers, has a 
lower interest in winning than the small actor, insurgent groups, because winning 
is not critical for a great power‟s survival.32 In addition, this school regards 
reliable and manageable intelligence as one of the most important capabilities of 
COIN forces. Tuck (2007) stresses the importance of good intelligence and 
minimum use of force.
33
 In a nutshell, the examination of this school is intended 
to determine COIN forces‟ own capacities. Thus, remedies are oriented to 
increase COIN forces‟ capacities required to carry out unconventional missions. 
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The second school explores insurgent groups‟ dynamics: psychological 
causes of insurgency and recruiting dynamics. Psychological factors are examined 
because they offer insurgents motivation to join insurgent groups. Gurr (1968) 
examines psychological variables, such as frustration, that affect civic uprising.
34
 
Some pay attention to the recruiting dynamic of insurgent groups. Kilcullen 
(2009) argues that massive military attack–led remedies allow insurgent groups to 
easily mobilize insurgents because they encourage the uncommitted to become 
accidental guerrillas.
35
 By the same token, Desker and Acharya (2006) and 
Abrahms (2008) highlight the identification of recruiting dynamics of non-state 
fighters.
36
  
Insurgent groups also benefit from corrupt or unreliable government 
because its mismanagement encourages the uncommitted to join insurgent groups. 
The U.S. COIN Guide reveals that “the government threatened by a nascent or 
active insurgency is the most important actor in COIN.”37 Thus, insurgent groups 
intend to force COIN forces to perpetuate indiscriminate violence, leading to 
civilian casualties that make the logic of mobilization favorable to insurgent 
groups. By the same token, they welcome a corrupt government to make the 
uncommitted support their insurgency more. Salary may also support insurgent 
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recruitment. For example, with the war in Afghanistan, the Taliban pays insurgent 
fighters more than the Afghan Army pays soldiers. In Iraq, the U.S. forces turned 
over all responsibility to the Iraqi government. As a result, the Awakening 
Council grew disillusioned because the Iraqi government slowed and reduced pay.  
Basically, COIN remedies based on actors of both COIN forces and 
insurgent groups are an enemy-based approach. However, an enemy-based 
approach of COIN fighters is different from an enemy-centered approach of 
conventional fighters because COIN fighters struggle with non-state insurgents. 
Thus, COIN fighters already have huge asymmetrical power against insurgent 
fighters. However, light weapons are more effective than heavy weapons. In 
addition, COIN fighters should be concerned about recruiting dynamics of 
insurgent groups unlike conventional fighters.  
The third school pays attention to the local population aspect: its focuses on 
personal security, the “hearts and minds,” and population control. Local residents 
see their physical survival as vital. Kalyvas (2006) argues that individuals on the 
battleground seek to maximize their personal security by tracing the logic of 
denunciation and defection.
38
 The most dominant approach within this school 
focuses on how to gain the hearts and minds of the domestic population. As 
opposed to the aforementioned first group of scholars‟ skepticism about the 
effectiveness of the indigenous force, Cassidy (2006) argues that the use of local 
forces is effective for gaining the hearts and minds of the local population. He 
                                                 
38
 Stathis Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006).  
  25 
contends that the French COIN forces achieved some success in terms of gaining 
the hearts and minds of the local Algerians under the innovative plan of the SAS 
detachments, “whose officers were experts in Arabic and Arab affairs,” during the 
1957-1958 COIN missions.
39
  
Population control and political or economic incentives are seriously 
considered as well. Markel (2006) argues that the British COIN forces defeated 
the Malayan insurgency with a strategy of population control under an effective 
“hearts and minds” campaign.40 Kahl (2007) also pays attention to local 
population by stressing the minimization of civilian casualties.
41
 By the same 
token, Newsinger (2002) stresses the importance of the establishment of political 
and economic infrastructure for the domestic population by examining the Mau 
Mau uprising.
42
 
The fourth school examines how domestic actors constrain or prevent their 
military forces‟ behavior. Some emphasize the political or diplomatic roles of 
domestic actors, such as political elites beyond simply military operations on the 
ground in order to achieve a successful COIN outcome. Catignani (2005) argues 
that COIN is not attainable exclusively with military force, but rather, requires 
political activities, such as diplomacy for the successful outcome of the IDF 
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(Israel Defense Force)‟s COIN operations by examining the IDF COIN campaign 
during Al-Aqsa Intifada.
43
  
Some also treat the COIN actors as strongly constrained by domestic actors. 
Arreguin-Toft (2001) sees the operational scope of COIN forces constrained by 
domestic groups. He argues that the big actor, confronted with guerrilla war, has 
to conduct a long war, but it is difficult to persuade the domestic population to 
wait for long-delayed victories.
44
 Similarly, Merom (2003) examines the 
battleground at home. He argues that democratic big actors lose small wars 
against the small actors because a democratic society and democratic institutions 
prevent forces from using extreme measures and taking/inflicting the casualties 
required to win this type of war.
45
 
COIN remedies based on actors of both a domestic population and a local 
population is the population-oriented approach. This approach focuses more on 
making the local and/or domestic populations favorable to COIN success. 
However, there is no clear cut between an enemy-centered and a population-
centered approach because one approach is closely related to the other for tactical 
and/or strategic level success.  
C. Pitfalls of the Current COIN Literature 
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Which problems or pitfalls does the current COIN literature reveal? What 
needs to be done to make the COIN literature richer? The current literature has 
two pitfalls: lack of attention to the process of COIN and underdevelopment of 
the role of middle powers for COIN. First, the conventional literature 
overemphasizes one aspect of the above interconnected variables and 
underemphasizes the effects of other variables because it treats COIN as outcome-
seeking, not process-seeking. Little attention has been paid to the impact of the 
interplay among the four actors from the viewpoint of process.  
Second, the current literature marginalizes the positive effects and the 
substantial role of middle powers. It has been argued that great powers should 
always be responsible for COIN because they have the most resources, such as 
military technology and economic capability. IR scholars tend to take non-great 
powers as simply symbolic players rather than substantial players. Unlike 
conventional warfare, the four actors‟ interactions, rooted in the process of COIN, 
shape the trajectory of COIN: failure or success. To put it differently, COIN is not 
simply a kinetic fight between two opposing regular forces. Since different actors 
are involved in the trajectory of COIN success, non-great powers can be more 
effective under certain conditions. Non-great powers can benefit most only if they 
possess a well-disciplined military. Along with an organized military, middle 
powers can also become substantial players when they display high morale. In 
addition, their role can be effective when they understand culture on the 
battleground. In this respect, middle powers are frequently better than great 
powers in conducting COIN.  
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II. Theoretical Framework 
A. COIN Process and Adaptation Costs 
         Understanding COIN process is important because an effective process 
reduces adaptation costs for COIN forces. As has been noted, there are two COIN 
approaches in general: an enemy-oriented approach and a population-oriented 
approach. The enemy-oriented remedies – more violent/brutal, compressed, and 
material-oriented strategies – require more tangible approaches, such as the use of 
an appropriate military doctrine to overwhelm insurgents by force. In contrast, the 
population-oriented remedies – less violent, more friendly and idealistic-oriented 
strategies – suggest more intangible approaches, such as confidence building, a 
high degree of the „hearts and mind‟ strategy instead of the humiliation of an 
occupation, consensus formulation, multilevel dialogues involving a variety of 
groups, and cultural education for COIN forces. 
Despite a clear distinction between the two remedies, successful COIN 
requires the integration of both approaches. Integration should be understood as a 
process, particularly as a time sequence. There are three processes in managing 
COIN. The first process is an enemy-based approach with a subsequent 
population-based approach. In this process, COIN forces initially focus on an 
enemy-centered approach and then later adopt a population-oriented approach, 
step-by-step depending on battleground situations. Determining a sequence is a 
battleground situation vis-à-vis the level of dominance of insurgent groups. South 
Korean COIN forces made the initial use of enemy-based remedies and the later 
use of population-based remedies in Vietnam.  
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The second process is a population-based approach with the support of 
military forces which is intended to deter the potential activities of the enemy 
early enough. The sequence of this process is the initial use of a population-based 
approach and the later use of an enemy-based approach. The South Korean 
military in Iraq adopted population-oriented remedies with the subsequent use of 
enemy-based tactics. The ROK successfully used a population-centered approach 
with supportive hard power.  
The final process is an optimal balance between an enemy-led and a 
population-led approach. This process is an ideal type because battleground 
situations in COIN rarely offer a perfect balance between insurgent groups and 
local populations. Thus, I drop this scenario from my study.  
Study of the first two processes is important because both processes are 
closely related to adaptation costs. A military mostly trained for conventional 
warfare will rarely adapt during conventional warfare because one SOP is 
applicable to most conventional warfare. However, conventional forces may have 
to pay a higher adaptation cost because conventional tactics are not effective in 
some battlegrounds. Thus, the minimization of adaptation costs is crucial for 
COIN success. If this is the case, under what conditions will COIN forces be able 
to minimize adaptation costs? Put simply, what leads to minimizing adaptation 
costs and contributing to COIN success?  
B. The Logic of Success for the ROK COIN 
     COIN needs to be clearly defined in order to measure its success, a dependent 
variable. I conceptualize COIN as a process of gaining or regaining security in the 
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area where the interplay among four actors affects the trajectory of success. With 
this definition in mind, tactical success needs to be distinguished from strategic 
success. While tactical success refers to the degree of security control in one or a 
few areas within overall battlegrounds, strategic success is securing all 
battlegrounds. Thus, strategic success can be achieved through the expansion of 
tactical success to the overall battleground that requires coordinated efforts among 
COIN coalition forces. The leading country of the COIN coalition forces is in 
charge of the overall battleground and assigns other COIN forces to specific areas. 
Assigned COIN forces aim to secure their Tactical Area of Responsibility 
(TAOR). The COIN success as the dependent variable in this project refers to the 
tactical level of success.  
The ROK military‟s success of COINs in Vietnam and Iraq was driven by 
the combination of the special nature of missions and the positional advantages of 
South Korea. The nature of missions was the first driver to reduce adaptation 
costs. Soldiers fight harder and better when they recognize a mission as highly 
important. The importance of missions for building national prestige generates 
higher military desire and capability.  
A high degree of willingness not only stimulates soldiers to fight harder but 
also enhances capability, which results in minimizing adaptation costs. In contrast 
to the capability of conventional warfare – kinetic power – COIN capability is 
operationalized by types of tactics, the degree of organizational flexibility, asset 
types, and the COIN proficiency of fighters. High morale and desire of the 
military make COIN forces capable enough for unconventional war and 
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minimizes time/process required for building COIN capability: no desire, no 
capability. Unusual missions are assigned to the military tend to generate more 
morale and performance because the forces consider the success of these missions 
crucial to increase national prestige.  
What was a routine or unusual mission to the ROK military? Conventional 
military operations against the North Korean army were recognized as routine for 
more than 60 years. Conventional capabilities deterred the North Korean army 
from invading South Korea once again. Border patrols around the Demilitarized 
Zone (DMZ) or on the Northern Limit Line (NLL) have also been conventional 
missions. Conventional warfare has been recognized as a mandatory mission but 
at the same time it has become a routine way of operations. This mission was not 
related to national prestige but maintenance of external security on the Korean 
peninsula or status quo.  
By contrast, both missions in Vietnam and Iraq were extremely rare and 
important so that the ROK military was armed with a higher degree of enthusiasm. 
The ROK military‟s mission in Vietnam had been its first ever overseas military 
operation. This task was crucial for increasing national prestige. South Korean 
soldiers knew that mission success would contribute to Korean economic 
development and military modernization because their participation encouraged 
the U.S. to give South Korea more financial and military aid. In addition, South 
Korean political leaders and military elites recognized that mission success would 
contribute to maximizing other national interests through diplomatic negotiations 
favorable to South Korea. In a situation where the U.S. struggled with fighting 
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against the Viet Cong guerillas, they needed South Korean fighters who were 
recognized as professional and capable. Thus, this mission was recognized as the 
most important task on a national level.  
The ROK military‟s mission in Iraq was the most important overseas 
operations in the 30 years after its participation in the Vietnam conflict. More 
importantly, it was the first major activity for South Korea as a growing middle 
power in the post-911 era. South Korea, as a growing middle power, saw the 
mission in Iraq as an opportunity to extend its role in contributing to international 
security. In a nutshell, both missions in Vietnam and Iraq were important, and so 
the ROK military approached the challenge with a high degree of enthusiasm.   
The ROK military‟s mission in Vietnam served as an important opportunity 
to increase national prestige and maximize utilities, both of which were 
significant benefits for all of South Korea. The success of the mission in Vietnam 
was crucial for the development of a national economy and the military 
modernization. Similarly, the ROK military‟s mission in Iraq was an important 
chance for South Korea, as a growing middle power, to show its increased 
capacity and responsibility for the world beyond simply international security. 
Thus, this mission was recognized as highly important to maximize national 
prestige, and by doing so, South Korean soldiers in Iraq were highly motivated.  
A high degree of motivation in Vietnam and Iraq led the ROK COIN forces 
to a fast adaptation tempo. South Korea dispatched volunteers and its best units to 
Vietnam and Iraq. A willingness to adapt made mission organization flexible, and 
by doing so, the ROK COIN forces were able to create COIN capability rather 
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than the capability required for conventional warfare in both Vietnam and Iraq. 
Military officers first sent preliminary mission teams to battlegrounds as the first 
step for the adoption of an effective COIN approach. This process minimized 
adaptation costs.  
The second driver for the ROK military‟s successes in Vietnam and Iraq 
sprang from the different nature of COIN. Unlike conventional warfare, COIN 
forces‟ physical enemy is not regular troops but guerillas who operate in terrains 
where they easily hide. In addition, other actors, such as the local population, 
affect the trajectory of COIN‟s success. COIN forces must gain the hearts and 
minds of the local population and understand social situations that surround the 
battleground.  
South Korea had positional advantages in two dimensions: material and 
non-material. First, in terms of the material dimension, the ROK had experienced 
communist insurgencies at home in the early 1950s and harsh poverty after the 
Korean War.
46
 Second, unlike the U.S., the ROK military was less seen as an 
occupier and outsider in both Vietnam and Iraq due to a relative lack of power 
asymmetry. Third, the ROK military was more familiar with the terrain and 
geography of the battleground. For example, its military was good at activities in 
mountainous areas which made the ROK military well-suited for jungle 
operations in Vietnam. Furthermore, politically divided geography in Vietnam 
was similar to the one in South Korea. Both countries were divided between two 
governments as a result of political-ideological friction between democracy and 
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communism. Fourth, South Korea, as a growing middle power, also deployed an 
organized military similar to great powers. Although there is a big gap between a 
middle power and a great power in terms of military capacity for conventional 
warfare, there is no huge gap between the two for unconventional warfare 
missions. 
When it comes to the non-material environment, South Korea‟s socio-
cultural characteristics were closer to Vietnam and Iraq. Similar to Vietnam, 
Confucius culture was embedded in South Korea. Thus, the ROK military was 
able to minimize adaptation time required to understand Confucius culture which 
emphasized the village. South Korea also had a community ethic similar to Iraqis 
and unlike Western countries‟ emphasis on individualism. Consequently, the 
ROK COIN forces understood the importance of community in Iraqi villages. To 
put it another way, it was better positioned to gain hearts and minds of the Iraqi 
residents with a relatively low adaptation costs. Second, the ROK enjoyed some 
connections on a societal level. There was a friendly connection between South 
Koreans and Iraqis. Iraqis held a positive image of South Koreans. They liked to 
buy Korean products, such as Samsung electronics and Hyundae cars.  
Encouraged by the above two advantages, the initial image of Korean 
troops was more positive than American troops by the local population. The 
ROK‟s position was more advantageous from the viewpoint of Korea‟s domestic 
population as well as Iraq‟s local population. The importance of these missions 
encouraged the South Korean population to support their military‟s activity more 
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than the American population. Both the aforementioned material and non-material 
advantage contributed to reducing adaptation costs of the ROK COIN forces.  
Figure 1 
A Theoretical Framework: The Logic of the ROK COIN Success 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AC: Adaptation costs, S: Sufficient condition 
All in all, the success of COIN requires the minimization of adaptation 
costs which is an intervening variable. The ROK COIN forces were able to 
minimize adaptation costs under two logics – the special nature of missions and 
the political/socio-cultural advantages. Together, they were sufficient conditions 
for COIN success. Armed with both the logic of special missions and 
political/socio-cultural advantages, the ROK military was able to achieve 
remarkable success in Vietnam and later in Iraq. 
The aforementioned two levels lead to a successful outcome in a synergistic 
way. The nature of special missions serves as the first driver of increasing 
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motivation for success (see Figure 2). When a country as a whole recognizes a 
mission as rare and crucial for national prestige, soldiers are more equipped with 
morale and pride for their mission. In this vein, large audience support motivates 
them to be more eager to accomplish their mission. Since they are more motivated, 
they are more willing to adjust mission organization, develop appropriate tactics, 
and select the best soldiers/units. Thus, a high degree of enthusiasm is transferred 
to a high degree of capability for COIN.  
Figure 2  
The Process of Minimizing Adaptation Costs: Unusual Mission 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Positional advantages are also crucial for COIN because SOPs which are 
effective in one COIN often do not work for the other (see Figure 3). COIN forces 
need to adapt to battleground environments as soon as possible. Two positional 
environments are important. South Korea had advantageous material 
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and non-great power experiences. It also enjoyed non-material environments, 
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such as more connections on a societal level and cultural alignment and/or better 
understanding of the battleground society.  
Figure 3 
The Process of Minimizing Adaptation Costs: Political/Socio-Cultural 
Advantages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C. Assumptions and Hypotheses 
With the aforementioned insights in mind, I lay out two assumptions and 
three big hypotheses.  
Assumptions 
1. Mission types affect the military‟s willingness and, therefore, its military 
capability. 
2. The ROK‟s political and socio-cultural advantages affect the trajectory of the 
military‟s performance.  
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1. As the COIN forces are equipped with high morale driven by the nature of a 
rare mission, they will fight harder and better in their attempt to increase their 
national prestige, resulting in COIN success.  
1A. When the COIN soldiers have high morale and pride, a successful 
outcome is more expected.  
1B. When the mission‟s expected gains for the ROK are high, the COIN troops 
will fight harder and better through learning lessons from the past as well 
as current events and by increasing their willingness to make the military 
organization adaptable for COIN missions. 
2. Mission variations of COIN forces, rather than overall military capacity, is 
related to mission success.  
2A. When insurgents are heavily dominant, the initial use of an enemy-based 
approach is most likely to be effective. When insurgents are relatively weak, 
the initial use of a population-based approach is most likely to be effective. 
2B. When the COIN forces are tactically flexible, a successful outcome is 
more likely. 
2C. When the military sends its best units/soldiers and the COIN forces are 
equipped with light weapons/equipment, success is more achievable. 
3. States’ political and socio-cultural characteristics make their military’s success 
more probable in COIN warfare.  
III. Methodological Framework  
A. Selecting Methodology 
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Qualitative methodology will be employed particularly based on case study. 
There has been methodological competition among rational choice, quantitative 
analysis, and qualitative analysis. Each methodology has both merits and limits. 
Rational choice methodology is theoretically sound and rigorous and thus it 
started to gain a hegemonic position in the field of Political Science.
47
 However, it 
struggles with serious weaknesses on two dimensions: minimal empirical work 
and limited applicability to security studies. Its unrealistic assumptions often 
make empirical testing extremely difficult. In addition, rational choice is limited 
regarding security studies because it focuses more on the logic of bargaining and 
cooperation.
48
 As Walt (1999) reminds us, rational choice emphasizes method for 
theory construction (trivial arguments with precision), not the contents of 
theory.
49
  
This research requires rich empirical work and examines military 
effectiveness, as one axis of security studies. Thus, rational choice is not a useful 
research methodology. Although I do not employ rational choice, I still take into 
account the concept of rationality. Since I define the middle states as strategic 
rational actors, I regard their goal seeking vis-à-vis mission achievement as vital. 
Seen in this light, the framework concerns rational outcomes but is not based on 
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rational choice itself in the sense that I do not employ hard formalization – 
rational choice method – heavily based on mathematics.50  
Since rational choice methodology is not optimal for this research, the other 
two methodologies need to be examined. Despite the energetic emergence of 
rational choice theorists, many scholars are still heavily reliant on quantitative and 
qualitative analysis, rather than game theoretic methodology.
51
 There has been a 
rivalry between quantitative and qualitative methodology in the social sciences. In 
Designing Social Inquiry (DSI), King et al (1994), as quantitative scholars, argue 
that the same logic of inference that applies to large-N statistical analysis should 
apply to small-N or single-country analysis.
52
 DSI suggests that qualitative 
research should be treated as derivative of the logic drawn from quantitative 
research. Some scholars, however, have responded by challenging and modifying 
DSI: Brady and Collier‟s (2004) Rethinking Social Inquiry, George and Bennet‟s 
(2005) Case Studies and Theory development in the Social Sciences, and 
Gerring‟s (2004/2007) Case Study Research.53 
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Quantitative methodology is different from qualitative methodology along 
several dimensions. Quantitative ontology lies in regular-pattern or correlation 
seeking, whereas qualitative ontology has its roots in causality-seeking. The 
former is a probabilistic analysis based on a large-N study, whereas the latter 
seeks deterministic outcomes based on a small-N analysis. In addition, the former 
seeks to know less about more, whereas the latter attempts to know more about 
less.
54
  
The recognition of the difference between quantitative and qualitative 
analyses shows that qualitative methodology is preferable for this study. This 
study will trace the causal mechanisms of the ROK military‟s COIN effectiveness, 
particularly focusing on the four actors‟ interactions. It utilizes qualitative 
methodology.
55
  
B. Process Tracing and Case Selection 
Qualitative methodology has various methods to trace rich accounts of 
events or actors: counterfactual reasoning, congruence testing, path dependence, 
and process tracing. Counterfactual analysis attempts to test the condition that X 
was necessary for Y by asking what would happen if X were not present. 
Congruence analysis aims to identify and predict correlational patterns in the 
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presence and strength of independent and dependent variables, in a similar way to 
quantitative analysis.
56
 Path dependence, initiated by Lipset and Rokkan (1967), 
stresses history while arguing that events in the past affect the possible sequence 
of events in the future.
57
  
Lastly, process tracing focuses on chains of events by identifying 
intervening variables. The process tracing method will be employed to trace 
different paths of the same outcome (successful COIN) despite different COIN 
remedies in Vietnam and in Iraq. It suggests the possibility of different paths from 
the independent to the dependent variable. As Van Evera (1997) reminds us, the 
method of process tracing allows researchers to explore “the chain of events or 
the decision-making process by which initial case conditions are translated into 
case outcomes.”58 
Qualitative analysis lends itself to case study.
59
 Gerring (2007) defines a 
case study as “the intensive study of a single case where the purpose of that study 
is […] to shed light on a larger class of cases.”60 He classifies a case study as the 
examination of one or a few cases as opposed to a cross-case study. However, as 
DSI notes, qualitative methodology may be criticized due to selection bias.
61
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In my attempt to minimize selection bias, two cases will be selected with 
case-selection criteria proposed by Van Evera (1997).
62
 The unit of analysis for 
the research is conflict, particularly COIN, and the actor is the ROK military. Two 
COIN cases in Vietnam and Iraq conducted by the ROK military will be selected 
and explored for three reasons: “data richness,” “extreme value” on both the 
independent and dependent variables, and outlier / crucial characteristic.
63
 Rich 
data are available for the Vietnam War from various sources, such as the Vietnam 
Virtual Archives. Since the Iraq War is still happening, a variety of data are 
accumulating. Since rich data are accessible, it is possible to answer more 
questions.  
Second, these two cases are examples of the successful outcome of COIN 
(dependent variable), at least on a tactical level. They also tap the independent 
variable in the sense that South Korea is the middle power engaged in these 
missions with quite different methods – hard methods in Vietnam and soft 
methods in Iraq. Finally, the ROK military‟s experiences in Iraq and in Vietnam 
offer cases that are rarely explained by the current literature or theory. This 
outlying or crucial characteristic allows us to trace unexplained conditions or 
events.  
C. Data Sources 
I conducted archival research in the U.S. For military postures, I examine 
the ROK military‟s official documents, such as Defense Reform 2020. I also use 
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several primary sources, including the autobiography of General Chae, 
Commander, ROKFV (Republic of Korea Force in Vietnam); Foreign Relations 
of the United States; and several online archival documents, such as Texas Tech 
Vietnam Archive and ProQuest Historical Newspapers; in my attempt to trace the 
COIN effectiveness of the ROK military forces in Vietnam and Iraq. In addition 
to English materials, I use a variety of Korean data, such as the ROK Ministry of 
National Defense documents. Furthermore, in my attempt to gain Korean archival 
data, I conducted field research in South Korea. In particular, I used archival 
sources in several agencies, such as the ROK National Assembly Library and the 
ROK Institute for Military History Compilation. The archival research in both the 
U.S. and South Korea contribute to the qualitative analysis.  
D. Measurement 
     It is imperative to clearly measure both independent variables and a dependent 
variable because these serve as a logical flow chart for the whole research project. 
First, the dependent variable for the research is COIN outcome – success or 
failure. Since missions in Vietnam and Iraq were successful cases for the ROK 
military, COIN success needs to be measured by several indicators (see Table 3).  
Table 3 
Measurement of COIN Success 
Indicators Measurement 
TAOR control  
A. Battle outcome: Kill ratio, POWs 
B. Separation between local population and 
insurgents 
C. Population growth in TAOR 
D. The degree of insurgent activities  
The function of local A. Local population‟s responses to infrastructure 
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population‟s basic / normal 
lives   
building of COIN forces  
B. The degree of local autonomy  
C. The function of local market 
Evaluation from others 
(Comparison with other 
COIN forces) 
A. The adoption of the ROK COIN model 
B. The COIN leading country‟s request for more 
forces 
C. The COIN leading country‟s remarks on the 
ROK military  
D. Reporters‟ remarks on the ROK military  
 
As had been defined earlier, COIN success refers to security control of 
assigned areas. Security control can be achieved through two paths: physical 
control and the safety of the local population. Physical control means success in 
the Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR) measured by battle outcome, 
separation between local population and insurgents, population growth in TAOR, 
and the degree of insurgent activities. The function of local population‟s normal 
lives can be measured by the degree of infrastructure building, growth of local 
markets, and the degree of local autonomy.  
Furthermore, the ROK COIN success can be evaluated by others, including 
other participating forces and/or civilians. In particular, the COIN leading 
country‟s remarks on the ROK military‟s performance will be explored and 
civilian reporters‟ experience on the battleground will be examined. If the ROK 
military did well, other forces would adopt tactics or models similar to the ROK 
military. Similarly, if the ROK military did well, the COIN leading country would 
ask South Korea to extend its military presence or further dispatch more soldiers.  
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The independent variables are examined over two dimensions: willingness 
and capability drawn from rare mission and positional advantages. To begin with, 
willingness is gauged with five indicators (see Table 4).  
Table 4 
Measurement of Willingness Driven By Logic of Unusual Mission 
Types Indicators Measurement 
Willingness 
Expected/achieved utility of 
mission success 
A. The scope of national 
prestige 
B. The scope of interest 
C. Governmental dialogue 
National pride/High morale Veterans‟ accounts through 
archival research 
Willingness to change 
conventional organization  
Examination of the process of 
organization changes by 
leaders  
Mission study of the ROK 
military  
A. Preparatory team 
B. The use of lessons from past 
events 
C. The use of lessons from 
current events 
 
First, the ROK military‟s willingness is measured by the degree of expected 
utility that South Korea could acquire through mission success. Second, 
willingness is measured by the level of soldiers‟ morale and pride through 
examining archival materials. Willingness is also measured by the ROK military‟s 
eagerness to change conventional organization eligible for COIN mission. In 
addition, it is gauged by the level of mission study conducted by the ROK 
military before dispatch as well as during operations on the battlefield.  
What is more important in this examination is to trace the transition from 
willingness to capability because COIN capability is a more direct indicator of its 
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success. Strong enthusiasm for mission success makes COIN forces more capable 
for unconventional missions by encouraging them to develop appropriate tactics 
and a flexible organization. In more detail, capability is measured according to 
three indicators (see Table 5).  
Table 5 
Measurement of Capability Driven By Logic of Special Missions 
Types Indicators Measurement 
Capacity 
Initial 
Tactical 
Adoption 
Professionalized 
military tactics for 
COIN (Enemy-based 
tactics) 
Adopted tactics  
- Small unit tactics  
- Night operations 
Qualified societal 
tactics for COIN 
(Population-based 
tactics) 
Adopted tactics 
- “Hearts and minds” 
- Civil affairs management 
Organizational flexibility 
A. Examination of Mission- 
oriented military 
organizational 
innovation 
B. Infrastructure building  
capacity 
- Types of infrastructure 
managed by the COIN 
forces 
Indigenous force building 
- Training program 
Soldiers/assets eligible for COIN 
A. Cultivating elite soldiers  
- Standard of selecting 
units/soldiers 
- Mission training program 
- Mission rules observed by 
soldiers 
B. Qualified military assets 
- Types of weapons and 
equipment 
(e.g., light armament) 
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First, initially adopted tactics are measured by examining a variety of 
required COIN remedies, such as small unit tactics and civil affairs management. 
Second, organizational flexibility required for COIN success is measured by 
examining various COIN characteristics, such as mission-oriented military 
organizational reform, infrastructure building capacity, and indigenous force 
building. Third, the scope of soldiers and assets eligible for COIN is measured by 
analyzing how to cultivate elite soldiers and how to acquire appropriate military 
assets.  
While the logic of special missions functions as one axis of the ROK COIN 
mission abroad, political/socio-cultural advantages of South Korea function as the 
other axis. South Korea was better positioned than other countries, particularly 
great powers, in two dimensions: material and non-material. Material 
environmental advantages are measured according to four indicators (see Table 6).  
Table 6 
Measurement of Politico-Environmental Advantages (Material Environments) 
States’ Advantages Measurement 
Material 
environments 
Non-great power 
experiences 
A. Historic examination of South 
Korea 
B. COIN experiences of its own 
home  
C. Its own experience in economic 
development 
Lack of power asymmetry Economic and military power gap 
Familiarity of terrain and 
geography 
Comparative examination between 
two countries 
Strong military 
organizations unlike weak 
powers 
The strength of military 
organization 
- Overall military organization  
- Size of forces and weapons 
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First, the historical experiences of non-great powers are examined as one 
indicator, particularly focusing on the historic examination of South Korea, its 
COIN experiences at its own home, and its experience in economic infrastructure 
building. Second, the structural position of non-great powers is examined by 
measuring the economic and military power gap between a COIN country and 
insurgent country. Third, the scope of familiarity of terrain and geography is 
investigated. Finally, a middle power position that is different from a weak power 
is explored by measuring the strength of a military organization.  
Non-material environmental advantages are also considered by various 
indicators (see Table 7). Connections between an insurgent country and a home 
country at the societal level are important for reducing adaptation costs. Thus, 
Vietnamese and Iraqi friendliness toward South Koreans is traced.  
Table 7 
Measurement of Socio-Cultural Advantages (Non-material Environments) 
States’ Advantages Measurement 
Non-material 
environments 
Cultural understanding 
Commonality among countries  
- Societal level 
- Troops‟ degree of understanding 
to society  
Connections on a 
population level 
Vietnamese and Iraqi degree of 
friendliness 
- Interview data from newspapers 
Local population‟s 
favorable response to 
COIN forces 
A. Vietnamese and Iraqi accounts 
from historical newspapers  
B. The scope of the first 
impression tactic 
C. Its negative response to 
insurgent groups 
Support from domestic 
population 
Its activities to support the COIN 
forces 
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Second, cultural understanding is essential for gaining the “hearts and 
minds” of the local population. Accordingly, the level of cultural understanding is 
explored. While the first indicator is oriented to ties between South Korea and the 
insurgent country before dispatching troops, how local populations responded to 
the ROK military in the first phase of COIN is examined. Thus, the scope of the 
local population‟s favorable response to COIN forces is traced by examining 
archival materials that include their accounts or evaluation. Finally, support from 
the ROK domestic population is crucial for continuing COIN because the people 
can ask their military either to withdraw or alternatively may support its activities. 
Consequently, the scope of domestic population‟s support is investigated.  
IV. Within-Case Variation 
As has been noted, unusual missions served as the first driver for increasing 
the military‟s enthusiasm for their missions. Since this serves as the first step in 
the process, one should examine within-case variation. If unusual missions are 
more likely to lead to success, are routine missions less likely to lead to success? 
What is a routine mission that the ROK military has performed?  
Border security has become one of the major routine missions for the ROK 
military ever since the Korean War. South Korean territory is clearly separated 
from North Korean territory over the Military Demarcation Line (MDL). There is 
the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) between the MDL in the south and north. The 
length of the DMZ is around 250 kilometers and its width is about 4 kilometers. 
The ROK military has patrolled this area as part of border security. While the 
ROK Army has three Field Army Commands, massive numbers of soldiers from 
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two Field Commands have been stationed and performed military exercises 
around border areas to deter the North Korean military‟s provocative actions. 
Routine work may decrease soldiers‟ willingness to perform effectively. Although 
South Korean conventional military forces have heavily patrolled the border areas, 
North Korean soldiers successfully infiltrated the border many times.  
Soldiers‟ missions around the military border are to prevent infiltration 
from the north. However, military troops who were in charge of these routines 
often did not succeed. Quite a large number of North Korean infiltrators 
successfully crossed the border and then carried out their operations in South 
Korea. The most typical three cases are the 1968 attempted raid on the Blue 
House, the 1968 communist guerillas‟ infiltration in Uljin and Samcheok, and the 
1975 axe murder incident (see Table 8).  
Table 8 
The Cases of Routine Missions 
Time Incidents Infiltration’s type Result 
1968. 1.17 
-2. 3 
An attempted 
raid on the 
Blue House 
31 North Korean 
commandos‟ 
infiltration 
South Korea 
7 civilians dead, 23 soldiers 
dead, 52 soldiers injured 
North Korean commandos 
28 dead, 2 fled, 1 captured 
1968. 
10.30-11. 2 
Guerillas on 
Uljin and 
Samcheok in 
South Korea 
124 communist 
guerillas‟ 
infiltration 
South Korea 
30 civilians dead, 52 soldiers 
dead, 67 injured, 1 captured 
North Korean guerillas 
(2 month operation) 
107 dead, 6 fled, 7 captured 
1976. 8.18 The axe 
murder 
incident 
Border security 
forces‟ infiltration 
(Tree / Hatchet 
incident) 
2 American officers dead 
8 South Korean, American 
soldiers injured 
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A. The 1968 Attempted Raid on the Blue House 
The first event to examine within-case variation happened on January 17, 
1968 when 31 North Korean commandos successfully crossed the border. North 
Korean commandos intended to assassinate the South Korean president and key 
governmental officials. They successfully crossed the South Korean border in the 
MDL during nighttime. More surprisingly, they successfully infiltrated Seoul, the 
capital city of South Korea over four days without getting caught.
64
 Ironically, the 
year of 1968 was the time when the ROK COIN forces were successfully 
preventing the infiltration of Viet Cong guerillas in Vietnamese villages. In this 
vein, the ROK military‟s failure to prevent North Korean infiltration was in 
contrast with its success to thwart Viet Cong infiltration.  
How did North Korean commandos successfully infiltrate South Korea? 
The vigilance of border security soldiers was relatively weak due to its routine 
nature. Their mission was not recognized as national prestige but as their 
customary duties. By contrast, North Korean commandos were equipped with a 
high degree of enthusiasm because they saw their mission success as highly 
important for their country. Second Lieutenant Kim Sin-jo who was the only 
captured North Korean commando said that “I never thought that this mission 
would fail because I believed that it was the greatest honor to die for Communist 
Party and Kim Il Sung.”65 Similarly, they were equipped with a high degree of 
                                                 
64
 1.21 Incident of Kim Sin-jo‟s commando forces Part II (Korean), 
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16 (Accessed September 29, 2010). 
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pride and self-sufficiency. Second Lieutenant Kim recollects that “we were 
trained under the highest pride that we are the best soldiers in the world.”66  
Their high morale was translated to a high degree of capability for 
infiltration operations. Before the dispatch, North Korean infiltrators, who were 
armed with pride, were professionally trained under mission-focused tactics.
67
 In 
particular, they were trained to move silently and stand still for an hour. This strict 
training was intended to prevent South Korean forces from indentifying their 
infiltration. In addition, North Korean commandos possessed a very detailed 
scheme about what to do. For example, they put on South Korean military 
uniforms in order to effectively carry out their operations in South Korea. Their 
training and the carefully developed plans allowed them to successfully infiltrate 
up to the Blue House (the president‟s office). 
In contrast to the high degree of willingness and capability of North Korean 
commandos, the nature of the ROK military‟s routine work vis-à-vis border 
security was recognized as less crucial. A barbed-wire fence in the MDL was 
rusty and had not been replaced due to budget issues. The area with an old-
fashioned fence offered North Korean commandos an opportunity to effectively 
infiltrate South Korea.  
North Korean commandos failed to assassinate South Korean President 
Park Chung Hee. The ROK military which indentified North Korean commandos‟ 
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presence in Seoul carried out anti-guerilla operations and killed 28 commandos.
68
 
Their infiltration, however, was quite successful. Moreover, they created chaos by 
killing 32 South Koreans in the center of the South Korean capital. In this vein, a 
small failure of the routine mission of border guards led to serious damage to the 
military and society of South Korea.  
B. The 1968 Communist Guerillas‟ Infiltration 
     The second case of North Korean infiltration‟s success is the 1968 communist 
guerillas‟ infiltration. On October 30, 1968, 120 North Korean communist 
guerrillas successfully infiltrated in east coast villages – Uljin and Samcheok – of 
South Korea. It was the largest size of infiltration after the Korean War.
69
 Their 
infiltration was intended to determine whether guerilla activities were possible in 
South Korea.     
North Korean guerillas infiltrated those areas via a coastal route at 
nighttime. They recognized that this coastal line was optimal for infiltration 
because of lack of difference in tides between morning and evening.
70
 They 
entered into local villages in infiltrated areas and tried to educate South Korean 
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village residents with communist ideology. They also forced them to join the 
guerilla groups and encouraged social uprising in South Korea.
71
  
The ROK Army was responsible for border security in those areas which 
was its routine work. The 38th Division was in charge of Samcheok and 36th 
Division was in charge of Uljin. In a situation where specific areas of 
responsibility were designated like the above, the 36th Division did not dispatch 
patrol troops on that day. The absence of patrol forces served as a chance for 
infiltration. The first team, which was composed of 30 guerillas, successfully 
infiltrated in Uljin on October 30, 1968, following the other two successful 
infiltrations.
72
 Captured guerillas said that there were no barriers to infiltrate those 
areas.
73
  
Only a small number of South Korean soldiers patrolled there. What 
happened was that even they lacked the desire and capability to carry out their 
border security missions. One patrol soldier saw four rubber boats approaching 
the shore on November 2, 1968, but he left the station out of fear without 
reporting this incident.
74
 This soldier‟s performance was totally opposite to South 
Korean soldiers in Vietnam. In 1968, South Korean soldiers were recognized as 
the most brave and loyal soldiers on the Vietnamese battleground. Only after one 
of Uljin residents reported the infiltration of communist guerillas on November 3, 
1968, did the ROK military identify their appearance in South Korea.  
                                                 
71
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The ROK military, which recognized guerillas‟ activities after the civilian‟s 
report, then massively carried out irregular operations. However, anti-guerilla 
operations were not easy because those areas were surrounded by mountains. 
Thus, this operation lasted for about two months. The ROK military killed 107 
guerillas and captured 7 guerillas. However, the action also caused serious 
damage. 52 South Korean soldiers were killed and 30 civilians were killed. This 
operation was considered a failure, considering that the operational areas were in 
South Korea where guerillas‟ military activities were extremely difficult. 
Moreover, the fact that communist guerillas were easily able to infiltrate was 
more problematic because it meant the failure of the mission given to border 
guards. As a result, two South Korean officers and soldiers were sent to court 
martial due to their negligence in border security and troop preparedness.
75
 It was 
the same year that the ROK COIN forces achieved a remarkable success in 
Vietnam, and by doing so, many soldiers were awarded medals.  
C. The 1976 Axe Murder Incident 
The last case that I examine in terms of within-case variation is the 1976 Ax 
Murder Incident. The Joint Security Area (JSA), Panmunjeon, is the only area in 
the DMZ where South and North Korean soldiers carry out security missions 
together. Two opposite sides of soldiers stand face-to-face in close proximity. 
South Korean soldiers and American soldiers had been responsible for the JSA of 
the South Korean side under the U.S. command ever since the Korean War (The 
ROK military, however, has been in command of the JSA since 2004).  
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On August 8, 1976, North Korean security guards attacked a South Korean-
American security party that was trimming a big tree in the JSA with axes and 
pickaxes. South Korean-American soldiers were perplexed by a sudden 
provocative attack. Two American officers – JSF company commander Capt. 
Bonifas and Lt. Barret – were killed and 8 other soldiers were injured.76 South 
Korean President Park harshly criticized North Korea while saying that “a stick is 
effective to deal with crazy dogs.”77 This incident also made the U.S. consider the 
option of bombing North Korea. However, U.S. President Ford finally decided a 
soft option which was to chop down the tree. The action to remove the tree was 
carried out under Operation Paul Bunyan.
78
  
The JSA is a most critical area because the opposite sides‟ soldiers confront 
each other every day. It can serve as a powder keg at any time. However, security 
guard missions were South Korean and American‟s routine work. They were less 
conscious of the potential for North Korean guards‟ provocative attacks. Thus, 
South Korean security guards allowed North Korean guards to easily conduct 
inhumane attacks at them. North Korea should be blamed the most for this 
tragedy. At the same time, the routine nature of the security mission at the JSA 
made South Korean and American soldiers less alert in a dangerous military area.  
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The above three cases show that routine missions often end in failure 
because soldiers in charge tend to be less alert and able to accomplish their 
missions. Similarly, soldiers who are responsible for routine work, such as border 
security, also face repetition fatigue. Thus, infiltration or provocative attack was 
not that difficult from the perspective of North Korean infiltrators. These 
examples are cases of mission failure – a dependent variable – caused by a lack of 
enthusiasm and capability. More importantly, their low degree of morale and 
capability sprang from the nature of the missions – routine work – not the kinds of 
missions that lead to national prestige.  
Accordingly, these cases show how significantly the type of mission affects 
the outcome. Highly important and crucially unusual missions create enthusiasm 
and generate capability. Additionally, when COIN forces are at an advantage due 
to their political and socio-cultural positions, their mission success becomes 
synergistic. This was what the ROK COIN forces did well in Vietnam and Iraq.  
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CHAPTER 3 THE ROK MILITARY’S COIN IN VIETNAM 
I. Overview 
The Vietnam War, like most wars, started as a conventional campaign in 
the sense that two big opposite groups supporting different states fought against 
each other. One group – the United States and SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty 
Organization) – sided with the government of South Vietnam, whereas the 
opposition – communist allies – backed communist North Vietnam. However, the 
nature of the Vietnam conflict became anti-guerilla warfare or COIN over time.  
One of the reasons American forces entered the Vietnamese battleground in 
1961 was to deter the Communist Domino Effect in Vietnam. The battleground 
situation, however, entered upon a new phase, so-called COIN, due to the strong 
emergence of the Viet Cong, which focused on guerrilla warfare. The United 
States fought against the Viet Cong with a conventional-power approach from the 
beginning: less so for the U.S. which used conventional tactics and massive 
technological firepower. By and large, the U.S. forces‟ remedy ended in failure. 
COIN led by the United States was unsuccessful in the sense that the United 
States withdrew its troops from the battleground in 1973, and the North 
Vietnamese army seized Saigon in 1975.  
In addition to the U.S., seven countries, including the Republic of Korea, 
Australia, and Spain, participated in the Vietnam War under the slogan of “More 
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Flags to Vietnam” (see Table 9).79 They responded to President Johnson‟s request 
for the participation of “the nations of the Free World.”80  
Table 9 
Countries of COIN Coalition Forces in Vietnam 
Year 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 
US 17,200 161,100 388,568 497,498 548,383 475,678 344,674 156,975 29,655 
ROK 140 20,541 45,605 48,839 49,869 49,755 48,512 45,694 37,438 
Australia 200 1,557 4,525 6,818 7,661 7,672 6,763 1,816 128 
Thailand 0 16 244 2,205 6,005 11,568 11,568 6,265 38 
Philippine 17 72 2,061 2,020 1,576 189 74 57 49 
New 
Zealand 
30 119 155 534 516 552 441 60 53 
Taiwan 20 20 23 31 29 29 31 31 31 
Spain 0 0 13 13 12 10 7 0 0 
Source: Yong-ho Choi, T„onggyero bon Pet„ŭnam chŏnjaeng kwa Han‟gukkun / Statistics of the 
Vietnam War & ROK Armed Forces (Seoul, The ROK Institute for Military History Compilation, 
2007) 
 
Seoul dispatched the second-largest number of troops – around 320,000 
soldiers for all participating years – to the South Vietnam battlefields, which was 
recognized as an unusual mission. The main units were Army Capital Infantry 
Division (Yellow Tiger/Maeng Ho), 9th Division (White Horse/Baek Ma), and the 
ROK Marine Corps‟ 2nd Brigade (Blue Dragon/Cheongryeong). Table 10 shows 
the South Korean military‟s area of responsibility in this COIN mission.  
Table 10  
South Korean COIN Forces Posts in Vietnam 
Area Forces 
Da Nang 1
st
 Support Group 11
th
 Support Battalion (Sep 19, 1966 – Jan 29, 
                                                 
79
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80
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1972) 
Hoi An The Cheongryeong Brigade (Jan 7, 1968 – Jan 29, 1972) 
Chu Lai The Cheongryeong Brigade (Sep 9, 1966 – Jan 6, 1968) 
Binh Khe The Maeng Ho Armored Regiment (Nov 1, 1965 – Mar, 1973) 
Phu Cat The Maeng Ho 1
st
 Regiment (Nov 1, 1965 – Mar, 1973) 
Qui Nhon The Maeng Ho Division Command Headquarter  
Song Kau The Maeng Ho 26
st
 Regiment (Apr 15, 1966 – Mar, 1973) 
Tui Hoa The Cheongryeong brigade (Dec 26, 1965 – Sep 18, 1966) 
The Baek Ma 28
th
 Regiment 
1
st
 Support Group 12
th
 Support Battalion 
Ninh Hoa The Baek Ma Division Command Headquarter (Sep 1966 – Mar 
1973) 
The Baek Ma 28
th
 Regiment 
Nha Trang Field Command Headquarter, 100
th
 Logistical Support 
Command, 2
nd
 Support Group 
Kam Lan The Cheongryeong Amphibious Group (Oct 9, 1965 – Dec 25, 
1965) 
The Baek Ma 30
th
 Regiment 
Di Ahn The Dove (Bidulgi) Unit (Mar 16, 1965 – Mar, 1973) 
Vung Tau 1
st
 Hospital (Sep 22, 1964 – Mar, 1973) 
Taekwon-do (Korean Martial Art) team 
Ho Chi Minh 
(Saigon) 
ROKFV (Republic of Korea Force in Vietnam) Command 
Headquarters (Oct 20, 1965 – Mar, 1973) 
Navy group/the Baek Gu Squadron (Jul 7, 1965 – Mar, 1973) 
Air Force Support Group/Eun Ma (Jul 1, 1967 – Mar, 1973) 
Source: General Chae, Myong-sin. Pet„ŭnam chŏnjaeng kwa na (The Vietnam War and Me). 
Seoul: Palbokwon, 2006.
81
   
 
The overall strategic failure in Vietnam does mean that all COIN forces 
were unsuccessful at a tactical level. The ROK military fought well against 
Vietnamese insurgents in a situation where South Korea was not a great power 
like the U.S. Thus, the ROK military‟s participation was not only meaningful for 
more flags but also substantive for its role. The first question will focus on how 
the ROK military‟s success in Vietnam can be traced to identify the underlying 
logic of substantive roles.  
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II. The ROK COIN Success in Vietnam 
A. Gaining Security: Strong Control of Assigned Areas 
Since Viet Cong guerillas were dominant in the region, the ROK military 
suppressed their activities with the initial adoption of an enemy-based approach. 
This first phase of control was effective enough to regain security in the assigned 
areas by winning major battles against the NVA and more importantly against the 
Viet Cong (see Table 11). Their forces were in full control of their Area of 
Operation (AOA).
82
 They also were capable in mountainous terrains; they 
controlled an area occupied by two North Vietnamese Army (NVA) battalions 
within a few days on Phu Cat Mountain.
83
 In addition, just three Korean soldiers 
were taken as prisoners of war (POW), even though around 320,000 conducted 
operations against the Viet Cong.
84
 In contrast, during the first phase of operations, 
especially in 1966, the ROK forces‟ capture rate of POWs was highest with 7.0 
per 1000 strength; the U.S. forces ranked second with 4.5 per 1000 strength 
(Thayer, 1977, p. 51).
85
 Due to their remarkable achievements, 266 medals were 
awarded to South Koreans by the U.S., which was the COIN-leading country.
86
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The ROK COIN forces‟ enemy-based approach was highly effective in the first 
phase, and by being so, their effective security control made them favorable to the 
step-by-step introduction of a population-based method in the second phase.  
Table 11 
The Successful Major Battles led by the ROK forces‟ Enemy-based Approach 
Operation code Period Contents 
Maeng Ho 5 
(Maeng Ho) 
Mar 23 – 
26,  
1966 
Massive nighttime infiltration 
* NVA: 331 dead, 287 POWs, weapons captured 
 The ROK forces: 13 dead / The kill ratio: 25:1 
Duc Co battle 
(Maeng Ho) 
August 
8,  
1966 
 
Decentralized operation  
The typical example of effectiveness of company-
led tactical base tactics 
* NVA: 187 dead, 6 POWs, weapons captured
87
 
 The ROK forces: 7 dead / The kill ratio: 27:1 
Maeng Ho 6 
(Maeng Ho) 
Sep 23 –  
Nov. 9, 
1966 
Cave operations (The suppression of Vietcong 
hidden headquarter) in Phuket mountatin 
* Vietcong: 1,161 dead, 518 POWs, weapons 
captured 
  The ROK forces: 30 dead / The kill ratio: 39:1 
Baek Ma 1 
(Baek Ma) 
Jan 21 –  
March 5, 
1967 
Cave operations 
The importance of information by POWs 
* Vietcong: 393 dead, 31 POWs, weapons 
captured 
  The ROK forces: 19 dead / The kill ratio: 21:1 
Tra Binh Dong  
Battle 
(Cheongryeong) 
Feb 14 – 
15, 1967 
Decentralized operation 
The fight between the ROK one company 
Marines (11
th
 company, 294 soldiers) and two 
brigades of NVA (around 2,400 soldiers) 
- The effective company-led tactical base tactics 
* The ROK forces: 15 dead, NVA: 246 dead / The 
kill ratio: 16:1 
* All company soldiers promoted to the upper 
rank. 
Oh Jac Kyo 
(Baek Ma and 
Maeng Ho) 
Mar 8 –  
Apr 18, 
1967 
Centralized operations 
The successful collaboration between two 
divisions 
Keeping the line of supply (Highway one) 
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* Vietcong: 266 dead, 145 POWs / Baek Ma: 19 
dead/The kill ratio: 14: 1 
* Vietcong: 608 dead, 272 POWs / Maeng Ho: 16 
dead/The kill ratio: 38: 1 
Hong Kil Dong 
(Baek Ma and 
Maeng Ho) 
Jul 9 –  
Aug 26, 
1967 
Centralized operations 
The destruction of Vietcong‟s command nerve  
The collaborative operations between two 
divisions 
* Vietcong: 394 dead, 57 POWs, weapons 
captured  
Maeng Ho: 21 dead / The kill ratio: 19: 1 
* Vietcong: 271 dead, 61 POWs, weapons 
captured 
Baek Ma: 9 dead / The kill ratio: 30: 1 
Bo Mul Sun 
(Cheongryeong) 
Jul 14,  
1967 
The collaborative operations between ROK and 
US 
The seizure of massive war supplies * K44 rifle: 
975, K56 rifle: 189, etc 
Mae Hwa 
(Maeng Ho) 
Aug 20 – 
Sep 6,  
1967 
The guarantee of Presidential Election (Sep 3, 
1967) 
The turnout of area under Maeng Ho‟s control: 
90 % of local population 
Source: General Chae, Myong-sin. 2006. Pet„ŭnam chŏnjaeng kwa na / The Vietnam War and Me. 
Seoul: Palbokwon.   
 
The ROK troops under General Chae Myung-Shin, Commander of ROKFV 
(Republic of Korea Force in Vietnam), made remarkable achievements as soon as 
its first major troops arrived on the Vietnamese battleground in 1965. There 
existed four military regions in South Vietnam, and the ROK troops mostly took 
charge of Region II.
88
 The ROK troops shared some operation areas with U.S. 
troops, particularly the U.S. Marines within Region II, but they conducted 
operations independently from U.S. Command. The ROK military stationed its 
command headquarters in Saigon. The marine brigade secured the areas of Hoi 
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An, Chu Lai, Tui Hoa, and Kam Lan, and the one Army division – the Maeng Ho 
– controlled the areas of Binh Khe, Phu Cat, Qui Nhon, and Song Kau.89 The 
marine brigade and army division rapidly started to secure those areas through 
criss-cross searches as soon as they arrived.
90
  
B. Tracing Evaluation of the ROK COIN Success in Vietnam 
Positive evaluations of the ROK military‟s performance in Vietnam can be 
traced through multiple sources: self-evaluation of the ROK forces, American 
military commanders‟ judgment, assessment from the U.S. military, the U.S. 
overall evaluation, South Vietnam‟s evaluation, and civilians‟ accounts by 
reporters.  
General Chae‟s autobiography provides a detailed account of what South 
Korean troops did in Vietnam.
91
 South Korean troops fully separated the local 
Vietnamese from Viet Cong guerillas by tightly controlling their AOA through 
successful battles. South Korean troops captured the highest number of POWs in 
1966 in terms of the number of POWs per 1,000 strength, and few Korean 
soldiers were taken as POWs.
92
 The ROK military‟s pacification project was 
initiated when the ROK COIN forces started to gain physical security in the 
regions.     
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Is self-evaluation of the ROK forces supported by external evaluations? To 
begin with, the U.S. commanders admired South Korean troops‟ achievements in 
Vietnam. The commander of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam 
(MACV), General William Westmoreland, praised the ROK forces‟ achievements 
in Vietnam several times. In a meeting in the summer of 1966, the U.S. Secretary 
of Defense Robert McNamara told the ROK Minister of Defense, Kim Sung-Un, 
that “General Westmoreland praised highly the performance of the Korean troops 
in South Vietnam” and that the ROK troops are dedicated and well-trained.93 In a 
House Conference in 1967, General Westmoreland also evaluated Korean soldiers 
first class warriors.
94
 In a meeting in October 1967, Westmoreland expressed to 
the ROK Prime Minister “his great admiration for the performance of Korean 
soldiers in Vietnam and for their leaders.”95 He “specifically praised General 
Chae and presented the Prime Minister with a highly favorable report on the 
Korean forces which had been prepared by his staff.”96  
In addition to the U.S. military generals, the U.S. military, the leading 
country of the COIN coalition forces in Vietnam, positively evaluated the ROK 
COIN forces as a whole. According to the report on the role of allies in the 
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Vietnam War issued by the U.S. Department of the Army in 1975, the U.S. 
military highly valued Korean troops‟ effectiveness and management in Vietnam, 
which shows that American troops had high opinions of South Korean troops‟ 
performance. The report says that “the Koreans showed remarkable ingenuity in 
handling many of their requirements with a minimum of equipment.”97 It also 
sees South Korean soldiers as highly professional.
98
 Other U.S. military records 
state that South Korean forces were highly effective, particularly in terms of kill 
ratio.
99
 In Vietnam, non-combat troops often had to engage in combat against 
guerillas; even their performance was outstanding. Thus, the American military 
tried to learn from the remarkable performance of even non-combat troops. The 
Dove unit – a non-combat unit – killed 18 guerillas and captured their weapons in 
a single fight with guerillas in 1966.
100
 Impressed by this performance, the 1st 
division commander of the U.S. military praised the South Korean‟s ambush 
tactics and asked the Dove unit to teach his soldiers about South Korean tactics.
101
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Since the ROK soldiers were famous for their remarkable performance in 
Vietnam, the U.S. forces often asked them to come to American areas of 
operations and fight with them. While the ROK forces successfully suppressed the 
Viet Cong in Quy Nhon in 1966 based on their own tactics (company-led tactical 
base), the U.S. forces struggled with fighting against the North Vietnamese Army 
(NVA) in Duc Co around Cambodia. Thus, the U.S. forces asked the ROK forces 
to send South Korean units to Duc Co so that they could fight against the NVA 
with South Korean soldiers. The American forces‟ request was intended to figure 
out whether the ROK forces‟ tactics were effective to fight against a large-unit 
enemy as well as a small-scale guerilla fight.
102
 The 9th company of the 1st armor 
regiment of the Maeng Ho division was outstanding in winning the battle of Duc 
Co.
103
 American General Walker, who was suspicious of South Korean tactics, 
held the hands of South Korean battalion commander Byoung-soo Choi after the 
battle while saying that “you did a great job.”104 As a consequence, this battle led 
American soldiers to evaluate South Korean soldiers more positively, and the U.S. 
forces started to learn the ROK military‟s tactics.  
The U.S. Congress also recognized the remarkable performance of their 
Korean ally in Vietnam. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report 
unusually praises the ROK military‟s performance in Vietnam. When senators 
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asked about the ROK military‟s performance at Binh Dinh in 1972, the U.S. 
military told them that “they had done a good job.”105  
The South Vietnamese government also recognized the remarkable 
performance of the ROK forces. Thus, it asked Seoul to send more troops to 
Vietnam. In a letter sent by the South Vietnam Prime Minister to the South 
Korean Prime Minister on February 14, 1966, he praised the ROK military as 
brave and useful forces.
106
 Surrounded by external assessment, the South Korean 
government also cited the remarkable performance of their forces in Vietnam as a 
reason for additional dispatch in the letter which the South Korean government 
sent to the National Assembly.
107
  
More important, non-governmental sources also verify South Korean 
troops‟ performance. The New York Times, on February 12, 1967, reported the 
ROK military‟s impressive performance, such as the kill ratio of 15 to 1 and 
successful pacification projects.
108
 A more balanced and livelier evaluation on the 
ROK military‟s performance came from Katsuichi Honda, Japanese newspaper 
correspondent of the Ashai Shimbun. He worked as a combat reporter on the 
Vietnamese battleground from 1966 to 1968. By arguing that his eyes are the real 
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data, he said that “on the battleground the ROK Army is undoubtedly the best 
among those foreign armies in Vietnam.”109  
In a nutshell, the ROK military‟s performance in Vietnam was outstanding. 
The ROK military‟s remarkable performance often even made other foreign allies 
jealous of it.
110
 If the ROK military conducted COIN operations effectively, the 
remaining question should be “how?” Exceptional performance by the ROK 
military would not have been feasible if it had not been equipped with an 
enthusiasm and capability for COIN drawn from the nature of a mission crucial 
for national prestige, particularly because it had focused on conventional warfare 
against North Korea‟s regular forces before the deployment.  
III. The Nature of Unusual COIN Mission in Vietnam 
What was the key driver that led to the success of the ROK forces in 
Vietnam? The nature of unusual missions functioned as the key driver. Why was 
the ROK military‟s COIN mission in Vietnam recognized as an unusual task? 
Since the ROK military had focused on national security on the Korean peninsula, 
which was based on fighting against the North Korean army, the overseas mission 
in Vietnam was an extremely rare mission. To be more precise, this was the first 
dispatch of South Korean troops on international ground in modern Korean 
history. A U.S. Army document, Vietnam Studies, recognizes the function of the 
ROK‟s rare mission. It reports that “this [the Vietnam conflict] was one of the few 
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times in Asian history that a Far Eastern nation had gone to the assistance of 
another nation with so many forces.”111 
The special mission of Vietnam COIN was the fundamental driver for the 
ROK forces‟ success, particularly because their missions contributed to national 
prestige. What types of national prestige did its mission success increase? The 
ROK military‟s mission in Vietnam was regarded as highly important to boost 
two axes of national utility: security and economy.
112
 
When it came to security, the North Korean army was looking for an 
opportunity to invade South Korea in the early 1960s. Thus, alliance with the U.S. 
was crucial for South Korea‟s survival. Moreover, military modernization was 
essential to guarantee its security. Seoul recognized that South Korea‟s 
participation would contribute to not only strengthening its alliance with the U.S. 
but also accelerating military modernization. In terms of the economic utility, 
Seoul needed more money and resources to keep developing the South Korean 
economy in the early 1960s. South Korea‟s involvement in Vietnam served as the 
most important chance to obtain financial support from the U.S.  
By the time the South Korean government recognized the importance of the 
dispatch of its forces to Vietnam, it had already begun preparing detailed plans for 
the role of the ROK forces in the Vietnam conflict before President Johnson‟s 
request.
113
 Encouraged by Seoul‟s recognition of the importance of its unusual 
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mission in Vietnam, the ROK military that would represent South Korea saw its 
COIN mission in Vietnam as the most important opportunity to maximize 
national utility, and by doing so, it retained a high degree of enthusiasm for 
mission success. The ROK military‟s high degree of enthusiasm made it possible 
to develop a high capability for COIN by minimizing adaptation costs.  
The nature of an unusual mission drove the ROK soldiers in Vietnam to be 
armed with a high degree of willingness and capability. The enhanced willingness 
and capability functioned as one of the axes of the ROK military‟s success in 
Vietnam.  
IV. The Function of Unusual Mission I: Willingness 
     The ROK military‟s mission in Vietnam was crucially important to maximize 
two utilities (security and economy), leading to national prestige. Thus, a larger 
audience paid attention to the mission success of its military in Vietnam. In a 
similar vein, since South Korean soldiers recognized themselves as 
representatives of the country, they were highly motivated to achieve their 
mission, and by doing so, their motivation enhanced their capability. Their 
recognition of the Vietnam conflict as a crucial mission armed South Korean 
soldiers with national pride and morale. It also made ROK military elites more 
than willing to adapt mission organizations to fight against insurgents. In a similar 
vein, it encouraged the ROK COIN forces to intensively study their Vietnam 
mission trajectory in an effort to guarantee mission success. The ROK COIN 
forces‟ enthusiasm, driven by the importance of the mission, contributed to 
reducing adaptation costs, which are required for COIN, by converting its 
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eagerness to capability more quickly. Above all, key utilities that made South 
Korea regard its mission in Vietnam as important need to be examined.  
 A. Expected and Achieved Utilities of Mission Success 
1. Two Key Utilities 
     The expected utility of mission success can be explained by looking at the 
ROK-U.S. alliance. South Korea‟s participation in its ally‟s war created two 
expected utilities: security utility (the presence of American troops in South 
Korea and South Korean military modernization) and economic utility (economic 
modernization).  
First, the ROK military‟s mission in Vietnam played a key role in 
maximizing security utility. South Korea‟s security was fundamentally based on a 
long-allied relationship between Seoul and Washington. The U.S. government has 
assisted in the development of the ROK military organization since the ROK-U.S. 
Mutual Defense Agreement in 1953. The U.S. government financially supported 
nearly sixty percent of the ROK total military expenditure.
114
 This strong support 
encouraged the ROK military to modernize within ten years after the Korean War, 
before the deployment to Vietnam. More important, under this alliance, both 
militaries shared information and weapons to prepare for the North Korean 
threat.
115
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However, because the U.S. was struggling with an insufficient numbers of 
soldiers in Vietnam, there was a high potential for the U.S. to send its troops 
stationed in South Korea, particularly two divisions, to Vietnam.
116
 A 
memorandum of a conversation between ROK and U.S. officials clearly shows 
that the level of U.S. forces in Korea was a critical issue to determining the 
ROK‟s participation in Vietnam. The memorandum states that “With regard to the 
level of U.S. forces in Korea, […] the U.S. cannot undertake to make a precise, 
open-ended commitment. [And] we cannot say that we will keep any specific 
number of troops for any specific period of time.”117 
What made matters worse was that in 1964, when the first South Korean 
troops were sent to Vietnam, North Korea was stepping up its effort to invade 
South Korea. Thus, the ROK military‟s participation in the Vietnam conflict 
allowed the U.S. to guarantee the presence of American troops in South Korea. 
The ROK military‟s participation in the Vietnam conflict also accelerated 
its military modernization. Several documents clearly show how much Seoul paid 
attention to military modernization during the Vietnam War. Seoul believed that 
military modernization was very effective to cope with Viet Cong insurgency as 
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well as to deter North Korea‟s provocative attacks in the future. In this vein, the 
Vietnam War offered an opportunity to promote the learning process and achieve 
military modernization. In an official talk between U.S. Secretary of Defense 
McNamara and ROK Minster of National Defense Kim on May 18, 1965, the two 
military representatives discussed military assistance and the military transfer 
program.
118
  
A memorandum from Assistant Secretary of Defense John McNaughton 
also shows that Ambassador Brown supported the ROK‟s military modernization 
request, including the provision for additional packages (e.g., six 155 mm 
howitzers and one assault transport ship).
119
 The memorandum from the 
President‟s Special Assistant McGeorge Bundy implies that the U.S. loan offer 
for military modernization allowed another Korean brigade go to Vietnam.
120
 In 
1966, the Washington Post also reported that the U.S. plans to invest millions for 
the ROK‟s military modernization.121 The Brown Memorandum of March 4, 1966 
detailed the U.S. military and economic assistance.
122
 The Memorandum states 
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ten items for military assistance and six items for economic assistance.
123
 One 
item shows that military assistance aims to “provide over the next few years 
substantial items of equipment for the modernization of Republic of Korea 
forces.”124  
The ROK military‟s modernization was accelerated by the ROK forces‟ 
participation in the Vietnam conflict, and by doing so, it served as a stepping 
stone for military industrial infrastructure building. South Korea started making 
M-16 rifles in 1972 and a variety of guns in 1977.
125
 Although the ROK soldiers 
used the M-1 rifle before the Vietnam conflict, all soldiers were armed with M-
16s in 1975.
126
 In a similar vein, military spending was increased so that the ROK 
military was more capable of maintaining national security against the North 
Korean army. The ROK‟s military budget was 23 billion won in 1965, whereas it 
was 127 billion won in 1971.
127
 A paper prepared by the Policy Planning Council 
of the Department of State dated June 15, 1968 states that “The return of the ROK 
forces from Viet-Nam will open the way to a strengthening and restructuring of 
the ROK military.”128 
                                                 
123
 Frank Baldwin, “America‟s Rented Troops: South Koreans In Vietnam,” 
Critical Asian Studies 7 (October-December 1975), 36-7; The Vietnam War and 
the ROK Forces, http://www.vietnamwar.co.kr/hall2-04(blw).htm (Accessed 
March 4, 2010).  
124
 Ibid.  
125
 Choi, Statistics of the Vietnam War & ROK Armed Forces, 145.  
126
 The ROK Institute for Military History Compilation, The Vietnam War and the  
ROK forces through memoir 3, 772.  
127
 Choi, Statistics of the Vietnam War & ROK Armed Forces, 148.  
128
 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, 
434. 
  77 
Moreover, when the ROK COIN fighters returned to their homeland, they 
played a key role in modernizing and reforming their military organization. The 
U.S. also noticed the positive impact of the South Korean military‟s experience in 
Vietnam on its own military development against the North Korean Army.  
Second, the ROK military‟s mission in Vietnam also played a crucial role 
in maximizing economic utility. The Vietnam War provided South Korea with an 
opportunity for economic growth as well as military modernization.
129
 In 1966, 
the Los Angeles Times stated that “the direct and indirect economic benefits South 
Korea is receiving as a result of the Vietnam conflict will grow.”130  
South Korean society was struggling with economic poverty nationwide in 
the 1960s. The term of Poritkogae was used to reflect the yearly food shortage 
during the spring austerity (May-June).
131
 Economic development was not a 
matter of prosperity but of survival for South Koreans. South Korean soldiers 
recognized how important their mission was for revitalizing the national economy. 
In an attempt to maximize economic utility, South Korean political leaders tried 
to increase their negotiation power with this opportunity created by the dispatch 
of South Korean soldiers to Vietnam.  
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ROK President Park requested U.S. President Johnson‟s commitment to 
massive economic assistance in exchange for deploying South Korean troops to 
Vietnam and increasing their numbers. President Park visited Washington on May 
17, 1965 to secure President Johnson‟s promise. A memorandum from James C. 
Thomson of the National Security Council Staff stated that “The Koreans have 
wanted a very specific commitment from us to maintain our forces in Korea at 
their present level.”132 It also mentioned that “Park will want all the reassurance 
we can give him on our continued economic support. We propose to include in 
the communiqué a general aid pledge: to finance Korea‟s essential imports, to 
make available $150 million in development loan [  ].”133 In the summit meeting 
on May 17, 1965, President Johnson said to President Park that “the U.S. planned 
to extend all possible aid to Korea. It planned to keep its troops there [and] the 
U.S. would finance essential imports and development loans, technical assistance, 
and food for peace.”134  
Interestingly enough, because of the ROK forces‟ remarkable performance 
in Vietnam, Seoul‟s efforts to seek more economic utility from the U.S. became 
easier. The ROK COIN forces, which began their mission as symbolic players in 
1964, became substantive players through successfully securing areas assigned to 
them as time went by. The ROK COIN forces became substantive players in 
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Vietnam particularly due to a fast adaptation tempo – lower adaptation costs – 
driven by the ROK military‟s enthusiasm and related capability. Consequently, 
the U.S. requested another larger dispatch of South Korean troops, who fought 
well. Impressed by the remarkable success of the ROK troops, Washington and 
the South Vietnamese government officially requested the dispatch of one more 
division from Seoul on February 22, 1966.
135
 The U.S. commitment to financial 
support was strengthened through subsequent dispatches. What is implied here is 
that the ROK soldiers, as substantive players, contributed to maximizing 
economic utility. U.S. economic aid contributed to the ROK‟s fast economic 
growth during and after the Vietnam War. ROK GNP per capita increased from 
79 dollars in 1960 to 1,011 dollars in 1977.
136
 Five billion dollars were imported 
to South Korea through South Korean companies, which went to the Vietnamese 
market, military aid, and other byproducts.
137
 This foreign dollar currency was 
used to intensively develop the domestic economy. Per capita income of North 
Korea at this time was 153 dollars, higher than in South Korea, which was 103 
dollars.
138
 However, starting in 1969, the per capita income of South Korea 
overtook that of North Korea.
139
  
Moreover, the economic development achieved under this rare opportunity 
contributed to Seoul‟s emergence as a middle power, and by doing so, South 
Korea started to draw attention to international security beyond national security 
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on the Korean peninsula. Ultimately, the ROK military‟s mission in Iraq was the 
result of this trajectory.  
The ROK‟s participation in the Vietnam conflict offered an opportunity for 
the growth of its national strength by achieving security and economic utilities. 
Thus, the South Korean government was proud of its soldiers‟ achievements. 
When President Park announced the withdrawal of its military on January 24, 
1973, he stated that “the original mission of the Korean troops has been 
accomplished.”140 Since these two national utilities were expected to be achieved 
from the beginning, South Korean soldiers were enthusiastic about their mission 
in Vietnam. In a similar vein, they recognized themselves as key players in 
increasing ROK national prestige. General Chae stated in a memoir in 1969 that 
the ROK forces‟ role in Vietnam made the nation stronger and increased national 
prestige in the international arena.
141
  
2. International Political Utility 
Also important is that these two utilities contributed to South Korea‟s 
increased role in international politics. Before the Vietnam conflict, South Korea 
seldom enjoyed the international arena and instead clung to the Korean peninsula, 
particularly in terms of security and political issues. These two utilities, which 
were achieved through South Koreans‟ remarkable Vietnam role, gave South 
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Korea an opportunity to gradually rise as a middle power in the international 
environment. South Korea hosted the 1st Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC) in 
Seoul on June 14, 1966. The 1st ASPAC, in which foreign ministers from ten 
countries participated, was intended to promote peace, liberty, and prosperity in 
the Asia-Pacific region.
142
 It permitted South Korea to see beyond the Korean 
peninsula in the sense that South Korea played a leading role in establishing and 
managing this council. Thus, the ASPAC can be an example of how national 
prestige was enhanced from the ROK military‟s mission.  
How South Korea had been recognized by participating in the Vietnam 
conflict can also be traced by the increase in communication between South 
Korea and the United States. The U.S. Department of State Foreign Relations of 
the United States serie is a collection of governmental documents. The increase of 
communication on a governmental level can be traced by comparing three 
publications that deal with Korea based on the periods: 1958-1960 (title: Japan; 
Korea), 1961-1963 (title: Northeast Asia), and 1964-1968 (title: Korea). In the 
1958-1960 period, South Korea played a small role in international affairs and 
instead heavily focused on domestic affairs.
143
 The Foreign Relations of the 
United States in this period dealt with the sections on South Korea and Japan 
together. Similarly, in the 1961-63 period, the U.S. Department of State published 
The Foreign Relations of the United States and included Korea in the volume of 
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Northeast Asia.
144
 However, in the 1964-68 period, The Foreign Relations of the 
United States published an entire volume dedicated to Korea.
145
 Since South 
Korea dispatched its troops to Vietnam, its voice could not be marginalized any 
longer, not only in the bilateral relations arena but also in the international arena. 
Thus, governmental officials discussed several issues more intensively and 
produced many governmental documents.  
In this vein, South Korea achieved international political utility as well 
through its troops‟ mission in Vietnam. The U.S. failed to achieve international 
political gain because it withdrew its troops without success, whereas the ROK 
maximized international political gain by participating in the Vietnam conflict and 
winning a variety of battles.  
B. National Pride and Morale 
1. Mission and Pride 
         Since South Korean soldiers were aware of the importance of their mission 
in Vietnam related to the aforementioned utilities, their morale and pride were 
extremely high. The U.S. military recognized the function of national pride in 
mission success. A U.S. Army document, Vietnam Studies, reports that “Many 
observers felt […] that, as a nation, the Koreans must succeed for the sake of their 
home country.”146  
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In addition, South Korea had relied on the U.S. for its security since the 
Korean War. The ROK military had been assisted by the U.S. military in terms of 
organizational development and military leadership. Thus, South Korean soldiers 
also saw their mission success as an opportunity to show the world that South 
Korea had an organized military that was both independent and strong. Vietnam 
Studies states that “the Vietnam War was an opportunity to show that Koreans 
could operate on their own without American forces or advisers looking over their 
shoulders.”147  
South Korean veterans who went to Vietnam recollect their strong pride. 
Military veteran Dae-myung Choi, who served in the headquarters of the ROKFV 
in 1967, states that since the ROK military‟s mission was its first overseas 
deployment, soldiers recognized their mission in Vietnam with a great honor.
148
 
Another veteran, Duk-gon Lee, who served as a search company commander, 
mentions that all of their company soldiers thought of themselves as diplomats as 
well as combatants who enhanced national prestige.
149
  
That South Korean soldiers maintained strong pride can be noted by a high 
volunteer rate. The 9th commander of the 1st regiment, Youn-il Yong, noted in 
1966 that 98 percent of his company soldiers volunteered to participate in the 
mission in Vietnam, and that high rate was based on their patriotism and the 
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importance of the mission to the nation.
150
 Marine veteran Eung-se Kim, who 
served in the personnel department in the Cheongryeong brigade, states that the 
volunteer rate of the artillery battalion was 100 percent.
151
 
Soldiers‟ morale is critically important because it is directly related to their 
will to fight. Thus, high morale leads to success. South Korean veteran Kyung-jin 
Jung, who won the Tra Binh Dong battle, states that he was convinced that his 
company could win battles because his company soldiers‟ morale was higher than 
his enemies‟.152 In particular, morale is more crucial for COIN success because 
COIN mostly relies on small unit operations, and it requires patience. ROK 
soldiers‟ morale was high because of their pride about their mission. For example, 
the ROK Marines wanted to fight with the enemy as soon as possible when there 
were no combat missions.
153
 Put simply, South Korean soldiers‟ morale was 
already high before their dispatch, and their morale remained high until the U.S. 
discussed its troops‟ withdrawal.  
In many ways, soldiers‟ high morale led to the COIN success in Vietnam. 
Military veteran Sung-sik Choi recollects that morale was the secret of mission 
success.
154
 One explanation is that soldiers‟ high morale was converted to their 
patience in guerilla warfare. South Korean soldiers‟ pride and high morale made 
them patient enough when fighting with Viet Cong guerillas. General Chae states 
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that while American soldiers stopped fighting against Viet Cong guerillas when it 
became dark, South Korean soldiers patiently stayed in one area even for a week 
to catch Viet Cong guerillas.
155
 
In addition, high morale made all soldiers enthusiastic fighters regardless of 
their duties (combat fighters or non-combat fighters). Since soldiers‟ morale was 
very high across units, even non-combat soldiers sometimes wanted to participate 
in combat missions. Sa-yeon Park, who was a medic soldier in the Maeng Ho 
division, voluntarily participated in combat in Chanh Ly in 1966.
156
 Surprisingly, 
he killed seven guerillas and captured 11 attackers in the combat operations.
157
  
The other function of morale had something to do with bravery of fighters. 
COIN fighters have to fight against ideologically and spiritually strong guerillas 
who sometimes use brinkmanship-led tactics, and thus COIN fighters have to be 
brave enough to deal with guerillas: without bravery, there is no triumph in 
guerilla warfare. The ROK fighters, encouraged by national pride and high 
morale, were brave enough to fight against Viet Cong guerillas. The junior 
officers‟ role model of bravery helped soldiers to be brave. The ROK officers 
were very brave because they were selected officers. For example, when Captain 
In-ho Lee, who was the Marine intelligence officer, saw the Viet Cong throw a 
hand grenade during a cave search operation, he caught it with his body and was 
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killed while saying “it is hand grenade! Stay away!”158 Junior officers‟ bravery 
played a role in inspiring non-commissioned officers to be brave. The Marine 
division commander, Young-jong Lee, who captured seven guerillas with his 
soldiers and was awarded a war medal, recollects that his division was able to 
successfully carry out its mission because his soldiers were brave enough to get 
close to the guerillas.
159
  
2. Efforts to Maintain Morale 
Although South Korean soldiers‟ morale remained high, the South Korean 
government and the ROK military paid tremendous attention to maintaining 
soldiers‟ pride and morale because of the different nature of conflict in Vietnam, 
which was unconventional fighting. Two methods were employed: material, and 
non-material.  
First, the South Korean government focused on material elements to 
maintain soldiers‟ morale. The South Korean government maintained soldiers‟ 
morale by increasing their compensation and allowance. On May 18, 1965, the 
ROK Minister of National Defense Kim asked the U.S. government to give Seoul 
enough money for “adequate pensions and death benefits for Korean casualties in 
SVN.”160 Seoul also asked Washington to increase overseas allowance for the 
ROK military in 1966.
161
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Washington positively responded to the ROK military‟s continued request 
to increase its soldiers‟ morale. In a meeting in the summer of 1966, the ROK 
Minister of Defense expressed appreciation for the efforts of the U.S. Secretary of 
Defense McNamara to enhance the morale of the ROK forces in Vietnam.
162
 
National and military leaders‟ concern for soldiers‟ morale helped sustain already-
well-disciplined troops. Seen in this light, there was a huge gap between South 
Korean and American troops vis-à-vis their will to fight, morale, and 
organizational strength. An old woman in the town of Song-Cau said to a reporter 
that “The ROK soldiers are strong and well-disciplined, but the Americans are not 
so strong and they are often beaten by the NLF; they are loose and dangerous for 
us, though they are generous with their money and pay me well.”163   
Second, the ROK COIN leaders focused on non-material elements to keep 
up soldiers‟ pride. The ROK military started to recognize that it would take harder 
work and longer engagement to conduct guerilla warfare than it had calculated. 
Thus, Korean military leaders continued to make encouraging statements. They 
urged Korean soldiers to take pride in themselves about their missions and 
recognize themselves as “freedom crusaders,” not “mercenaries.”164 The ROK 
military leaders also treated dead bodies with honor in their attempt to maintain 
soldiers‟ high morale. In the Operation: Maeng Ho Five in March 1966, the ROK 
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forces sent the 3rd and 11th companies to the center of an enemy field to retrieve 
dead bodies of South Korean soldiers.
165
  
South Korean commanders also tried to give their soldiers time to relax and 
reenergize after battles. They recognized that since COIN would require harder 
and longer engagements, soldiers‟ tension and fatigue needed to be carefully 
managed in order to maintain their high morale. Accordingly, the COIN forces 
established facilities to overcome warfare fatigue on a regiment unit basis. A total 
of 9 facilities were established in areas assigned to South Korean COIN forces.
166
 
Moreover, the ROK COIN forces gave distinguished officers opportunities to 
have their vacations outside of battlegrounds, such as in Thailand and Taiwan. A 
total of 3,323 soldiers benefitted from these opportunities.
167
 This program 
continued to encourage soldiers to fight harder through positive competition. A 
military veteran, the 26th regiment commander Jong-lim Lee, notes that vacation 
facilities helped soldiers recharge their morale and energy.
168
 He further states 
that the resting facilities offered a place for a post-combat discussion where 
soldiers could share lessons learned on the battleground in a relaxing environment, 
which led to continuous success in Vietnam.
169
 
In a nutshell, the crucial nature of the mission in Vietnam allowed South 
Korean soldiers to maintain high morale. At the same time, military leaders and 
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the South Korean government made a tremendous effort to sustain that high 
morale. Consequently, South Korean soldiers, armed with high morale, fought 
harder to increase their national prestige.  
Indicative of this high morale is that some wounded soldiers voluntarily 
went back to their units. For example, a platoon commander, Chang-soo Lee, was 
shot and injured during the Operation: Maeng Ho Six in 1966 and then was sent 
to a field hospital.
170
 Despite the doctor‟s persuasion to stay in the hospital, he 
voluntarily went back to his unit after staying in the hospital only for 15 days. 
This high level of pride and morale enhanced the ROK forces‟ COIN capabilities 
as time went by, confirming hypothesis 1A.  
C. Enthusiasm for Its Own OPCON and Flexible Organization 
     The ROK military‟s mission success can also be traced by its tremendous 
attention to authority of operational control (OPCON) and its eagerness to adapt 
mission organization.  
Independent OPCON was important to ROK forces because ROK military 
elites did not want to merely participate; they wanted to win their mission. 
However, the U.S. military took its authority of OPCON for granted for two 
reasons.
171
 First, the U.S. military had OPCON for all military operations in South 
Korea. Second, the U.S. military saw unity of OPCON as natural for military 
effectiveness.  
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However, the ROK COIN leaders, who saw the failure of the U.S. forces in 
Vietnam, wanted their own OPCON. South Korean troops tried to avoid U.S. 
command tactics based on conventional warfare. General Chae sought to have an 
individual OPCON, independent from the American forces, because he had a 
skeptical view about the American forces‟ conventional tactics, “Search and 
Destroy.”172 Nevertheless, the American forces insisted on keeping the ROK 
forces under their control based on Unity of Command.
173
 The U.S. military 
commander pushed the ROK military division to “Search and Destroy” operations 
outside its sector.
174
 When the New York Times interviewed one Korean soldier, 
he said that “You Americans move too fast and have to come back to the same 
place again and again to fight the enemy” by implementing Search and Destroy 
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operations.
175
 Skeptical of these operations, General Chae kept asking for South 
Korean troops‟ own OPCON independent from the U.S. command, and in doing 
so, for his own authority for Korean troops‟ area of responsibility.176  
General Chae saw independent OPCON as necessary for COIN mission 
success in Vietnam. However, his insistence gave rise to some friction between 
the ROK military and the U.S. military. Vietnam Studies states that “There was a 
certain amount of confusion […] as to whether the Korean force in South 
Vietnam would actually come directly under US operational control or whether it 
would be a distinct fighting force working in close co-ordination with the other 
allies but under separate control.”177     
Despite this friction, the ROK military insisted on authority of OPCON by 
making logical arguments. One reason the ROK military pointed out was that 
South Korea should show the world that South Korean soldiers were not 
mercenaries under the command of the U.S. military, but voluntary assistants who 
were willing to help their neighbor.
178
 General Chae told American generals that 
if the ROK military was under the authority of the U.S. military, it would be 
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caught in a trap set by communist groups.
179
 He argued that communist countries 
would criticize the ROK forces as mercenaries who went to Vietnam to make 
money, and if that happens, the justification for South Korea‟s participation in 
Vietnam could be weakened, leading to the failure of psychological warfare.
180
 
His logical explanation finally persuaded American generals, and by doing so, the 
ROK COIN forces got their own OPCON.  
The underlying intention of the ROK forces to maintain independent 
OPCON was that if they have their own OPCON, they would be able to conduct 
operations aimed at increasing national prestige, leading to COIN success. 
General Son Hui-sun who served as a planner for dispatching South Korean 
troops in 1965, states that the ROK military‟s own operational control was crucial 
for operations based on national interest.
181
 Moreover, the ROK military was able 
to minimize its casualties under its own independent OPCON because the ROK 
adapted tactics for COIN. Five thousands South Korean soldier were killed over 8 
years, which was a relatively small number of deaths considering the harsh 
battleground. General Se-ho Lee, who went to Vietnam as the head of the liaison 
group, states that if the ROK forces had not maintained their own OPCON, ten 
times as many soldiers might have been killed in the same period.
182
  
The ROK COIN forces‟ insistence in OPCON clearly shows that the ROK 
soldiers did not simply participate in the Vietnam conflict, but played a 
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substantial role in helping their neighbor and making progress in the Vietnam 
COIN. Similarly, their persistence implies their willingness to successfully 
accomplish their mission abroad. In a nutshell, both two national utilities and an 
international political utility were expected by the South Korean government, the 
people, and the military. Thus, South Korean soldiers fought harder. Furthermore, 
they fought better through an independent OPCON and by making the 
organization flexible for the Vietnam mission‟s success, confirming hypothesis 
1B.  
D. Mission Study toward Mission Success 
           The ROK military success in Vietnam can also be traced by its level of 
mission study. Firstly, the ROK military spent a lot of time studying COIN-
based historical lessons. The ROK military concentrated on other militaries‟ 
historical cases in COIN before the deployment. The British Army implemented 
effective COIN in Malaya through fast learning tempo thanks to its flexible 
organizational culture, whereas the American Army decreased learning tempo 
due to its very conventional-oriented organizational culture.
183
 The British 
success in Malaya serves as the most common example of military organization 
culture determining the learning tempo. The ROK military deeply examined the 
secret of British troops‟ success in Malaya to learn from other forces‟ 
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experiences. Similarly, military analysts argued that American troops fought in 
Vietnam in the same way that they had fought in World War II.
184
 
Secondly, in addition to historical studies, the ROK military also 
intensively studied the upcoming mission in Vietnam.
185
 In particular, its 
upcoming mission study can be noted by examining several steps toward mission 
adaptation: a battleground study by a military advisory group, the dispatch of a 
non-combat unit as the first force in Vietnam, and the dispatch of major combat 
forces (see Table 12). The step-by-step dispatch was intended to minimize 
adaptation costs by familiarizing the ROK military with battleground situations.  
         First of all, the ROK military sent a military advisory group to Vietnam in 
its attempt to examine political, military, and societal situations in South Vietnam 
on May 11, 1962. The military advisory group was led by two-star general Sim 
Heuong-sun and was composed of 15 members.
186
 This preliminary examination 
contributed to reducing adaptation costs when substantive troops arrived on the 
Vietnamese battleground.  
Table 12 
The Step-by-step Dispatch to Minimize Adaptation costs in Vietnam 
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Mission Steps Adaptation Pace Dispatched Units 
The first step Initial mission 
study 
Military advisory groups (May 1962) 
: 15 officers 
The second 
step 
Non-combat 
troops 
A. The first dispatch (September 1964) 
Mobile Army Surgical Hospital: 130 
soldiers 
Taekwondo team: 10 instructors 
B. The second dispatch: The Dove Unit 
(March 1965) 
An Army engineer battalion/transport 
company 
A Marine engineer company 
A security battalion 
One Navy LST with crew 
* Troop size: 2,000 
The third step Combat troops A. The third dispatch: October 1965 
An Army division (Maeng Ho) 
A Marine brigade (Cheongryeong) 
B. The fourth dispatch 
An Army 26th regiment: April 1966 
An Army division (Baek Ma): October 
1966 
* Troop size of A and B: 50,000 
C. The fifth dispatch: July 1967 
* Troop size: 2,963 
Sources: The Vietnam War and the ROK Forces (http://www.vietnamwar.co.kr), Choi, Statistics 
of the Vietnam War & ROK Armed Forces, and U.S. Department of the Army, Vietnam Studies: 
Allied Participation in Vietnam. 
 
The second step was intended to make the Vietnamese see the ROK forces 
as friendly soldiers, not occupiers, by dispatching non-combat troops. The 
dispatch of a non-combat unit was intended to begin preliminary planning for 
large scale combat forces‟ participation.187 For example, although a Marine 
engineer company was dispatched to Vietnam in the second step, the ROK 
Marine headquarters expected the dispatch of combat troops, and thus, it was 
already preparing for combat missions by devising the plan for combat troops‟ 
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dispatch in May 1965.
188
 These intentions contributed to reducing adaptation 
costs by giving South Korean troops time required for comprehensive preparation 
before a large-scale engagement. The second step was initiated by dispatching a 
Korean Mobile Army Hospital and Taekwondo (Korean martial art) instructors to 
Vietnam. The Vietnamese preferred South Korean hospitals because of a 
similarity of South Korean hospital personnel‟s appearance, which was one of the 
advantages for South Korean troops to carry out COIN operations in Vietnam.
189
 
There were American and Australian hospitals in addition to the South Korean 
hospital in Vung Tau, but more residents wanted to go to the South Korean 
hospital. Lieutenant Moon, who served in the South Korean hospital, states that 
more than 60 percent of local residents liked South Koreans when his troops 
arrived at Vung Tau.
190
 Experiences from a Korean Mobile Army Hospital 
offered a very important opportunity for later success of COIN.
191
  
The second step was completed by dispatching the Dove Unit, which was 
mostly composed of engineering groups. The title of this unit was chosen because 
the dove symbolizes peace.
192
 Similar to the first dispatch, the title of the Dove 
Unit was intended to encourage the Vietnamese to see Korean troops as helpers, 
not occupiers. This unit constructed roads and buildings around Saigon. The Dove 
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unit was quite successful at making the local population see South Koreans as 
their friends. When the Dove unit soldiers visited villages, residents often sang 
Korean songs, such as Arirang, for them.
193
 The Dove unit‟s activities facilitated 
the subsequent combat troops‟ acceptance.  
The ROK military, after completing the second adaptation, started sending 
its combat troops to Vietnam. The third step was initiated by dispatching the best 
army division and Marine brigade to Vietnam. The ROK COIN forces, which 
fully adapted to battleground situations, allowed the ROK combat forces to secure 
areas assigned to them within a relatively short time. Moreover, the success of 
major combat groups led to another larger dispatch of a combat division, the Baek 
Ma. The ROK COIN forces had become a corps-size unified but flexible 
organization in 1966 through the gradual process of adaptation to the Vietnamese 
battleground.  
The ROK military‟s careful study allowed its forces to engage in COIN 
missions in Vietnam step-by-step, confirming hypothesis 1B. Hun-sub Lee, who 
served as a forward party leader in 1964, states that the ROK forces were able to 
achieve a successful outcome because non-combat troops laid a foundation for the 
upcoming combat troops.
194
 In this vein, the secret of the ROK military‟s success 
in Vietnam was driven by step-by-step adaptation for the mission. The ROK 
COIN forces, which were constructed under thoughtful readiness, became the 
most optimal troops for COIN in Vietnam. In 1966, the ROK COIN forces had 
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the best organization, which was able to conduct both enemy-based and 
population-based operations.  
I have examined four features connected to the ROK military‟s willingness 
for COIN mission success in Vietnam. COIN mission in Vietnam was a crucial 
mission for the whole nation to achieve expected utilities, leading to 
maximization of national prestige. Thus, South Korean soldiers in Vietnam were 
armed with high morale and fought harder and better with a high degree of 
organizational flexibility and mission study, which confirms hypothesis 1.  
V. The Function of Unusual Mission II: Capability 
         The aforementioned commitment to success was converted into capability 
by allowing the ROK COIN forces to choose the appropriate COIN approach 
against enemies in Vietnam. It also made it possible for mission organization to 
be flexible so that the ROK military was able to increase its capacity to deal with 
irregular operations. The ROK military‟s commitment to mission success also 
contributed to the cultivation of best units/soldiers for the mission.  
A. A COIN Approach Adoption 
1. The Initial Adoption of an Enemy-based Approach 
The military advisory group responsible for the first step of adaptation 
contributed to the initial adoption of an enemy-centered approach for the ROK 
military‟s COIN mission in Vietnam. This group recognized the Viet Cong 
insurgents‟ dominance on the Vietnamese battlefield, and by doing so, it 
encouraged the ROK COIN forces to adopt an enemy-focused approach in the 
first phase. The reason why the ROK COIN forces adopted an enemy-based 
  99 
remedy in the initial phase was because it was extremely difficult and ineffective 
to apply a population-based approach in an insurgent-dominant region. South 
Korean veteran, Nak-yong Moon, states that only after COIN forces suppressed 
the Viet Cong‟s activities were they able to carry out civil-military operations.195 
Thus, in the initial stage, 70 percent of the ROK forces‟ operations were based on 
military combat operations, whereas 30 percent of them were driven by civil-
military operations.
196
 However, a balance between combat operations and civil-
military operations had been maintained since mid-1967.
197
 
Mission studies, like the military advisory group, were important to make 
the COIN forces understand the mission environment as fully as possible before 
their dispatch. Through mission studies, the ROK military knew that the South 
Vietnamese as well as the North Vietnamese admired Ho Chi Minh, which made 
the mobilization logic favorable to the Viet Cong. Likewise, the ROK COIN 
forces recognized that Ho Chi Minh supporters were easily recruited by the Viet 
Cong guerrillas.
198
 Thus, the Viet Cong guerrillas were dominant, and they were 
conducting violent attacks. For example, in 1965 when the ROK forces started 
sending their combat troops to Vietnam, there were 10,601 terror attacks in South 
Vietnam.
199
 Coastal regions in the II Corps area, where the ROK COIN forces 
were mostly responsible, were dominated by insurgent groups. Vietnam Studies 
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states that “The most populated coastal province in the II Corps area, with roughly 
800,000 people, Binh Dinh had been dominated by the Viet Cong for many 
years.”200 General Chae stated in 1969 that most areas assigned to the ROK forces 
were dominated by Viet Cong guerillas.
201
 Moreover, the Vietnamese in general 
maintained a strong spirit of resistance through historical experiences, such as 
fights against colonial powers, including China and France. By the same token, 
they had developed a variety of guerilla tactics over a long period.  
The mission study rendered the ROK COIN forces capable of unusual 
missions abroad by leading them to adopt an enemy-centered approach in the first 
phase. The enemy-centered approach was aimed at gaining security in areas 
assigned to the ROK COIN forces. Thus, they set up standards to evaluate the 
degree of security in the areas ranging from A level to V level (see Table 13). 
With the use of standards, the ROK COIN forces brought 367 areas among 506 
areas (about 73%) under their control, which implies that the ROK COIN forces 
possessed a strong security control.
202
  
Table 13 Evaluation Standards for Security Control in Vietnam 
Control level Viet Cong’s 
residential area 
Viet Cong’s  
sub-organization 
Paying tax to Viet 
Cong 
ROK  
force‟s 
control 
A 
None None None 
 B None Sometime Sometimes 
 C None Frequent Sometime 
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Middle D Few places Dominant Regularly 
 E Few places  Organized  
Viet Cong‟s 
control 
V 
   
Etc N Unable to evaluate due to lack of data 
Source: Choi, Statistics of the Vietnam War & ROK Armed Forces, 134.  
 
There were two types of an enemy-based approach: large-scale operations 
and small-scale operations. Since the ROK COIN forces made mission 
organizations flexible, the ROK forces were able to conduct both large-scale 
operations and large-scale guerrilla operations. In the beginning, the ROK 
military had to conduct massive-scale operations to suppress a huge number of 
enemies in the assigned areas, but as time went by, small-scale operations were 
more effective because the Viet Cong carried out guerilla warfare.
203
 What 
matters the most was that the transition from large-scale operations to small-scale 
operations was fast enough to achieve remarkable success. Thus, the ROK COIN 
forces were able to pay tremendous attention to anti-guerilla warfare. While the 
ROK forces conducted only 1,175 large-scale operations, which were operations 
that included more than a single battalion unit, they carried out 576,302 small-
scale operations, which were operations that included a company unit or 
smaller.
204
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Under battleground situations where an enemy-centered approach was 
required in the first phase of COIN in Vietnam, the ROK COIN forces developed 
their own enemy-based tactics – small unit-led tactics – which were different from 
the U.S. COIN forces‟ tactics. What matters the most is that the independent 
OPCON allowed the ROK military to develop its own tactics appropriate for the 
Vietnamese battlegrounds. Put differently, the ROK military‟s high morale was 
converted into COIN capability. General Chae devised the creative and adaptable 
tactics of company-led tactical base (chungdae chŏnsul kiji), typically company-
size operations.
205
  
Figure 4 
The Floor Plan of Company-led Tactical Base 
 
Source: The ROK Institute for Military History Compilation, The Vietnam War and the  
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ROK forces through memoir 1, 162.  
A company-led tactical base was intended to achieve both defense and 
offense at the same time using a single company.
206
 Offense was aimed at seizing 
the center of the guerillas‟ activities.207 Defense was aimed at deterring guerillas‟ 
activities and holding the area for more than 48 hours even under attacks from 
larger units, such as a regiment (see Figure 4).
208
  
Under this tactical concept, a big division spread out to the company level 
according to the newly devised SOP, and by doing so, effective small unit 
operations were attainable. The Department of the Army report of 1975 on the 
Vietnam War confirms that when the ROK COIN battalion arrived on the 
battleground, it conducted operations according to three separate companies and 
thus carried out small unit-based operations.
209
 This small unit operation in a 
concentrated area proved quite successful not only for military operations, but 
also for civic operations.
210
 The concept of a company-led tactical base 
encouraged more soldiers to contact the local population and thus allowed them to 
gather information vis-à-vis the Viet Cong.
211
 The ROK forces‟ tactics proved 
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very successful particularly in the battles of Duc Co in 1966 and Tra Binh Dong 
in 1967.
212
 
By contrast, the U.S. military put a high premium on conventional fighting. 
The Vietnamese Studies shows that although the U.S. military started viewing 
military struggle on the Vietnamese battleground as guerrilla warfare, it saw 
large-unit fighting as a fundamental strategy in 1966.
213
 Thanks to the South 
Korean troops‟ remarkable success, however, the U.S. forces started to adopt this 
tactic, which they called Fire Base, particularly after the battle of Duc Co.
214
  
Some units of the U.S. military focused on small-unit operations. 
Particularly, the U.S. Marines engaged in small fights in the northernmost part of 
South Vietnam under the plan of the U.S. Marine Corps Combined Action 
Platoon (CAP), which focused on unconventional methods similar to the ROK 
troops. This small unit operation was possible due to the historical experiences of 
the U.S. Marines. The U.S. Marines had already focused on the different nature of 
small wars from conventional wars before the Vietnam conflict, because it used to 
conduct small wars in many countries (e.g., Haiti) during the 1920s. The Small 
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War Manual of 1940 pointed out that “The motive in small wars is not material 
destruction. It is usually a project dealing with the social, economic, and political 
development of the people.”215  
The U.S. Marines used this Manual and developed more adaptable small 
war tactics in Vietnam. The U.S. Marines had recognized in 1965 that the 
protection of the local population and guerilla fights were vital to win the war in 
Vietnam.
216
 Similarly, they focused on gaining the hearts and minds of the local 
Vietnamese. The U.S. Marines in Region I gave around 200,000 local civilians 
medical treatment and distributed about 140,000 pounds of food.
217
 The U.S. 
Marines‟ civil affairs project was successful. Some local civilians willingly 
started to give the U.S. Marines information about Viet Cong guerillas. Thus, the 
success of this plan allowed the U.S. Marines to become the most adaptable force 
to small wars and unconventional missions in the entire U.S. military.  
The overall U.S. military organization, however, neglected to widen this 
plan to include the entire army.
218
 The U.S. military depended on conventionally-
oriented organization in general. The organization of the Military Assistance 
Command, Vietnam (MACV) was more effective at resisting an invasion from the 
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conventional NVA but was less effective at averting guerilla attacks.
219
 By the 
same token, the U.S. inflexible organization failed to take advice both from the 
U.S. Marines and the British advisory team.
220
  
Tactics of company-led tactical base, which the ROK COIN forces 
developed, were the most effective enemy-based method in Vietnam. The ROK 
COIN forces that had a remarkable success with these tactics expanded their 
TAOR over time. The ROK COIN forces, which were in charge of an area of 
1,535 km
2
 in 1965, were responsible for the area of 6,800 km
2
 in 1969, and 
population grew in the areas where the ROK forces were responsible (see Table 
14). Thus, the ROK COIN forces adopted close fight tactics on a small-unit basis 
over time, rather than kinetic fight tactics on a large-unit basis. In a similar vein, 
they used air bombings much less often than the U.S. forces because they thought 
that air bombings were not effective for COIN. General Chae states that the ROK 
forces used air bombings one-tenth as often as the U.S. forces.
221
  
Table 14 
The Expansion of the ROK COIN‟s TAOR 
Year 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 
Area (km) 1,535 4,470 6,800 6,800 6,800 
Population 310 970 1,200 1,240 1,241 
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(thousands) 
Source: Choi, Statistics of the Vietnam War & ROK Armed Forces, 63. 
 
At the same time, the company-led tactical base made it easier for the ROK 
forces to apply a population-led method. A company strongly secured each village 
assigned to it but remained just outside of the village. Therefore, guerillas were 
separated from the local population.
222
 Moreover, this base offered soldiers more 
chances to contact the local population. In this vein, the tactic served as a guide 
for the effectiveness of a population-led method in the second phase of the COIN 
operations in Vietnam. 
The other creative tactic that the ROK COIN forces adopted was night-
based operations. General Chae feared that the ROK military would repeat the 
American forces failure if it could not identify the Viet Cong‟s tactics: “Viet 
Cong is everywhere on the ground but they disappear whenever COIN forces seek 
to look for them.”223 Thus, General Chae identified the Viet Cong‟s orientation 
where guerillas in Vietnam did not make a direct attack during the day. He found 
that they used to strike COIN forces by intentionally exposing themselves and 
then tempting COIN forces to chase them. As a consequence, the ROK COIN 
forces employed night-led operations, just like the Viet Cong. They slept during 
the day and then sought to strengthen control at night. Accordingly, they 
minimized the scope of the Viet Cong‟s nighttime activities.224 For example, 
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company commander Seo-nam Bang said in 1967 that as his units started 
conducting night operations, the Viet Cong‟s activities were less dominant.225 
In addition, one of the most important enemy-focused tactics was to disrupt 
the center base of the enemy, which offered mobilization, training, and supplies. 
The NVA 18th regiment and Viet Cong established the 226th base with the 
support of Laos in October 1969. The ROK forces worried that if this base were 
to function as a permanent base, it would weaken the effectiveness of an enemy-
based approach where the ROK forces had been successful. Thus, the ROK forces 
conducted the Army Foundation Commemoration operation. In this operation, 
they were successful in stabilizing villages around the plains of Quy Nhon and Go 
Boi by blockading the intermediate supply base.
226
 The enemy failed to increase 
its capacity.  
Encouraged by the success of an enemy-based approach, the ROK soldiers 
were perceived as the best fighters against the Viet Cong and the NVA. Thus, 
enemies were reluctant to engage with South Korean soldiers if possible. The 1st 
regiment commander, Sung-kak Jun, relates one of the events that he experienced 
in Vietnam. He says that there was a consensus among enemies that when they 
fight against South Korean soldiers, they have to have at least three times as many 
soldiers as the South Koreans did. In the Operation: Maeng Ho Six from 
September to November 1966, when the South Vietnamese Army (SVA) came to 
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the battlefield, the Viet Cong and the NVA avoided fighting with the SVA 
because they mistook the SVA for the South Korean Army.
227
 
The remarkable success of the ROK COIN forces‟ creative tactics spread 
out beyond the Vietnamese battleground. Taiwanese President Chiang Kai-shek 
invited ROK military instructors to Taiwan in July 1968 in order to learn the ROK 
forces‟ tactics. He said that “the reason why the ROK forces were able to fight 
better in Vietnam than the U.S. forces was because they developed their own 
tactics.”228 
All of the above enemy-centered approaches were successful in the area 
where insurgents were dominant in Vietnam. Moreover, these remedies were 
tactically flexible enough so that the ROK COIN forces were able to develop their 
COIN capacity depending on battleground situations, which confirms hypotheses 
2A and 2B.   
2. The Image of Brutal Fighters 
     The ROK soldiers‟ strong security control made some Vietnamese recognize 
them as brutal fighters over time. Particularly, the image of South Korean soldiers 
as brutal fighters was part of the Viet Cong‟s psychological warfare. Terry Rambo, 
a private American project researcher, sparked the discourse of Korean troops‟ 
brutality. The New York Times reported on January 10, 1970 Terry Rambo‟s 
argument that “South Korean forces had murdered South Vietnamese villagers in 
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Phuyen Province” based on interviews conducted in 1966.229 Influenced by the 
Vietnamese growing concern on this issue, in the same year, the Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam (DRV) Foreign Ministry denounced the massacre by South 
Korean troops.
230
 The New York Times also reported on January 16, 1970 that the 
ROK MND denied this rumor as „ungrounded‟ and „deplorable‟ charges.”231 
Some local villagers, however, kept alleging that the ROK troops killed 135 
unarmed Vietnamese in the Ha My hamlet in 1968.
232
  
South Korean veterans criticized the matter of representation of local 
villagers. Thus, there existed sharp disagreements between local villages and 
Korean veterans. General Chae has strongly denied most charges related to 
Koreans troops‟ brutality. While he has joined conferences about war atrocities, 
he noted the huge gaps between alleged charges and the facts on the ground. He 
asserts with the honor of his name and his country that unintentional killings of a 
few ordinary civilians might occur because South Korean troops had to fight 
against hidden guerillas, but he further stated that South Korean troops never 
committed mass killings.
233
  
                                                 
229
 Robert Smith, “Vietnam Killings Laid to Koreans,” The New York Times, 
January 10, 1970. The New York Times, January 16, 1970.  
230
 Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 03 – Allied War Participants, “DRV denounces 
massacre by S. Korean troops,” January 08, 1972, 
http://www.virtualarchive.vietnam.ttu.edu/starweb/virtual/vva/servlet.starweb 
(Accessed April 23, 2010).  
231
 The New York Times, January 16, 1970.  
232
 Kim, “Korea‟s „Vietnam Questions‟: War Atrocities, National Identity, and 
Reconciliation in Asia,” 623-24.  
233
 General Chae, The Vietnam War and Me, 489. 
  111 
General Chae also argues that most of the alleged mass killing areas were 
not South Korean operation areas while stating that the Viet Cong and extremists 
overemphasized South Koreans‟ killings.234 His statement is in line with Honda‟s 
evaluation through his experiences on the battlefield and in interviews with local 
civilians. Honda, the Asahi Shimbun reporter, stated that “the more frequent and 
closer the contact between the ROK Army and the people in a district, the more 
popular the ROK became.”235 South Korean troops might not be angels on the 
battlegrounds, but they maintained relatively favorable images with the local 
population, at least in specific areas, despite the bad conditions of bloody fights. If 
that is the case, what caused South Korean soldiers to be recognized as popular 
fighters rather than brutal fighters? Why did the Viet Cong‟s tactic fail? The 
introduction of a population-based approach in the second phase helped the ROK 
soldiers become more popular rather than being recognized as brutal.  
3. Introduction of a Population-based Method in the Second Phase 
         When the ROK COIN forces started effectively suppressing the Viet Cong, 
a population-based method was introduced in the second phase of COIN. In an 
attempt to separate the local Vietnamese population from the Viet Cong, the ROK 
COIN forces developed operational tactics based on three steps: separation-
interception-destroy. To that end, the ROK COIN forces set up tactical bases just 
outside of local villages.
236
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It was imperative for the ROK COIN forces to closely cooperate with the 
local population for the success of the above operational tactics, which required 
civil-military operations.
237
 To put it differently, gaining the hearts and minds of 
the Vietnamese was necessary. Although the ROK military considered hearts and 
minds on a tactical level (not a strategic level), its flexible adaptation was quite 
successful because this new method sprang from its other concern for 
unconventional military management.  
One of the key operation‟s philosophies of General Chae was to “protect 
one local civilian even though you lose hundreds of Viet Cong.”238 He thought 
that such efforts promoted the separation between the local population and Viet 
Cong guerillas. Encouraged by General Chae‟s philosophy, South Korean 
soldiers‟ behavior was entirely different from American soldiers‟ behavior. Honda, 
the Ashai Shimbun reporter, revered the ROK behavior that he saw in Vietnam.
239
 
According to him, South Korean troops did not fire until Viet Cong did and never 
set fire to houses in farmland, unlike American troops.  
General Chae‟s philosophy for gaining the hearts and minds of the local 
population materialized under three programs: the sanitized village program, the 
sister-relation program, and the good will program.
240
 The sanitized village 
program aimed to protect local residents by separating them from Viet Cong 
guerillas. As part of actively implementing this sanitized village program, South 
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Korean forces devised a sister-relation program which aimed to address the 
immediate difficulties of local Vietnamese. Under this program, they provided 
local populations with security and economic infrastructure. South Korean troops 
built safe villages, such as Jae Koo hamlet for local residents.
241
 They built 
schools and helped drill wells in this sister village.
242
  
One of the best examples of the ROK forces gaining the hearts and minds 
of the local Vietnamese within a relatively short amount of time was the activities 
of the Jae Koo battalion. This battalion was named after a brave South Korean 
officer who sacrificed himself to save his soldiers during the training period for 
the dispatch to Vietnam. As soon as the Jae Koo battalion arrived at its TAOR, it 
helped the Vietnamese and took care of patients. Thus, the local Vietnamese 
started to recognize the Jae Koo battalion as a friendly force. The initial success 
of the Jae Koo battalion in gaining the hearts and minds contributed to more 
defections of the Viet Cong. On October 30, 1965, less than a week since the Jae 
Koo battalion arrived, one Vietnamese woman came to the inspection office of the 
Jae Koo battalion. She told South Korean soldiers that since she was impressed by 
South Korean soldiers‟ efforts to help the local residents, she was willing to 
persuade her son, who had joined in the Viet Cong, to come back to her village by 
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defecting.
243
 She went to a mountain where her son was operating, and several 
days later, she came back to the village with her son.
244
 
The Jae Koo hamlet was the most successful case of creating a safe village. 
Most of the facilities in Phu Cat areas were destroyed due to the South 
Vietnamese army‟s operation against the Viet Cong. Thus, the ROK COIN forces 
built 150 homes and then offered them to refugees in February 1966. This hamlet 
became popular among the Vietnamese because the ROK soldiers strongly 
secured this village. Thus, a market appeared in the village, and the population 
grew to more than 3,000.
245
 More people wanted to move in to the Jae Koo 
hamlet, and thus the Jae Koo battalion had to control too much influx of outside 
villagers.
246
 Since South Korean soldiers were very popular, Phu Cat leader 
Captain Loc asked South Korean officer Jun-tak Kwon to make a brotherhood 
relationship with him.
247
 The village name was also chosen to be the Jae Koo 
hamlet according to Loc‟s suggestion.248  
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In a similar vein, the ROK military carried out a good will program in their 
attempt to implant a favorable image of its soldiers among local residents.
249
 
South Korean soldiers showed their respect to elders and often demonstrated 
Taekwondo, the Korean martial art, for local residents.
250
 In addition, under this 
program, 1,572 mobile hospitals as well as 51 general hospitals offered medical 
treatment to the local Vietnamese.
251
 A total of 217,713 South Koreans and 
medical personnel participated in medical treatment activities from 1965 to 
1972.
252
 The military hospitals gave a total of 3,523,364 Vietnamese medical 
treatment from 1965 to 1972.
253
  
One of the most productive operations carried out under the combined 
tactics of an enemy-based and a population-based approach was the Harvest 
Protection operation. This operation protected the local population with the use of 
enemy-based tactics. In 1965, the 5th company of armor regiment, the Maeng Ho 
division, was responsible for the Hoa Lac village, which was located 6km from 
the eastern side of Binh Khe. Hoa Lac residents were harvesting on the Hoa Hiep 
plain, and the Viet Cong had been attacking this area. Accordingly, villagers 
asked the 5th company to protect their harvesting areas from the attacks of 
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guerillas in November 1965.
254
 The 5th company successfully expelled Viet Cong 
guerillas through three days of fighting, and as a result, farmers were able to 
harvest 70-80 percent of crops.
255
 The success of this operation persuaded the 
Vietnamese to trust the ROK soldiers.  
Similarly, South Korean soldiers were professional fighters from the 
viewpoint of an enemy-based approach, but at the same time, they stressed the 
importance of a population-based method. As a result, many local Vietnamese 
wanted the ROK soldiers to stay with them. The 9th company of the Jae Koo 
battalion was withdrawing from the Jae Koo hamlet after completing its mission 
in 1966. In the meantime, Phu Cat residents asked the 9th company to stay with 
them, and thus, the 9th company had to stay one more day.
256
 Since the ROK 
soldiers were regarded as the best soldiers against Viet Cong guerillas, when 
South Korean soldiers stayed, Viet Cong guerillas were reluctant to engage. This 
was what happened in the Jae Koo hamlet as well. After the withdrawal of the 9th 
company, Viet Cong guerillas attacked a school that South Korean soldiers had 
built.
257
 As a consequence, the Jae Koo hamlet residents strongly pleaded for the 
return of the ROK soldiers, and the Jae Koo battalion came back to this hamlet to 
be responsible for the security of this area.  
The combined remedies were possible because they were initiated by an 
enemy-centered approach and were supported by a population-based tactic. South 
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Korean veteran Young-il Moon states that the ROK had conducted two types of 
operations at the same time: one to physically fight against enemy combatants and 
the other to fight with hearts in their attempt to help civilians live under stable 
conditions.
258
  
In general, the ROK flexible methods were positively evaluated. Nicholas 
Ruggieru, IPS correspondent, reported, “the Koreans not only fought well; they 
built bridges, roads, classrooms, houses, and more than 100 other facilities. They 
also engaged in a series of relief projects for bereaved families, refugees, civilian 
wound, and the poor.”259  
The introduction of a population-based method in the second step was 
effective. First, it helped reduce the ROK military‟s brutal image by adapting 
them to the battleground in Vietnam.
260
 Second, it helped the local population see 
South Korean soldiers as crusaders, not as occupiers.  
Company commander, Min-Sik Park recollects his experiences on the 
ground about the pacification project. In accordance with General Chae‟s doctrine, 
he focused on the protection of every single local civilian in 1968, and villagers 
started to be grateful to his company‟s soldiers‟ efforts over time.261 Similarly, 
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another junior officer who was on the ground took pride in the ROK military‟s 
effective population-based remedy. Vietnam War veteran Man-Won Ji, has 
written memoirs under the name of the truth in Vietnam. He went to Vietnam in 
1967 just one year after he became an officer. He recollected in his memoirs that 
“local Vietnamese villagers wanted to receive food from Koreans, not 
Americans.”262 And he further said that “they were grateful for Korean soldiers‟ 
kindness and generosity by calling us Dai Han.”  
Under the second phase of tactics – an introduction of a population-based 
method – South Korean soldiers‟ behavior was entirely different from American 
soldiers‟ behavior. Honda shows a typical example to differentiate between 
Korean and American soldiers. He reported that Korean soldiers “got out of their 
jeeps […] and handed it [gum and toffee] directly to each child,” whereas 
American soldiers “amused themselves by throwing candy over the children‟s 
heads and watching them run and scramble for it like animals.”263 Similarly, 
South Korean veteran Nak-yong Moon also states that American soldiers threw 
rations (military packaged food) to the Vietnamese from their cars.
264
 However, 
South Korean troops handed them directly to the Vietnamese after opening 
them.
265
 In addition, American troops did not have trained interpreters on the front, 
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but Korean military units had a conversation with local residents thanks to well-
trained interpreters. The ROK military commanders always stressed that Korean 
soldiers had to be courteous to local residents.  
The U.S. military attempted to evaluate the ROK‟s pacification project 
more carefully. The U.S. Army‟s report stated that the ROK pacification projects 
were more effective in an early stage (before 1968) than in a later stage (after 
1968). The U.S. Army, however, recognized the overall success of South Korea‟s 
military pacification projects. The U.S. Army report mentioned that “Korean 
combat forces had their greatest success with small unit civic action projects and 
security operations within their Korean tactical area of responsibility.”266 
All in all, security control initiated by an enemy-centered approach was 
consolidated by introducing a population-based method later. This examination 
clearly shows how important a combination of the two methods is even in 
insurgent- dominated areas. The ROK forces secured the areas assigned to them. 
For example, the only area where trains ran in all of Vietnam was the South 
Korean military‟s tactical area.267 Thus, more people came to the areas where 
South Korean troops were responsible. The number of defectors in South Korean 
areas was 5-6 times larger than in other areas.
268
 Vietnamese who left their 
villages came back to their homes when South Korean soldiers secured their 
villages. Bam Re O, who was a leader of Phe Diem village, stated in 1967 that 
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when the Maeng Ho division soldiers secured the village, people who deserted 
their homes came back.
269
 These combined tactics designed to win guerilla 
warfare were achievable particularly under the flexible COIN organization.  
B. Organizational Flexibility 
The ROK military‟s eagerness for mission success tends to render military 
leaders willing to make organization flexible. Conventional military forces seek to 
centralize this organization under one unified command. The ROK military used 
to organize COIN forces based on a Joint General Staff in order to retain benefits 
from centralization. However, centralized and inflexible organizations are not 
effective for guerilla warfare in Vietnam. Thus, one of the biggest concerns of 
Korean commanders was to make the ROK COIN organization in Vietnam 
flexible enough to cope with the Viet Cong by keeping a balance between 
centralization and decentralization.
270
  
On the one hand, in order to maximize benefits from centralization, the 
ROK military placed all South Korean troops in Vietnam under General Chae‟s 
unified command. On the other hand, the ROK military included one Marine 
Brigade in addition to two Army Divisions in an attempt to gain from 
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decentralization. This combination allowed all Korean units to favorably compete 
with each other to achieve a successful outcome. Furthermore, the Marine brigade 
was under the authority of the ROK unified command, but it independently 
operated. Less intervention at the highest level made independent operations more 
effective because counter-guerilla warfare was not large-scale combined 
operations but was small- scale independent operations.  
The ROK COIN forces had features of both centralization and 
decentralization because its organization was flexible. First, centralization under 
one unified command and decentralization based on small-unit operations served 
as the flexible organization. This organizational flexibility allowed the ROK 
COIN forces to be capable of both large-scale battles and small-unit operations. 
This flexible organization was effective because the ROK forces had to conduct 
both centralized and decentralized operations depending on situations, due to dual 
enemies – the NVA regular forces and the Viet Cong irregular forces. Likewise, 
this workable organization was a perfect match for the tactics of a company-led 
tactical base.  
Centralized operation required a unified command, which the ROK forces 
already had. One of the best centralized operations based on a large scale was the 
Oh Jac Kyo operation. Two army divisions were dispatched to Vietnam in 1967. 
One division – the Maeng Ho division – was responsible for the northern part of 
South Vietnam, whereas the other division – the Baek Ma division – was in 
charge of the southern part of South Vietnam. This operation aimed at filling the 
middle ground area of South Vietnam by connecting the two divisions‟ secured 
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areas. This middle area – Song Cau and Tuy An – was dominated by the Viet 
Cong.  
The Baek Ma division commander opposed this operation.
271
 The problem 
was that this division‟s opposition could make it difficult to conduct a large-scale 
operation in a uniformed way. The presence of a unified command, however, 
functioned as an entity to address this demerit from decentralized divisions by 
integrating ideas and plans of both divisions. Put simply, this corps scale 
operation was possible because there was a unified command – the ROKFV. The 
ROKFV, under the command of General Chae, devised a plan to conduct this 
operation.
272
 By successfully conducting the Oh Jac Kyo operation, 73,000 
Vietnamese were liberated from the enemy‟s grip.273 Moreover, the success of 
this operation opened Highway One under the control of the ROK forces, and by 
doing so, one of the enemies‟ supply lines was blockaded. In addition, the success 
of this operation paved the way for more effective anti-guerilla operations against 
irregular guerrillas.  
Second, under organizational flexibility, the ROK COIN forces stressed the 
importance of small-unit operations with light weapons. They flexibly changed 
organization depending on battleground situations. The 26th regiment commander 
Jong-lim Lee relates that soldiers‟ reliance on heavy fire does not guarantee 
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success in combat in Vietnam because guerilla warfare is brain warfare.
274
 Some 
regiments eliminated their single heavy machine company, which was equipped 
with heavy weapons, and then replaced it with a light-weapon based company. 
For instance, the 26th regiment used the 4th heavy machine gun company as a 
light gun company.
275
 Put differently, the ROK forces remade their organization 
sufficiently flexible to win missions according to the battleground circumstances.  
In addition, unlike the conventional organization that the ROK military 
employed for its homeland security, the ROKFV established the department of 
civil-military affairs under its command.
276
 The department head was a colonel. 
Furthermore, each unit under the ROKFV also operated staff who were in charge 
of civil-military affairs.
277
 Under this organization, each unit cooperated with its 
partners according to its position. For example, the partner of the ROKFV for 
conducting civil affairs was the South Vietnam government, and the partner of a 
division or brigade was a province (Tinh) size settlement.
278
 Similarly, a regiment 
unit‟s counterpart was a town (Sa), and a company unit‟s counterpart was a 
village (Thon).
279
  
Another important feature vis-à-vis the ROK COIN organization was that 
COIN forces were responsible for both military operations and civil affairs at the 
same time. South Korea believed that one voice under a unified command made 
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organization more flexible to effectively deal with COIN. Thus, the South Korean 
ambassador in Vietnam, Sang-cheol Shin, did not intervene in the ROK military‟s 
affairs in Vietnam. Instead, he played a role only as the representative of the 
South Korean government. However, he recollects that unlike South Korea‟s 
unified and cooperative authority, there was friction between General 
Westmoreland and the American ambassador over their respective degrees of 
authority in the U.S.
280
 
In short, the ROK COIN forces were able to deal with guerilla warfare 
effectively by making the organization flexible. Furthermore, these flexible 
organizations were managed by the best units, not less-professional units. 
C. Effective Resources 
1. The Best Units: Cultivating Elite Units 
The ROK military chose the best units to dispatch. The ROK military 
commanders, guerilla war veterans, spent a lot of time selecting units eligible for 
the unconventional missions. In particular, the guerilla warfare experience of the 
ROK COIN leaders helped them to select South Korean units with high standards 
to successfully complete unconventional operations. Military leaders decided to 
dispatch the most professional units for the first combat missions: the Maeng Ho 
division and the Cheongryeong brigade.  
South Korean military leaders put a high premium on combat experience 
when they chose the effective divisions to deal with the Viet Cong. Thus, they 
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decided to dispatch the Army Capital division (Maeng Ho) and the Marine 
brigade (Cheongryeong), which made great achievements during the Korean War 
as its first combat troops.
281
  
Figure 5 
The TAOR of the Maeng Ho Division  
As of November 1965 
 
Source: The ROK Institute for Military History Compilation, The Vietnam War and the  
ROK forces through memoir 1, 160. 
 The Maeng Ho division had the crucial mission to protect the ROK capital, 
Seoul, before its deployment to Vietnam. Accordingly, this division possessed the 
smartest and best-trained officers. The Maeng Ho division arrived at Quy Nhon 
on October 22, 1965 and took over the South Korean TAOR, which ranged over 
1,200 km, from the U.S. military (see Figure 5). Since it was the best division in 
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the South Korean military, it was able to reduce its adaptation costs. It 
successfully secured its TAOR by suppressing the Viet Cong through 175,107 
engagements.
282
  
The Cheongryeong brigade was also selected because the ROK Marines 
were evaluated as the best branch in the ROK military. Since guerilla warfare 
requires a brave spirit, the Marines were the optimal forces in COIN in Vietnam, 
particularly when the ROK forces adopted an enemy-centered approach in the 
initial phase. For example, when the ROK Marines carried out the operation to 
return the city of Hoi An in December 1967, all the Marines of the 3rd battalion 
were highly motivated. Thus, they were able to win the urban warfare in the city 
of Hoi An.  
The mother unit of the dispatching Cheongryeong brigade had achieved 
remarkable success in many battles during the Korean War.
283
 Thus, the Marines 
were evaluated as best of the best. Military veteran Tae-suk Jung, who served as 
the Cheongryeong brigade‟s chief of staff, recollects that the Marines were armed 
with pride, and they agreed that defeat is not acceptable.
284
  
Since the Marines were the best branch, it was successful in securing 
assigned areas within a relatively short amount of time. Put simply, the best unit 
helped reduce adaptation costs on the battleground. The Cheongryeong brigade 
arrived at Dong Ba Thin in October 1965 and successfully secured Tuy Hoa 
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within two months in December 1965.
285
 In particular, Highway One was secured 
under the Cheongryeong brigade‟s control. By securing this area, it also cut off 
the Viet Cong‟s supply line and helped address the food shortage of the local 
population.
286
 Furthermore, the Cheongryeong brigade won the Tra Binh Dong 
battle, which was one of the most renowned military battles in world history. One 
Marine Company (around 300 soldiers) – the 11th company – defeated two NVA 
regiments (around 2,500 soldiers) at Tra Binh Dong on February 14, 1967.
287
  
Figure 6 
The Attack Plan of the NVA in the Tra Binh Dong Battle 
 
Source: The ROK Institute for Military History Compilation, The Vietnam War and the  
                                                 
285
 The ROK Institute for Military History Compilation, The Vietnam War and the  
ROK forces through memoir 3, 1.  
286
 Ibid., 58.  
287
 General Chae, The Vietnam War and Me, 367-71. There is a debate whether  
enemies in Tra Binh Dong were the NVA or the Viet Cong. The Cheongryeong  
brigade intelligence staff officer, Chil-ho Cheo, argues that these enemies were  
evaluated as Viet Cong because the dead bodies did not wear unified uniforms.  
The ROK Institute for Military History Compilation, The Vietnam War and the  
ROK forces through memoir 3, 249.  
  128 
ROK forces through memoir 3, 171.  
A remarkable success in this battle promoted all Company soldiers to upper 
ranks. In addition, the U.S. 3rd amphibious force commander said that “this was 
the best performance in Vietnam since I served [in the Vietnam conflict], and the 
ROK Marines are a role model for all COIN coalition forces.”288 
In a similar vein, South Korean troops, inspired by the selection of the best 
units, mastered operations in mountainous terrain in Vietnam with relatively low 
adaptation costs. Thus, South Korean troops gained control of North Vietnamese 
Army (NVA) battalions in Phu Cat Mountain with a short amount of time in 
1966.
289
 
Since the ROK military chose the best units as COIN forces, it was able to 
reduce its adaptation costs. Another factor that contributed to minimizing 
adaptation costs sprang from the individual level: best soldiers.  
2. The Best Soldiers: Cultivating Elite Fighters 
The scope of the ROK military‟s capability for COIN can also be 
investigated by tracing the qualification of the soldiers that the ROK military 
dispatched. Seoul determined the types of soldiers to be sent to Vietnam in early 
1964. In the meantime, Seoul was worried that the South Korean troops‟ dispatch 
might lead to the opposition of countries that had supported South Korea‟s 
position in the United Nations (U.N). Thus, in the first phase, there was some 
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suggestion that Seoul needed to dispatch mercenaries, based on reserve forces or 
civilians, to Vietnam.
290
  
This suggestion was positively received because it had two merits. First, 
South Korea thought that if regular forces were to be dispatched, it would be more 
vulnerable to the North Korean military‟s attack. The dispatch of mercenary 
forces was expected to solve this problem. Second, South Korea thought that the 
dispatch of mercenary forces would help solve an unemployment problem.  
However, Seoul knew that regular forces would fighter better than 
mercenaries. Fighting well was an important issue to maximize national prestige. 
Thus, the discourse regarding the dispatch of mercenaries was truncated, and 
instead the ROK military paid more attention to the dispatch of the best soldiers 
among the regular forces to Vietnam.  
The ROK military chose soldiers to win COIN, rather than simply 
participating in it. The ROK military understood the different nature of COIN, 
particularly small- unit fights under decentralized military organization. Thus, it 
knew that the role of each individual commander and each soldier‟s individual 
proficiency is important to win guerilla warfare in Vietnam. All soldiers to be 
deployed were carefully screened. Elite soldiers were placed in three categories: 
senior commanders, junior commanders/officers, and non-commissioned officers.  
First, senior commanders were chosen with high standards among officers 
who were the best qualified and had experience with guerrilla warfare. General 
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Chae Myung-Shin was selected as Commander of ROKFV (Republic of Korea 
Force in Vietnam). General Chae experienced COIN against communist guerrilla 
groups. He fought against the Red Guerilla Group in the Taebaek mountains 
(T„aebaeksan) in 1949 just before the Korean War broke out, and commanded the 
White Bone Group (Paekkol pyŏngdan) to cope with guerilla warfare during the 
Korean War.
291
 Based on this experience, General Chae had already identified the 
different dynamic in the Vietnam War.
292
 He said in his autobiography that 
“although conventional combat forces were dispatched to Vietnam, it is difficult 
for them to locate targets, because the Vietnam War is guerilla warfare.”293  
In addition to General Chae, the ROK military chose other senior 
commanders – a regimental commander and a battalion commander – using very 
high standards.
294
 Key high-ranking officers in Vietnam had experience in 
guerilla warfare. The selected commanders, including Colonel Kim Jong-Un, 
Colonel Sin Hyun-Soo, and Lieutenant Colonel Bae Jung-Do, had experienced 
real battles and guerilla operations and were decorated with medals for their 
remarkable achievements during the Korean War.
295
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Second, junior officers were also selected according to high standards 
because they mostly were in charge of guerilla warfare directly on the spot. The 
ROK military knew that since guerilla warfare is a small-unit operation, the role 
of junior officers is important for mission success. A military veteran, who served 
as company commander, Se-kwon Jang, notes that the role of junior officers, such 
as platoon commanders, was important for mission success.
296
 
Junior army officers were mostly graduates from the Korean Military 
Academy, which requires four years of professional training.
297
 Military veteran 
Chul-ho Lee, who served as company commander of the army division, stated in 
1969 that all platoon leaders and company commanders were selected from 
graduates of the Korean Military Academy.
298
  
Unlike the ROK Army officers, the ROK Marines did not consider which 
school officers graduated from – the Naval Academy or other military institutions 
– because all Marine officers were commissioned with the highest standard of 
training in the ROK military.
299
 All Marine officers were already the best officers 
in the military. Despite the Marine officers‟ professionalism, the ROK Marines 
chose the best of the best Marine officers. For instance, success of the Tra Binh 
Dong battle, where one company defeated an enemy force the size of two 
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battalions, was attainable under the leadership of the best junior officers and the 
bravest soldiers.
300
  
Third, non-commissioned officers‟ will to fight and their quality were 
carefully considered. Non-commissioned officers were sent on a voluntary basis 
in order to increase their eagerness to win. ROK President Park Chung Hee, the 
former Army general, knew that volunteer soldiers usually fight better and harder. 
Thus, even though South Korea‟s military service was based on a three years 
mandatory system, COIN forces in Vietnam were selected mostly on a voluntary 
basis among serving soldiers. Although the tour of duty in Vietnam was one year, 
incapable soldiers were sent back to Korea immediately. Staff officer Kuk-jong 
Bae, in charge of selecting soldiers in the Maeng Ho division whose commander 
was General Chae, stated in 1967 that he selected experienced and volunteer 
soldiers under the direction of General Chae.
301
 He further said that 9,000 soldiers 
among the 13,000 soldiers of the Maeng Ho division were replaced according to 
this standard.
302
  
All volunteer soldiers could not always go to Vietnam because the ROK 
military selected only the best soldiers from the pool of volunteers. The ROK 
military knew that the decentralized close fight – jungle operation – required each 
soldier to be a first-rank marksman. Since the ROK commanders recognized the 
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importance of decentralized organization in COIN, they viewed the individual 
capability of each fighter. Thus, qualified and volunteer non-commissioned 
officers were sent to Vietnam. In this vein, although they mainly used old-
fashioned M-1 rifles in 1966, as opposed to the state-of-the-art AK-47 that the 
Viet Cong used, South Korean soldiers had already become professional shooters 
before their deployment thanks to the high standard of dispatching soldiers and 
related training. For example, Company commander Tae-il Lee stated in 1966 that 
his unit‟s hit rate was already 88-92 percent before their dispatch.303 Thus, 
ordinary soldiers were already professional before being deployed. 
Similar to ordinary soldiers‟ quality, the quality of non-commissioned 
officers was important because COIN forces often had to fight against guerillas on 
a division-unit basis. Division commanders were highly qualified and brave. One 
Marine company carried out an ambush on July 19, 1967 in The Loi, and one 
division was separated from the main unit. This division‟s commander, Hak-
young Kim, faced one Viet Cong company. Under his professional and heroic 
command, this division killed 32 and captured 4 guerillas without any South 
Korean casualties.
304
 Small units commanded by distinguished and experienced 
officers allowed the ROK military to successfully achieve its decentralized 
mission. Moreover, since South Korean fighters were professional, each fighter 
was able to serve as an agent for psychological warfare as well. These best 
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soldiers were also armed with military assets suitable for COIN, rather than 
conventional warfare, leading to a synergistic outcome.  
3. Assets Used By COIN Troops 
The ROK COIN capability can also be examined by looking at assets that 
the ROK COIN forces used on the Vietnamese battlegrounds. The ROK forces 
knew that small-unit operations are more viable than big-unit operations in COIN. 
Thus, they focused on weapons and equipment suitable for COIN operations. A 
small unit required light-weight equipment, unlike conventional organization, 
which is composed of heavy weapons. When large numbers of Korean troops 
arrived in 1965, they had to use the heavy M-1 rifle due to their lack of proper 
military assets. What was worse was that unlike the AK-47 used by the Viet Cong, 
the M-1 rifle was not an automatic gun.
305
 It was the worst weapon for a close 
fight. 
The South Korean commanders recognized that this heavy and manual 
weapon would be ineffective for unconventional guerilla fighting.
306
 Thus, the 
South Korean military continued to request other weapons from the U.S. military, 
and by doing so, upgraded its key weapons from the ineffective M-1 rifle to the 
light M-16 in 1967. The process of the ROK forces acquiring the M-16 was one 
of the fastest transfers from willingness to capability. What is more interesting is 
that the ROK soldiers‟ enthusiasm made it possible for them to acquire the M-16. 
                                                 
305
 The ROK Institute for Military History Compilation, The Vietnam War and the  
ROK forces through memoir 3, 143.  
306
 General Chae, The Vietnam War and Me, 61-2. 
  135 
Impressed by the ROK soldiers‟ high morale, the U.S. military provided all South 
Korean soldiers with M-16s in 1967.
307
 
In addition, the ROK COIN troops acquired appropriate communication 
equipment for COIN. The ROK forces used old-fashioned communication 
equipment, such as the P-6 and the P-10, which had short communication 
ranges.
308
 However, the ROK COIN forces, which had already identified the 
nature of COIN, tried their best to acquire better communication equipment. As a 
result of General Chae‟s pressure on the U.S. military, the ROK military even 
supplied squad leaders with new communication equipment, such as the PRC-6, 
PRC-2S, and PRC-25, because they often had to be separated from platoon 
leaders in jungle operations.
309
 A South Korean veteran who went to Vietnam in 
1966, Sung-hwan Kim, states in his memoir that longer range communication 
equipment was important in mountainous operations.
310
 In a meeting between the 
U.S. Vice President Hubert Humphrey and the ROK Prime Minister Jung Il-
Kwon in Saigon, the ROK Prime Minister confirmed that “Korea had received the 
communications equipment and radar requested earlier.”311 Similarly, South 
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Korean veteran Ki-jung Do, who was in charge of communications, stated in 1967 
that the ROK soldiers used the PRC-2S, with which soldiers could communicate 
with each other during the rainy season over a 5-15 mile distance.
312
 
By the same token, the ROK COIN forces differentiated between 
conventional weapons and unconventional equipment. South Korean troops asked 
for COIN equipment suitable for their light divisions. The official document vis-
à-vis the 1966 conversations between President Johnson and President Park stated 
that “$32 million of DoD [Department of Defense] funds for counterinsurgency 
equipment had been utilized for this purpose, and the counterinsurgency 
equipment plus $30 million other equipment is waiting in Okinawa for the use of 
the new ROK light division.”313 In a nutshell, military modernization through 
active participation in the Vietnam War made it possible for the ROK military to 
become a learning entity effective enough to deal with guerrilla fighters as well as 
to become a conventional force modernized enough to cope with conventional 
fighters, North Korean armies. This historical lesson sheds light on how the ROK 
military can develop and adopt a balanced strategy in the coming years of the 
post-September 11 attacks.  
All of the above best units, best soldiers, and suitable weapons/equipment 
contributed to mission-oriented capacity in Vietnam, which led to COIN mission 
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success in Vietnam. This finding shows that mission-oriented capability is more 
important for COIN success than overall military capacity, which confirms the 
capability hypothesis (hypothesis 2).  
The ROK military‟s willingness to successfully complete the Vietnam 
COIN, initiated by the importance of this unusual mission, helped cultivate its 
COIN capacity, which was required to fight against Viet Cong guerillas. In this 
vein, the nature of the “unusual mission” served as the key driver for the 
mission‟s success. At the same time, South Korea was better positioned to 
successfully complete the mission in Vietnam due to its advantages in both 
material and non-material environments.  
VI. The Political and Socio-Cultural Function in the ROK COIN in Vietnam 
A. Material Environments: The ROK‟s Political Assets 
         South Korea had four types of advantages from the viewpoint of material 
environments: non-great power experience, lack of power asymmetry, familiarity 
with terrain and geography, and organized military. This material standing 
buttressed the political advantages of South Korea.  
1. Non-great Power Experiences 
         The non-great power experiences of South Korea made its COIN forces 
favorable to mission success. These advantages can be traced using three 
trajectories: historical position of nation-building, domestic COIN experiences, 
and its own experience with economic development.  
         First, South Korea, as a non-great power, historically had been overwhelmed 
by great powers due to a power gap. China had attempted to expand its sphere of 
  138 
influence to the Korean peninsula. Japan ruled over the Korean peninsula from 
1910 to 1945. Moreover, South Koreans experienced a tragic war, the Korean 
War, which was a proxy war of great powers. Thus, they knew how the 
Vietnamese would feel when foreign troops arrived there with a massive amount 
of kinetic power. In particular, South Korean soldiers, who saw North Korean 
communists and soldiers kill civilians and destroy their assets, tried their best to 
treat the Vietnamese well based on their own experience. South Korean veteran 
Dong-han Park recollects that the Korean War‟s experience contributed to a better 
understanding of the Vietnamese people‟s hardship.314 
Experiences like the above allowed South Korea‟s COIN forces to 
recognize the importance of communication with the local people so that they 
would see the ROK COIN forces less as occupiers who used their military power 
for their own interest maximization. Thus, the ROK forces intensively taught 
soldiers the local language. They operated a Vietnamese language school in 
Saigon, and its principal was South Vietnamese. A total of 1,344 soldiers 
completed this program from 1966 to 1972.
315
 Some soldiers who went to this 
school stayed with Vietnamese people in their homes, and by doing so, they 
became friends with the local Vietnamese. In addition, each unit operated its own 
language program. The Maeng Ho division taught Vietnamese to a total of 1,103 
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soldiers from 1966 to 1971 and the Cheongryeong brigade taught 235 soldiers 
Vietnamese in the same period.
316
  
This language training and the ROK military‟s emphasis on communication 
made COIN missions on the battleground more effective as well. The ROK COIN 
forces executed operations – both combat and civil-military operations – with 
well-trained interpreters.
317
 The ROK COIN forces were able to communicate 
with local Vietnamese, and by doing so, they were able to recognize situations on 
the battleground, such as the locations of insurgents.  
Second, Koreans‟ guerilla warfare experiences against the Communist 
partisans made the ROK military identify the importance of technological, light-
weight, and small weapons. The military officers‟ individual experience 
significantly affected the tactical success of COIN in Vietnam. South Korean 
forces fought against Communist partisan groups, mostly in mountainous terrain, 
before and during the Korean War.
318
 General Chae was a military expert on 
COIN, since he experienced guerilla warfare in the 1950s. He knew that the local 
population (water) should be separated from insurgents (fish) for COIN 
success.
319
 He fully studied Mao Zedong‟s guerilla tactics, making it possible for 
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his groups to defeat Chiang Kai-shek‟s army, which was ten times bigger than 
Mao‟s troops.320   
In particular, General Chae‟s experience played a crucial role in reducing 
adaptation costs in Vietnam by making the ROK COIN forces develop anti-
guerilla tactics before their dispatch. South Korean veteran Gi-taek Kim recollects 
that General Chae had already developed the concept of a company-led tactical 
base before the ROK COIN forces were dispatched.
321
 
This experience of unconventional warfare also provided the ROK military 
with an opportunity to reduce adaptation costs in terms of organizational change. 
The ROK military was under conventional-led organizational culture before the 
Vietnam War, but the ROK military commanders‟ experiences with guerilla 
warfare allowed its organization to be flexible step-by-step, which in turn allowed 
it to be effective for guerilla warfare in Vietnam. South Korea‟s COIN experience 
made it possible for the ROK forces in Vietnam to devise the tactics of a 
company-led tactical base.
322
  
The U.S. also believed that the ROK military‟s experience of guerilla 
warfare – its positional advantage – would play a crucial role in dealing with the 
Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army (NVA). In 1964, the New York Times 
reported that the U.S. military needed to invite South Korea because it has “had 
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experience in guerilla warfare.”323 What is implied is that the U.S. expected the 
ROK military‟s potential for COIN effectiveness. 
Third, the South Koreans‟ own experience with economic management 
allowed COIN soldiers to fully understand what the Vietnamese really wanted. 
The local Vietnamese population was eager for food and facilities. South Koreans 
had experienced the hardship of food shortage, and as a result, they recognized 
how severe starvation was for the village people. Thus, the ROK forces 
understood the function of a manageable food supply in COIN success. They 
provided the Vietnamese people with relief food, such as rice, wheat, corn, and 
milk. Since rice was a staple of the Vietnamese diet, just like the Korean diet, the 
ROK COIN troops knew that rice would be the most important supply item. The 
item of which the ROK COIN forces offered the largest amount was rice. They 
provided the Vietnamese with about 16,000 tons of rice from 1965 to 1972, 
whereas they offered the Vietnamese approximately 1,170 tons of wheat in the 
same period.
324
 South Korean troops also knew that working conditions in rural 
areas require many clothes in the process of village development. Thus, under the 
sub-project of relief activities, the ROK military provided local populations with 
about 430,000 clothing items from 1965 to 1972.
325
 Put simply, the ROK forces 
were able to prioritize what they really needed based on their home experience. 
Thus, South Korea‟s own experience of economic struggle allowed the ROK 
forces to reduce adaptation costs.  
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In a similar vein, the new village movement (Saemaŭl undong) that South 
Koreans experienced at home helped accelerate the project for village prosperity. 
Through the new village movement, South Koreans were good at renovating old 
houses and buildings. Thus, the ROK forces were able to effectively renovate old 
buildings or construct new ones. As of April 30, 1970, the ROK troops had 
already built 139 bridges, 290 school rooms, and 1,519 houses.
326
 The ROK 
forces constructed 1,740 buildings and about 400 km of roads from 1965 to 
1972.
327
  
South Koreans also focused on more effective farming under the new 
village movement. Based on their experience at home, the ROK soldiers helped 
the Vietnamese farm their land. Likewise, they provided the Vietnamese with a 
variety of equipment for farming.
328
 Moreover, the ROK COIN forces taught 
them how to effectively farm their land.
329
 According to a survey report, 60 
percent of Vietnamese people stated that the ROK soldiers‟ lessons were helpful 
for their farming.
330
 
The ROK COIN forces also gave the Vietnamese vocational training in 
their attempt to establish a stable societal infrastructure. They offered four types 
of training courses, such as mechanical skills, and 1,553 Vietnamese completed 
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these courses from 1968 to 1972.
331
 This vocational training was popular, and 
thus, more than 70 percent of Vietnamese people wanted more training courses.
332
 
The U.S. Marines also implemented pacification projects under the 
insightful CAP plan, but the U.S. military did not expand this project to the entire 
force. In contrast, the ROK pacification projects maintained the overall balance 
among all the units under General Chae‟s command because the ROK COIN 
forces already understood what would work in Vietnam before they came there 
due to their own experiences. The U.S. military started to study pacification 
projects under the name of the Program for the Pacification and Long-Term 
Development of South Vietnam (PROVN) in 1965, but it did not gain attention 
from the conventional war supporters.
333
 When General Abrams took charge of 
the U.S. military command in Vietnam in 1968, the PROVN gained attention on a 
strategic level, but it was too late and ineffective to implement, considering the 
situation on the battleground.
334
        
2. A Structural Position of South Korea: Power Symmetry 
         The local population tends to see foreign military forces more as occupiers 
when there is a huge power gap between its insurgent country and a country of 
foreign forces. Vietnamese people saw American forces as occupiers similar to 
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the way French forces were seen as occupiers in the 1950s particularly because 
the U.S. was one polar state under the bipolar system. In contrast, there was 
relative symmetry between South Korea and Vietnam in many ways: population 
size, economic power, and military power. 
First, the total population of South and North Vietnam was approximately 
40 million in 1972, similar to the total population of South and North Korea, 
which was about 50 million.
335
 In addition, the population of South Vietnam in 
1970 was about 19 million and the population of South Korea was around 32 
million, which was closer than the U.S. population.
336
 What is implied is that 
there was not a huge gap between the two countries vis-à-vis population size.  
Second, there was a relative lack of economic power gap between South 
Korea and South Vietnam. The size of the Gross National Product (GNP) for 
South Korea was about 8.1 billion dollars in 1970.
337
 The size of the GNP for 
South Vietnam was around 1.8 billion dollars in the same year.
338
 South Korea‟s 
economic power was just four times bigger than South Vietnam‟s. More 
interestingly, consumer goods of South Vietnam were greater than in South Korea. 
Approximately 150 thousand cars were running and about 5.45 million TVs and 
radios were used in South Vietnam in 1971.
339
 South Koreans had similar 
numbers of cars and TVs/radios. Considering the difference in population size, 
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the standard of living in South Vietnam was a little better than in South Korea in 
1971. However, the size of the GNP of the U.S. was 1.025 trillion dollars in 
1970.
340
 U.S. economic power was approximately 600 times larger than South 
Vietnam‟s in 1970. As a consequence, there was radical asymmetry vis-à-vis 
economic power between South Vietnam and the U.S.  
Third, the military power of South Korea was similar to that of South 
Vietnam, which possessed around 500 thousand regular troops.
341
 South Korea‟s 
military was equipped with old-fashioned weapons, similar to South Vietnam‟s 
military. Thus, there was power symmetry between the two countries in terms of 
military strength. In contrast, the U.S. military, as a great power force, was one of 
the two biggest military powers in the world. In this vein, there was a huge power 
gap between South Vietnam and the U.S.  
Faced with this power asymmetry, the South Vietnamese saw American 
soldiers more as occupiers, particularly in a situation where they historically 
experienced colonization under great powers, such as China, Britain, Japan, and 
France. In addition, when conventional forces based on kinetic power conduct 
unconventional warfare, they tend to have greater adaptation costs. The U.S. 
forces paid 54 billion dollars for the Korean War but spent 140 billion dollars for 
warfare in Vietnam.
342
 Likewise, American forces used 630 thousand tons of air 
bombs for the Korean War, whereas they dropped 7,550 thousand tons of air 
                                                 
340
 NationMaster, http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/eco_gdp_in_197-economy-
gdp-in-1970 (Accessed October 6, 2010).  
341
 Choi, Statistics of the Vietnam War & ROK Armed Forces, 11. 
342
 Ibid., 22.  
  146 
bombs for the Vietnam conflict.
343
 Ironically, despite lower costs, the U.S. won 
the Korean War in the sense that the U.S. forces with other U.N forces 
successfully defeated the invasion of North Korean troops in South Korea. 
However, it lost the Vietnam conflict despite massive warfare costs. Why was this 
massive amount of warfare cost ineffective? The U.S. failure springs from the 
nature of COIN. Destruction led by heavy weapons rarely guarantees COIN 
success, but rather selective suppression based on small-unit operations is more 
effective for COIN success by using a population-based method at the same time. 
What is implied here is that COIN forces need to reduce warfare costs by 
minimizing adaptation costs in the first phase of COIN. When American COIN 
forces failed to reduce adaptation costs in the first step, they lost the opportunity 
to make battleground situations favorable to COIN forces. And failing situations 
made American COIN forces rely more on heavy weapons as time went by in 
their attempt to achieve short-term military effectiveness, leading to a vicious 
cycle.  
3. Familiarity with Terrain and Geography 
Similar to Vietnam, the Korean peninsula was divided into two countries. 
Divided geography was familiar to South Korean soldiers. This familiarity 
contributed to the ROK military‟s efforts to gain the hearts and minds of the 
Vietnamese population. In 1967 when the Tiger Division conducted their eight 
operations around Cu-Mong Pass, an old man shouted something to soldiers; “My 
wife and daughter were helped by the ROK soldiers at a market at Cu-Mong Pass 
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[ ] They kept giving them food and medicine for more than one year. I think that 
now is the time for me to repay their kindness.”344 The Tiger Division took over 
part of its area of responsibility from American troops near the border between 
South Vietnam and North Vietnam. The Tiger Division named a market 
“Panmunjom” around this area and offered food to local residents.345 South and 
North Vietnamese people got together at 9:00 am every day, and as time went by, 
this market became popular even to North Vietnamese under communist rule.
346
 
Thus, this market served as an opportunity for more North Vietnamese to defect 
from North Vietnam. Defectors offered the ROK forces much information about 
enemies, which made their operations easier.  
In addition to the market, when the Second Company, the Tiger Division 
26th Regiment One Battalion, took charge of this area, “Panmunjom” became a 
security-guaranteed area where North and South Vietnamese could both meet, 
similar to Korean Panmunjom between North and South.
347
 The Korean forces‟ 
experience in Korean Panmunjom allowed Korean soldiers to manage remarkably 
well in this area. To put it another way, the ROK experience from the Korean 
peninsula helped successful management of this area. The Korean troops‟ success 
in 1966 allowed local Vietnamese in that area, like the above old man, to 
welcome the ROK troops‟ operation in 1967, not oppose it.  
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The features of the terrain in Vietnam were also similar to those of South 
Korea in the sense that South Korea is mountainous. The ROK forces had always 
been trained in mountainous areas. Thus, they were able to reduce the time 
required to adapt to mountainous or jungle areas. Moreover, military terrain with 
which South Korean forces were familiar in the DMZ at home were not so 
different from the battlegrounds in Vietnam in the sense that they had to vigilantly 
secure their areas. Their familiarity with securing the DMZ reduced adaptation 
costs by effectively deterring Viet Cong within a relatively short amount of time. 
Regiment commander Hyun-soo Shin stated in 1966 that he gave his soldiers 
directions for how to deal with guerillas based on South Korean soldiers‟ 
experiences in the DMZ.
348
 
4. The Organized Military of a Functioning State 
Since South Korea experienced the severe Korean War, the ROK military 
rapidly expanded its strength to deter another North Korean attack in the 1950-60s. 
Thus, in this period, the ROK military already had 630,000 personnel.
349
 In 
particular, it possessed 566,960 army soldiers and 24,000 Marines, who were the 
main forces conducting COIN in Vietnam. In the period, the ROK military sought 
to field 18 active and 10 reserve army divisions.
350
 In addition, it already had a 
plan to organize “a fleet marine force comprised of one marine division with 
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necessary and appropriate combat.”351 The ROK military also sought to increase 
the strength of the navy and air force in this period. The ROK Air Force had about 
200 fighter aircraft, and the ROK Navy had about 60 ships in this period.
352
 South 
Korea had a well organized military. Thus, the ROK military thus, unlike the 
weak states, played a substantive role in the Vietnam conflict, rather than a 
symbolic one. If the ROK military had not had organized military strength, the 
ROK COIN forces might have been just a symbolic player.  
B. Non-material Environments: The ROK‟s Socio-Cultural Assets 
     South Korea also had four non-material advantages: connections on a societal 
level, better cultural understanding, an initially favorable response from the local 
population, and consensus with the ROK‟s domestic population. These non-
material environments refer to socio-cultural advantages of South Korea.  
1. Socio-historical Position: Connections on a Societal Level 
The societal setting of South Korea was connected and similar to that of 
Vietnam. First, economic communication led to societal connection. In 1963, 
when the ROK forces were dispatched to Vietnam, South Korea had already 
exported 12.14 million dollars‟ worth of items to Vietnam.353 Thus, societal 
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connections between two countries became closer than before, and the two 
peoples communicated more often.  
Second, both South Korea and Vietnam had similar societally- and 
politically-divided situations. In particular, both countries were divided between 
two governments by foreign powers‟ influence. Vietnam was divided into two 
states after World War II. South Vietnam was under the control of France, and 
North Vietnam was under the influence of China.
354
 Thus, two opposing societal 
groups were created in Vietnam: communist in the north and anti-communist in 
the south. Similar to Vietnam, South Korea was divided into two governments as 
a result of external powers‟ influence. When World War II was over, a communist 
block based on the Soviet Union and China was in charge of North Korea, 
whereas a democratic block, led by the U.S., controlled South Korea where its 
domestic political system remained authoritarian but was anti-communist. Thus, 
similar to Vietnam, there were two fighting societal groups – communism and 
anti-communism – on the Korean peninsula. This socio-historical similarity 
encouraged the Vietnamese to feel friendlier towards South Koreans. For example, 
South Vietnam President Ngo Dinh Diem already felt friendlier towards South 
Koreans and their President, Park Chung Hee, before the South Korean troops‟ 
dispatch.
355
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Third, there was a similarity of appearance between South Koreans and the 
Vietnamese. The Vietnamese felt friendlier towards South Korean troops than 
towards American troops because South Korean soldiers looked similar to the 
Vietnamese. General Chae stated in 1969 that since “we [South Koreans] look 
similar to them [Vietnamese], they believed what we said.”356 Similarly, South 
Korean veteran Jung-hui Song states that South Korean forces were better 
positioned for conducting civil-military operations than American forces because 
the Vietnamese felt friendlier towards South Korean forces due to similarities 
between Koreans and Vietnamese in terms of appearance and traditions.
357
 By the 
same token, a local newspaper also mentioned the positive effects of similarity in 
the ethnic groups‟ physical appearances. The editorial of The Saigon Post stated 
during the Vietnam conflict that South Korean soldiers looked similar to 
Vietnamese although they are taller and they seemed to be just neighbors rather 
than remote foreigners.
358
  
Fourth, South Korean society understood Vietnamese society‟s aspiration 
for independence. South Koreans were under the rule of Japan from 1910 to 1945, 
and thus, they understood how precious national independence is. The 
Vietnamese had been ruled by foreign powers for a long time, and thus, the status 
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of an independent nation was regarded as crucial for them. Boosted by their 
experiences at home, the ROK COIN forces tried to show their similarities with 
the Vietnamese as part of gaining the hearts and minds of the local population. 
For example, when they constructed a new high school in 1966, they built a main 
gate with the same design as the Independence Gate of South Korea. This plan 
was intended to show the Vietnamese that South Koreans hoped Vietnam would 
become a unified independent nation as soon as possible.
359
 
Finally, South Korean society experienced hardship in war through the 
Korean War. American soldiers had been stationed in South Korean society 
during and after the Korean War. Thus, South Koreans and the Vietnamese were 
sympathetic to each other in terms of their reliance on foreign troops. General 
Chae argues that this similarity helped the ROK forces achieve mission success in 
Vietnam.
360
 In a nutshell, based on all of the above societal similarities, South 
Korean forces were able to recognize problems on a societal level quickly.  
2. The Initial Response of Local Population to the ROK Forces 
The Vietnamese population did not welcome South Korean forces warmly 
in the beginning. At the same time, they did not have animosity to the ROK forces 
either. Rather, the aforementioned element – connections on a societal level – 
made the ROK COIN forces increasingly favorable to mission success as time 
went by. The engineer battalion commander of the Dove unit, Ki-bong Oh, who 
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was dispatched before combat troops, states that although the Vietnamese did not 
cooperate with American troops, they voluntarily cooperated with South Korean 
soldiers.
361
  
The Vietnamese maintained a relatively favorable image of South Koreans 
in the initial phase of COIN because the Vietnamese recognized similarities 
between their country and South Korea. The direct similarity that the Vietnamese 
identified was that South Koreans were Oriental (Asian) people just like them. 
Thus, the Vietnamese rarely saw the ROK military as a foreign occupier, unlike 
the U.S. military. Veteran Chang-kyu Jang recollects that the Vietnamese treated 
South Korean soldiers like friends because of their societal and cultural 
similarities.
362
 The societal advantage of being the same oriental people was often 
used as a way to persuade Viet Cong guerillas to defect. A flyer was circulated 
bearing some statement that “since there would be a military attack here, we 
[South Korean soldiers], as an Oriental people just like you, came here to save 
you.”363 The second facet of their similarity is that South Koreans faced divided 
nations just like the Vietnamese.
364
 Korea had been divided into two countries 
since the Korean War. The sympathetic response from the local Vietnamese, 
boosted by these two similarities, made the ROK COIN forces favorable to civil-
military operations, particularly the first impression tactics.  
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Thus, the function of commonality as Oriental people was embedded in the 
minds of the Vietnamese people to constitute a relatively favorable image to the 
ROK forces from the beginning. A South Korean veteran who arrived at Vietnam 
in 1966, Young-ho Tak, recollects in a memoir that the local population 
maintained a favorable image of South Korean forces. He noted that despite their 
favorable image, the local Vietnamese were often reluctant to cooperate with the 
ROK forces because they were afraid of revenge from the Viet Cong.
365
 What this 
implies is that when the local population was physically secure, it was more 
willing to cooperate with the ROK military than with Western militaries.  
3. Cultural Position: Better Understanding of Battleground Culture  
The ROK COIN forces‟ better understanding of battleground culture played 
a key role in minimizing the adaptation costs required by COIN forces. One 
document issued by the ROK military states that “the ROK military in Vietnam 
successfully completed operations to control assigned areas along with civil-
psychological operations based on better understanding Vietnamese who had 
history, culture, and custom similar to South Korean.”366 The ROK forces better 
understood Vietnamese culture in three aspects: Confucian norms, the influence 
of religious leaders on the function of community, and traditions (e.g., marriage 
ceremony).  
First, South Koreans shared Confucian cultural norms, stressing a 
hierarchical relationship between seniors and juniors based on age. Thus, the 
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ROK COIN commanders stressed the importance of observing Confucian-based 
local culture. General Chae kept requesting that his soldiers respect old people 
and village leaders.
367
 More importantly, South Korean soldiers easily understood 
what their commanders meant when they were told to respect Vietnamese culture 
because they lived in a society where Confucian culture worked. Thus, in order to 
show village leaders respect, South Korean soldiers often handed relief supplies to 
village leaders, rather than directly to village residents.
368
 South Korean soldiers 
also showed senior residents their respect both materially and mentally. To that 
end, the ROK COIN forces built a resting place where seniors easily got together 
and had conversations.
369
 The ROK military‟s better understanding of the local 
cultural rule took effect quickly. For example, good relations with village leaders 
and seniors encouraged guerillas to defect from the Viet Cong.
370
  
In addition, Confucian culture emphasized non-material assets. General 
Chae encouraged his soldiers to “give local populations your hearts, not 
materials.”371 Thus, the ROK COIN forces did not simply give the Vietnamese 
materials, such as food. Rather, they tried to investigate the opinions of the local 
population who received food. To that end, they conducted a survey of the local 
Vietnamese. One of the questions in the survey was whether they felt thankful to 
the ROK forces who provided relief activities. After 3,245 Vietnamese were 
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interviewed by the ROK military, about 86 percent of interviewees answered that 
they were thankful to South Korean troops.
372
 In a similar vein, General Chae 
often put on Vietnamese traditional costume when he visited local villages to gain 
hearts and minds of the local population.
373
 
Furthermore, a key principle of Taekwondo was similar to the Confucian 
tradition that the Vietnamese had maintained because Taekwondo stresses 
etiquette and respect based on hierarchical relations. In order to maximize this 
advantage from Taekwondo, the ROK COIN forces taught the local Vietnamese 
Taekwondo. Taekwondo class was very popular and more Vietnamese 
participated in Taekwondo classes over time (see Table 15).  
Table 15 
The Increase of Vietnamese Trainees for Taekwondo 
Year 1962-
3 
196
4 
196
5 
196
6 
196
7 
196
8 
196
9 
197
0 
197
1 
197
2 
Instructors 4 10 20 100 146 198 205 208 199 22 
Vietnamese 139 440 1,602 5,405 81,64
8 
104,4
10 
137,2
95 
174,0
83 
196,9
71 
210,2
06 
Source: Choi, Statistics of the Vietnam War & ROK Armed Forces, 140.  
 
Taekwondo classes made the local Vietnamese feel closer to South Korean 
soldiers. In addition to the function of Taekwondo in making South Koreans feel 
close to Vietnamese, this martial art functioned as a psychological tactic. Viet 
Cong guerillas were afraid of close man-to-man fights because they thought that 
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all South Korean soldiers had professional Taekwondo training. South Korean 
veteran Jang-rae Son states that there were beliefs that South Korean soldiers 
were brave and were able to break bricks with just their hands, which made 
guerillas fearful.
374
  
Confucian cultural norms also highlight the importance of etiquette and 
well-mannered behavior. The ROK soldiers knew how to treat people who live 
under Confucian culture well. Thus, the ROK military commanders always 
stressed that Korean soldiers had to be courteous to local residents. Honda shows 
a typical example to distinguish between Korean and American soldiers, as has 
been noted earlier.
375
  
The second advantage served by better cultural understanding was that the 
ROK soldiers understood societal culture where religious leaders affected the 
local population more than governmental officials did. The ROK troops 
maintained close relations with various religious leaders, such as the Buddhist 
leader, Chau.
376
 Moreover, when the ROK forces visited villages, the first place 
that they went was the local religious leader‟s residence.377 When there were 
religious ceremonies, they also sent Buddhist South Korean soldiers to local 
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Buddhist temples and Christian South Korean soldiers to local churches.
378
 Good 
relations with religious leaders contributed to gaining the hearts and minds of the 
local population in Vietnam. For example, the Marine brigade carried out 
Operation: Cheongryeong One in Tuy Hoa from December 1965-January 1966. 
The ROK Marines protected Tuy Hoa residents during the harvest, and sometimes 
they directly helped the Vietnamese collect crops. Furthermore, they maintained 
good relations with religious leaders. Thus, when Marines were preparing for the 
withdrawal from Tuy Hoa after accomplishing their mission in January 1966, a 
Buddhist leader and his followers demonstrated to oppose the ROK Marines‟ 
withdrawal.
379
  
Finally, the ROK soldiers were able to understand the traditions of the local 
Vietnamese because their traditions were similar. For example, a Vietnamese 
marriage ceremony was similar to a South Korean one. South Korean tradition 
vis-à-vis marriage was that when there is marriage ceremony, all neighboring 
people get together to celebrate the new couple because South Korean society is 
community-based rather than individual-based. Thus, when there was marriage, 
South Korean soldiers participated in the marriage ceremony. In particular, the 
Marine brigade sent a company commander to the marriage ceremony with some 
gifts, such as rice and candles.
380
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Since the ROK soldiers better understood battleground culture based on 
their own culture, they were better positioned to conduct hearts and minds 
operations. For example, when South Korean soldiers visited villages, local 
villagers offered them corn. The problem was that the corn was infested with flies. 
Since South Korean soldiers understood that it is regarded as good manners to eat 
food that is offered, they ate the corn anyway. More than that, South Korean 
soldiers intentionally asked villagers “whether we can get more for later.”381 In 
addition, while American soldiers never bowed to local villagers, South Korean 
soldiers readily did because bowing was their tradition as well.
382
  
Better understanding of battleground culture based on similar traditions 
made the local Vietnamese recognize South Korean troops as friendly soldiers. 
Put simply, better understanding of battlefield culture reduced adaptation costs for 
a population-based method, and by doing so, the ROK troops were better able to 
gain the hearts and minds of the local population. Bam Re O, who was a leader in 
Phe Diem village, stated in 1967 that his village residents hoped that they would 
develop their village with the help of South Korean soldiers who came from a 
country with similar traditions.
383
 South Korean veteran Chang-won Kim also 
recollects that when local residents would take to the streets for demonstrations, 
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they would set American cars on fire, but they would allow South Korean cars to 
safely pass on the streets.
384
  
4. Intangible Resources: Non-material Role of Domestic Population 
COIN requires a long engagement for success: historically it took at least 
ten years to accomplish COIN. At the same time, it requires a lot of money and 
supplies. Thus, without the steadfast support from one‟s home population, it is 
difficult for a country to send its troops on a COIN mission and for COIN forces 
to continue their mission. In a similar vein, when a larger audience carefully 
recognizes the importance of this mission, mission teams are likely to be more 
eager for mission success base on increased material and non-material resources.  
A larger audience, including the ROK domestic population, gave the ROK 
military‟s mission more attention than routine missions. The South Korean 
population supported the engagement of the ROK troops in Vietnam because it 
identified two utilities of their mission: security and economy. First, the security 
utility motivated the South Korean population to support troop dispatch. To begin 
with, South Koreans thought that it was a good opportunity for South Korea to 
repay countries that helped it against communist countries during the Korean War. 
In addition, they also thought that the mission in Vietnam was necessary for South 
Korean security itself in a situation where anti-communist South Vietnam was 
being challenged by communist North Vietnam. North Korea rapidly sought 
military modernization and thus wanted to seize the chance to force South Korea 
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to be communist when President Park Chung Hee and military leaders discussed 
the matter of dispatching forces to Vietnam.
385
 Surrounded by serious threats from 
a communist country, South Koreans were armed with extreme anti-Communism 
sentiment. Accordingly, they viewed the Vietnam War as a necessary war to 
secure the South within the Korean peninsula as well as internationally. As a 
result, South Koreans supported their troops dispatch.
386
 
Second, economic utility played a role in making South Koreans support 
their troop dispatch. This was a very crucial period to develop the South Korean 
economy further, and the entire nation paid tremendous attention to getting out of 
poverty under the new village (Saemaŭl) movement. The ROK military‟s 
activities in Vietnam directly contributed to expanding the export markets of 
South Korea. Most military supplies that the ROK COIN forces used were 
imported directly from South Korea.
387
 In particular, Kimchi, which South Korean 
forces ate, was imported directly from South Korea.
388
 
Consensus from South Koreans helped the South Korean Congress 
unanimously pass the agreement for the first dispatch to Vietnam on July 31, 
1964.
389
 Under the support of domestic politics, the first combat troops were sent 
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to Vietnam without much challenge, considering the importance of this mission. 
The South Korean congress passed the bill to send additional troops on March 20, 
1966. Ninety-five congressmen voted for this bill, and only twenty-seven voted 
against it.
390
  
When the ROK National Assembly passed the bill to dispatch South 
Korean troops to Vietnam, the South Korean population reelected the incumbent 
as their president. The 6th presidential election took place in May 1967, while the 
ROK forces were carrying out overseas operations in Vietnam. Since there was 
consensus about the importance of these missions among the South Korean 
population, the incumbent President Park Chung Hee, who sent his troops to 
Vietnam, won the election by about 1.2 million votes.
391
   
The ROK population positively evaluated South Korean forces‟ role in 
Vietnam in the post-Vietnam era as well. According to a survey conducted in 
1999, 69.1 percent of interviewees positively evaluated the dispatch of South 
Korean troops to Vietnam, whereas only 6.8 percent of those interviewed 
negatively evaluated it.
392
 Moreover, in the same survey, when it came to the 
mission‟s contribution to national development, 85.8 percent of interviewees 
answered that it had significantly contributed to development, whereas 4.8 percent 
of South Koreans answered “no.”393 
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Domestic support contributed to an increase in the morale of deployed 
soldiers. South Korean veteran Gi-taek Kim recollects that the vigorous support of 
South Koreans at home contributed to the ROK forces‟ success by helping South 
Korean soldiers adapt to the Vietnamese battleground more quickly.
394
 The 9th 
commander of the Maeng Ho division, Chun-kun Lee, who won the battle of Duc 
Co in 1966, also states that the national level of support made it possible for the 
ROK forces to win battles in Vietnam, and national support was directly 
connected to the soldiers‟ performance.395 In addition, the ROK COIN forces 
were able to develop their capability due to increasing the number of volunteer 
soldiers encouraged by support from the domestic population. To put it another 
way, continued mobilization of qualified soldiers was not that difficult.  
I examined how South Korea‟s material and non-material advantages 
contributed to its COIN success in Vietnam. Cultural and political characteristics 
and advantages made South Korea‟s mission success in Vietnam more probable, 
which confirms the political and socio-cultural advantages hypothesis (hypothesis 
3).  
VII. Conclusion: Sufficient Condition of the ROK COIN Success in Vietnam 
A. The Change of Willingness and Capability over Time 
South Korea‟s eagerness for mission success in Vietnam was converted to 
workable capability, as I pointed out earlier. The ROK COIN forces had the 
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capacity for COIN missions by adopting an appropriate COIN approach, 
organizational flexibility, the best soldiers, and optimal assets. At the same time, 
the ROK COIN forces made the best use of their political and socio-cultural 
advantages. Thus, they effectively suppressed Viet Cong insurgents and captured 
weapons that guerillas used (see Table 16). Furthermore, they successfully carried 
out civil-psychological operations.  
Table 16  
The Effective Suppression of Insurgents in Vietnam 
Scope 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 Total 
Killed 517 5,117 7,387 9,035 8,014 3,456 4,633 3,261 42 41,462 
POWs 121 1,404 1,638 655 329 281 166 39  4,633 
Defect 4 512 884 720 188 63 52 60  2,483 
Captured 
weapons 
30 1,545 4,747 3,565 5,308 2,251 2,253 1,252 21 20,972 
Choi, Statistics of the Vietnam War & ROK Armed Forces, 80.  
 
However, the ROK COIN forces fought better in the first period (1965-66) 
than in the period of preparing for withdrawal (1971-73).
396
 The South Korean 
military‟s performance in battles tended to be exaggerated during the period of 
1971-73, although it was true that they still fought better than other coalition 
forces.
397
 The variation of South Korean soldiers‟ performance can be explained 
by a difference in enthusiasm for the mission in Vietnam. The Paris Peace Talks 
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to discuss the end of the Vietnam conflict started on May 10, 1968. Subsequent 
talks and the worsening political situation in South Vietnam forced the U.S. to 
seriously think about withdrawing its troops from Vietnam.
398
  
Thus, South Korean soldiers started to see their mission as less important 
during the period of 1971-73 than during the first period. Soldiers‟ willingness for 
mission success was reduced, and accordingly, their capability was also 
weakened.
399
 South Korean veteran Kyung-suk Park argues that South Korean 
soldiers‟ pride diminished during this period.400 He further argues that when 
officers tried to give soldiers high-level training in order to increase their pride 
and willingness, soldiers were disgruntled.
401
 One example of this lack of 
enthusiasm that ended in failure was the Anke Pass battle. The ROK COIN forces 
failed to recognize the infiltration of enemies in March 1972, and thus, they were 
severely damaged during the Anke Pass operations.
402
 General Deuk-man who 
served as the Maeng Ho division‟s general during 1971-73, notes some problems 
of the Anke Pass operations in 1972. He states that soldiers neglected to indentify 
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enemies‟ activities and that they passively engaged in battles.403 In this battle, 75 
South Korean soldiers were killed in action and 222 soldiers were injured.
404
 
Another veteran, Jong-sik Kim, who served as a company commander 
during the 1971-1973 period, states that South Korean soldiers lacked the 
willingness to win the battle, and they paid more attention to their own survival 
during the Anke Pass operations.
405
 Furthermore, Jong-tae Jeong, who served as a 
platoon commander during these operations, recollects that although he ordered 
his soldiers to move forward, not even one soldier moved; they just hid their 
heads in the drainage cannel.
406
 He also states that many soldiers started to ask 
why they had to fight here in Vietnam, doubtful of the importance of their 
mission.
407
 These issues were rarely raised in the first period.  
By the same token, in contrast with the soldiers‟ desire for combat in the 
first phase of the Vietnam mission, soldiers rarely wanted to see combat in the 
later period. This difference clearly shows that soldiers‟ morale was very low. 
South Korean veteran Sung-baek Wi, who served in the 30th regiment of the Baek 
Ma division, recollects that although his regiment was composed of the maximum 
number of soldiers, they lacked military discipline and preparedness for combat 
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during Operation: Dong Bo 18 in 1972.
408
 He further argues that symbolic 
operations cannot be successful, and combat success requires a mission with 
purpose.
409
 Movement toward withdrawal of all COIN coalition forces prevented 
the logic of unusual mission from working, and by doing so, South Korean 
soldiers were less enthusiastic and capable in this period.  
In a nutshell, while one axis (political/socio-cultural advantages) of mission 
success was not changed on the battleground, the other axis (the nature of 
important mission) rapidly changed in the 1971-73 period. The ROK military, 
which was struggling with a lack of morale and capability in this period, was not 
able to succeed with only political and socio-cultural advantages.  
B. Sufficient Condition of COIN Success in Vietnam 
The nature of the important mission – the first overseas mission in modern 
Korean history – served as the primary driver of COIN success because it 
increased the willingness and capability of the ROK COIN forces. Political and 
socio-cultural advantages of South Korea served as the second driver, which 
accelerated the ROK‟s COIN capacity. Accordingly, the nature of the unusual 
mission and political/socio-cultural advantages, taken together, were a sufficient 
condition for COIN success because they reduced the required adaptation costs. 
The two drivers allowed the ROK military to become a reliable and substantial 
fighter in Vietnam, particularly in the first six years of ROK involvement. When 
it appeared that the United States would leave Vietnam in the early 1970s, ROK 
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forces morale significantly declined, and their mission success atrophied in 1971-
73.  
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CHAPTER 4 THE ROK MILITARY’S COIN IN IRAQ 
I. Overview 
The Iraq War, just like the Vietnam War, was conducted as a conventional 
conflict between state actors (states‟ coalition forces led by the United States and 
the other state, Iraq), namely Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in the first phase of 
the war in 2003. As I pointed out earlier, the crucial assets in conventional 
warfare are firepower and technology. The American-led forces, armed with 
massive kinetic power and state-of-the art technology, seized Baghdad only 20 
days after the first attack on March 20, 2003, and President Bush declared 
completion of the mission on the USS Abraham Lincoln on May 1, 2003: “my 
fellow Americans: Major combat operations in Iraq have ended.”410 The success 
of this conventional major campaign, however, did not lead to strategic success 
because it gave rise to social disorder followed by a power vacuum and violence 
throughout the country. This disorder permitted a strong insurgency to rise, which 
made Iraq become an unconventional warfare battlefield composed of various 
insurgencies, such as indigenous Sunni insurgencies and foreign al-Qaeda 
insurgencies led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.  
         Unlike the Afghanistan War, from the beginning the U.S. war in Iraq was 
not supported by the U.N. and international society. Faced with lack of legitimacy 
for the Iraq War, the U.S. asked countries to form a “Coalition of the Willing 
(COTW)”.411 This coalition of mission in Iraq intended to achieve international 
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legitimacy for the Iraq War rather. Strong U.S. influence persuaded 63 countries 
to become members for an international COTW. A number of weak powers, such 
as Ethiopia, Mongolia, and Macedonia, were among its members. Thus, the U.S., 
did not expect the COTW countries to play a substantial role in COIN in Iraq but 
rather as a cover to help them justify American-led military actions in Iraq.   
By contrast, South Korean COIN forces played a significant role in the Iraq 
COIN mission. Seoul sent one division unit to the Kurdish region in northern Iraq 
– Arbil – to conduct COIN operations; the ROK forces were assigned to the most 
stable part of Iraq but there were still insurgent activities, such as bombing (see 
Table 17). It was the third largest number of troops after the U.S and Britain. The 
ROK COIN forces successfully controlled the security of assigned areas based on 
a population-centered approach. They helped local Iraqis establish political, 
economic, and societal infrastructures. South Korean soldiers had high motivation 
to successfully achieve their mission in Iraq. At the same time they had sufficient 
COIN capability as a consolidated middle power with an organized military. 
Furthermore, South Korea‟s COIN experience in both its homeland and Vietnam 
and connections on a societal level with Iraqis contributed to its success in Iraq. 
Thus, the South Korean military became as a substantial player in Iraq rather than 
a symbolic player.  
Table 17 
Deployed Soldiers 
Year 2003-04 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Unit Seohee/Jema Zaytun Zaytun Zaytun Zaytun Zaytun 
Number 300 per year 3,000 3,600 2,300 1,200 650 
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Total 1,141 19,032 (Man-days) 
Source: The ROK Ministry of Defense, “Kukche p„yŏnghwa yuji hwaltong (International peace-
keeping activities),” http://www.mnd.go.kr (Accessed October 8, 2010).  
 
II. The ROK Military’s Success in Iraq 
The Iraq mission between 2003 and 2008 conducted by the Korean Zaytun 
Division was successful in the sense that the COIN forces won the “hearts and 
minds” of the local Iraqi population without a single casualty of South Korean 
soldiers. In a situation where insurgent activities were less dominant in Arbil than 
other regions in Iraq, a population-centered method was the best choice in the 
Kurdistan region of the North, which turned out to be successful in securing the 
assigned region in a non-militaristic way. For example, the stabilization of Arbil 
by the ROK forces allowed more international companies to invest in the region. 
In the Dohuk area, including Arbil, of the northern region of Iraq, the number of 
international companies increased from 100 in 2004 to 404 in 2007.
412
 The local 
population in Arbil also increased from 700,000 in 2004 to 1,300,000 in 2008 due 
to the increased security and infrastructure building.
413
 
The Zaytun Division became the role model of a population-centered 
approach to other COIN forces. The U.S. Assistant Secretary for Political-
Military Affairs, John Hillen, visited the Zaytun division with a “thank you” letter 
from U.S. Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice on January 17, 2006. He said to the 
Zaytun division Commander, Seoung-Jo Jung, that “in a situation where 
American forces are strong for military combat but weak for civil affair 
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operations, South Korean forces‟ civil affair operations integrating politics, 
economy, and culture are the textbook model for American forces.”414  
The U.S. military gave South Korean forces much credit. The American 
Task Force which visited the area of responsibility assigned to the South Korean 
military on January 4, 2007 also praised the remarkable role of South Korean 
troops in stabilizing the region. The team said that they “had just witnessed a 
textbook demonstration of an effective way to go about „winning hearts and 
minds‟ of the local population through the Korean military detachment at 
Zaytun.”415  
In addition, on October 20, 2006 Maj. Gen Caldwell, spokesman for the 
Multinational Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) said to the Zaytun Division Commanding 
General Hwang that “You are an example of what is possible for all of Iraq,” 
emphasizing “hearts and minds.”416 Thus, there was a growing consensus about 
“Zaytun-Like Operations.”417 American Lieutenant General Chiarelli who hosted 
a meeting with other countries‟ commanders on January 19, 2006 stressed four 
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times that “we have to conduct operations just like the ROK forces.”418 In this 
meeting, he stressed the importance of the non-kinetic fight in Iraq. Similarly, 
Chief of U.S. Central Command, Admiral William Fallon, who visited the Zaytun 
division on March 26, 2007 said that “the Zaytun division is a role model for 
allies of MNF-I.”419 In a similar vein, General Petraeus sent his high ranking 
officers to the Zaytun division to learn the know-how of the ROK military‟s 
success in Arbil on March 31, 2008.
420
  
Asked by MNF-I Command, the Zaytun division finally published 
ZAYTUN CMO (Civil Military Operation) Handbook in order to share its secrets 
of successful COIN with other allies. This handbook stressed the concept of 
Operation Iraqi Future (OIF) which was different from Operation Iraqi Freedom 
(OIF).
421
 Just as the ROK COIN forces taught U.S. forces the concept of 
company-led tactical base in Vietnam, they taught the U.S. forces the concept of 
civil-military operations this time in Iraq.  
The remarkable success of the ROK COIN forces in Iraq was known to 
other countries as well. The Toronto Sun, a Canadian newspaper, praised South 
Korean forces‟ success in Iraq under the title of “Koreans Build Iraq Success” on 
October 18, 2006.
422
 This newspaper introduced the Zaytun division Commander 
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Joong-sun Hwang as a great commanding officer who knows “how to win battles 
without fighting.”423 The newspaper also stated that “Over the past three years, his 
19 doctors, 32 paramedics and 460 medical personnel, supported by 1,400 combat 
Marines and special-forces commandos, and 1,600 army engineers have virtually 
made themselves crucial to the people.”424  
The Iraqi government also noticed the remarkable achievement that the 
ROK COIN forces made in Arbil. The Iraqi Defense Minister who visited South 
Korea in January 2009 praised South Korean forces‟ performance in Arbil while 
saying that “there were no beautiful forces like the Zaytun division of the ROK 
military.”425 He further noted that since the Zaytun was stationed, armed 
insurgents were fearful of coming closer to the area [… and] since South Korean 
soldiers treated the local population with manners, Kurdish residents liked the 
Zaytun division.”426 
Best of all, the local Kurdish population showed South Korean soldiers 
their trust. The Iraqi local population in this region often called the Zaytun 
Division “a gift of God.”427 According to Kurdish Globe, the Kurdish local 
newspaper, 84 percent of the Kurdish residents supported the South Korean troops 
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in Arbil.
428
 Friendly relations between South Koreans and Iraqis, encouraged by 
this success, contributed to more productive communication and trade between 
the South Korean and Iraqi governments. In a summit talk between Korean 
President Lee Myung-bak and Iraqi President Jalal Talabani in September 2009 
when South Korean troops successfully completed their mission in Iraq, the Iraqi 
President expressed gratitude for the Koreans‟ efforts to build infrastructure in 
Iraq.
429
 In this summit, the two leaders signed a memorandum to further develop 
infrastructure: construction of a power plant and development of an oil field, for 
example.
430
  
Similarly, the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) president Massoud 
Barzani said that “there is a Kurdish proverb that there are no friends to Kurds 
besides mountains, but now we [Kurds] made another true friend [the Zaytun 
division soldiers].”431 Moreover, the Iraqi population saw the ROK COIN forces 
as friendly troops so that the Iraq military even purchased South Korean military 
uniforms for its own soldiers. The Chosun Ilbo (November 1, 2007) reported in 
2007 that a Korean company would export military uniforms to Iraqi forces.
432
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By the same token, since the ROK COIN forces were successful in 
gaining the hearts and minds of the Kurdish population, they wanted South 
Korean troops to stay longer than initially planned. The ROK military was 
originally scheduled to withdraw its troops no later than the end of 2007. Local 
leaders in Arbil asked for the ROK forces to stay in a meeting with the 
performance evaluation team that was dispatched in October 2007 to examine the 
achievements that the Zaytun division.
433
 In addition to local leaders‟ request, 
according to a survey, 84 percent of Iraqis in Arbil wanted South Korean forces to 
continue to be stationed in this region.
434
  
III. The Nature of the Unusual COIN Mission in Iraq 
         Similar to the Vietnam COIN, the Iraq COIN was an unusual mission. The 
Iraq COIN constituted the second largest overseas dispatch of South Korean 
soldiers after the Vietnam mission. In 1993, South Korean forces started to 
engage in international security, particularly by joining in U.N-led peacekeeping 
operations (PKO). In their first role, they joined in the U.N-led PKO in Somalia 
from July 1993 to March 1994.
435
 ROK forces have participated in these efforts in 
various countries, such as Angola and Western Sahara, since the first effort in 
Somalia. However, the numbers of deployed soldiers had been very limited. Most 
deployed soldiers were liaison officers or observers, and at best, an engineer unit 
of battalion size was dispatched to overseas missions.
436
 Similarly, their activities 
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were confined to supporting roles rather than independent roles. As a consequence, 
the division size of the overseas mission in Iraq was an unusual mission for the 
ROK military; the ROK forces‟ mission in Iraq comprised the largest number of 
troops ever dispatched overseas since the Vietnam mission. This was particularly 
special because they were responsible for the entire Arbil area. This guerilla 
warfare-led mission overseas was also unusual in a situation where the ROK 
forces had been trained primarily for conventional warfare against North Korean 
forces.  
IV. The Function of Unusual Mission I: Willingness 
A. Expected and Achieved Utilities of Mission Success 
     The ROK military‟s COIN mission in Iraq was expected to increase national 
stature interest and prestige both nationally and internationally.
437
 This 
expectation was achieved when the ROK COIN forces were successful in their 
mission in Arbil.  
1. A Key Utility and Byproduct 
Unlike the mission in Vietnam Iraq‟s economic utility was not important 
because South Korea already had become the 10th largest economy in the world. 
Similarly, during the Iraq War, South Korea, as a member of the OECD 
(Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development), had already 
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achieved economic development, unlike the ROK‟s situation during the Vietnam 
conflict.  
However, similar to Vietnam, the ROK military‟s mission in Iraq was 
important for South Korea‟s national security. The ROK regional security 
environment had not changed since the Vietnam War. North Korean armed forces 
still threatened. The Cold War was not over yet on the Korean peninsula. North 
Korean forces still carried out provocative attacks. For example, North Korean 
navy ships conducted gunnery attacks against the South Korean ships around the 
Northern Limit Line (NLL) on June 29, 2002. In this engagement named Icha 
Yŏnp„yŏng haejŏn, one South Korean ship was sunk and six crew members were 
killed in action.
438
  
Similar to the Vietnam period, the alliance between South Korea and the 
United States was key to South Korea‟s security. The alliance was still regarded 
as crucial for national security although the ROK military had become the 10th 
strongest armed force, and ROK forces were stronger than the DPRK forces. This 
was particularly true because China still strongly supported North Korea‟s 
political position.  
In the above regional security environment, American forces remained the 
most important deterrent logic to guarantee for ROK security. The alliance 
between the two countries was considered even more important because North 
Korea was believed to already have nuclear weapons. In the meantime, the Bush 
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administration developed the concept of “strategic flexibility” based on Global 
Posture (GPR). Strategic flexibility was aimed at quickly dispatching American 
soldiers to any place in the world. This could affect American forces in South 
Korea as well. Thus, the defense ministers of South Korea and the U.S. discussed 
this issue in the 2003 ROK-US Security Consultative Meeting (SCM).
439
  
While the U.S. military was struggling with its COIN mission in Iraq, U.S. 
forces in Korea were subjected to relocation. Faced with a need for more soldiers 
in Iraq, Washington sent one brigade (around 4000 soldiers) of American forces 
in Korea to Iraq.
440
 The dispatch of some American forces in South Korea to the 
Iraq mission was regarded as a sign of weakening security on the Korean 
peninsula. As a consequence, the ROK military‟s mission in Iraq became crucial 
for ROK national security to prevent the further transfer of American troops from 
South Korea to Iraq. In this vein, the dispatch of the Zaytun division in August 
2004 contributed to easing the pressure on U.S. forces in Korea. The U.S. plan to 
reduce American troops by 15,000 diminished.
441
 The ROK military mission in 
Iraq precluded additional American troops in South Korea from moving to Iraq 
and contributed to strengthening the alliance between South Korea and the U.S.  
In addition to national security maximization, the South Korean troops‟ 
mission in Iraq contributed to another byproduct: energy security. South Korea is 
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one of the largest exporters in the world. South Korea heavily relies on overseas 
energy to make this economy work. The ROK spends about 40 percent of its 
national budget to import energy.
442
 South Korea is the world‟s largest crude oil 
importer.
443
 In a situation where oil is a fundamental resource for the national 
economy, South Korea needs good relations with Iraq, one of the biggest oil 
export countries.  
Particularly, the Kurdistan region, for which the ROK COIN forces were 
responsible, contained oil. Thus, the successful mission of the ROK COIN forces 
was valuable for energy security for the nation. Since the ROK military was 
successful in winning the hearts and minds of local Kurds in Iraq, the South 
Korean government maintained good relations with the Kurdistan government as 
well. As a consequence, the KRG gave South Korean companies permission to 
develop and produce oil in northern Iraq. For example, on June 25, 2008 when 
ROK COIN forces were conducting stabilization operations in northern Iraq, the 
KRG signed an oil contract with state-owned Korea National Oil Corp.
444
 This 
contract made it possible for South Korea to acquire about 2 billion barrels of 
crude oil which would meet South Koreans‟ oil needs for more than 2.5 years.445  
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The other byproduct that South Korea gained through the successful 
mission of the Zaytun division was South Korean companies‟ participation in a 
variety of reconstruction projects in Arbil. The Zaytun division‟s success in 
winning the hearts and minds of the Kurdish population enticed the KRG to 
consider South Korean companies for infrastructure projects. The KRG invited 13 
South Korean companies to Arbil in July 2007, and both parties negotiated 
contracts worth 23 billion dollars for various projects, such as hydro dam and 
housing facilities. One KRG official told representatives from South Korean 
companies that “as long as the Zaytun division is here, [the KRG] will give South 
Korean companies more benefits.”446  
2. International Political Utility 
South Korea, as a consolidated democracy and a growing economy, has 
sought more engagement in international affairs both militarily and economically 
since the 1990s. Its first military involvement occurred in 1991, when it sent 314 
military medics and transportation corps members to the first Gulf War in Iraq. In 
subsequent years South Korean troops have been sent to many places in the world. 
Seoul was also seeking more economic engagement in world affairs as well. 
However, the scale of ROK military and economic engagement in world affairs 
remained small.  
Thus, the dispatch of one division to one of the most important international 
security missions, COIN in Iraq, was considered to be a golden opportunity to 
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increase its national prestige in the international arena. The ROK Army document 
clearly states that South Korea, at the time the 12th biggest economy in the world 
and a member of OECD, sent its troops to Iraq to play a substantial role in world 
affairs to increase its national prestige.
447
  
While the ROK military‟s mission in Vietnam introduced South Korea to 
international politics, its mission in Iraq served as an accelerator to extend its role 
in the international arena. To put it another way, it offered South Korea an 
opportunity to show the world that South Korea has become a middle power both 
willing and able to contribute to international security. South Korea achieved 
these utilities both in international security affairs and international economic 
affairs. The success of the Zaytun division showed the world that South Korea is 
an active and substantial player for international security beyond simply security 
on the Korean peninsula. At the same time, the Zaytun division showed the global 
economic community that South Korea is capable of building economic 
infrastructure for another country.  
B. National Pride and Morale 
         South Korean soldiers agreed that ROK military and economic 
achievements since the Vietnam War and its close alliance with the United States 
led to Seoul‟s discussion to help Washington and the Iraqis.448 South Korean 
soldiers‟ performance in Iraq increased ROK national prestige. As a consequence, 
South Korean soldiers were equipped with a high degree of pride vis-à-vis their 
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mission. Reporters of The National Defense Journal who visited the Zaytun 
division noted that they could read soldiers‟ pride in their mission.449  
Female non-commissioned officer Kung-mi Hwang who was being trained 
for Iraq in 2004 said that she, representing South Korea, would try her best to give 
Iraqis pride.
450
 Soldiers‟ pride in this mission sometimes guided some soldiers to 
delay their retirement from mandatory military service. When the Zaytun division 
was preparing for Iraq, 500 soldiers of the Zaytun division were supposed to retire 
during their deployment because their mandatory service term was supposed to be 
over. Nevertheless, they voluntarily extended their military service in order to 
participate in the mission in Iraq.
451
 Similarly, according to the survey, 90 percent 
of the Zaytun soldiers answered that their thoughts about life and death 
significantly affected their mission success.
452
 In this vein, their role in increasing 
their country‟s prestige was necessary for their role in COIN in Arbil.  
By the same token, South Korean soldier, Sak Lee, who returned to South 
Korea after completing his duty in 2005, said that “my heart was full of national 
patriotism and pride due to the fact that I used to be one member of the Zaytun 
division.”453 In a similar vein, two brothers, each of whom had abandoned 
permanent residency in the U.S. and Switzerland in order to volunteer to the 
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Zaytun division, strongly showed their pride as members of the Zaytun division 
when they returned to South Korea in September 2006 after accomplishing their 
duties.
454
  
The ROK president also recognized the role of the ROK soldiers in 
increasing national prestige. President Roh Moo-hyun who visited the Zaytun 
division on December 8, 2004 stressed the importance of its mission in Arbil 
while saying that “your [the Zaytun division soldiers] perspiration and efforts 
[here in Arbil] are another power of South Korea as well as a diplomatic power of 
South Korea.”455 
Zaytun division high-ranking officers also encouraged their soldiers to have 
a pride as representatives of South Korea. The first Zaytun division Commander 
Ui-don Hwang stated that “I will let the world know that the South Korean 
military is excellent and South Korea is a peace-loving people” in September 
2004 before the Zaytun division started to conduct operations.
456
 Another Zaytun 
division Commander Joong-sun Hwang stressed that all of his soldiers have to 
approach local residents as if they were South Korea‟s diplomats.457 In a similar 
vein, the Zaytun division in Iraq posted stickers which say that “you are the very 
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South Korea” in its working places.458 Another sticker says that “our sweat and 
efforts are a driver for South Korean power.”459 
National pride and related morale motivated South Korean soldiers to help 
the Iraqi population in Arbil with their hearts, and by doing so, they were 
successfully able to complete COIN in Iraq based on a population-centered 
approach. In an interview with a The Korea Defense Daily reporter two months 
before all South Korean forces withdrew from Arbil, the Zaytun division 
commander Sun-woo Park noted that “South Korean forces were successful in 
winning the hearts and minds of the local population in Arbil through a variety of 
civil-military operations and reconstruction projects.”460 He further said that “[due 
to the Zaytun division‟s mission success] Arbil has been evaluated as the most 
secured area in all of Iraq.”461 
Similarly, the 11th Civil-Military brigade soldiers who came back to South 
Korea in 2006 were proud of themselves in terms of their mission. The brigade 
commander Kuk-sun Im noted in 2006 that he appreciated his country which gave 
him this mission.
462
 Similarly, Lieutenant Colonel Won-cheol Kim said that he 
was proud of the achievements in Arbil.
463
 Captain Jong-kook Im also noted that 
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his experience was the highest source of pride that he had ever had.
464
 In a 
nutshell, Zaytun soldiers were proud of themselves as members of their special 
division, and thus, they maintained high morale. Their pride and morale 
contributed to making themselves become effective COIN players in Arbil, 
confirming hypothesis 1A (the hypothesis of morale and pride). 
C. Enthusiasm for Its Own OPCON and Organization 
The Zaytun Division was composed of two civil-military brigades and other 
supporting groups. Even though its mission was based on a population-centered 
approach, it required well-disciplined soldiers. Thus, around half of them came 
from special forces. When it came to the scope of operational control, the Zaytun 
Division was one member of the chain of command of MNC-I, but conducted 
operations independently under the ROK Joint Chiefs of Command in the 
assigned area, Arbil.
465
  
One of the most important four principles for the South Korean government 
to decide mission area in Iraq was whether it would be possible for the South 
Korean military to conduct independent operations under South Korea‟s own 
command.
466
 Similar to situations in Vietnam, the ROK military thought that 
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independent operations would make COIN success in Iraq better. Thus, the ROK 
military did its utmost to lobby for independent operational authority, and by 
doing so, succeeded. On October 1, 2004, the Zaytun division assumed 
operational command over some areas of the northern Iraq, including Arbil from a 
Striker unit under MNC-I.
467
 This independent authority allowed the ROK forces 
in Iraq to develop their own creative tactics.  
D. Mission Study toward Mission Success 
          Similar to the ROK military‟s efforts to reduce adaptation costs in Vietnam, 
it studied the COIN mission in Iraq in two ways: a historical study and current 
mission-based study. In the historical study, the ROK military focused on two 
factors: a key factor of the ROK COIN success in general and lessons learned 
from a population-focused remedy in the second phase of its mission in Vietnam. 
On the one hand, the key general concept for the ROK COIN was to separate the 
local population from insurgents. This concept had been applied to South Korea‟s 
own fight against Communist guerillas and its overseas fight against the Viet 
Cong. Thus, the Zaytun division adopted this general COIN rule by intensively 
reexamining the South Korean military‟s successful experiences.    
Second, the ROK military strategically reexamined how it had achieved a 
successful outcome in Vietnam because it believed that the Iraq mission would be 
similar to the Vietnam mission in the sense that the mission in Iraq is also 
unconventional warfare, more clearly COIN. In particular, since the ROK military 
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considered the adoption of a population-centered approach to its COIN mission in 
Iraq, it reexamined civil-military operations that the ROK military had carried out 
in the second phase of its COIN mission in Vietnam. By doing so, the ROK COIN 
forces fully identified what to do and how to do it in Iraq before deployment.  
The mission-based study on the battleground was made by dispatching 
soldiers step-by-step in an attempt to reduce adaptation costs. The gradual 
engagement to the Iraq mission proceeded with the following steps: examination 
by a surveillance team, the dispatch of preliminary COIN forces, the mission 
study by an advisory team on the battleground, and finally substantial 
involvement through a fully organized COIN unit.  
As the first step, the ROK military sent three liaison personnel to Kuwait on 
April 7, 2003, and then on April 17, 2003 before the dispatch of preliminary 
COIN forces; they launched a surveillance team which was composed of 20 
soldiers.
468
 This team was intended to investigate battleground situations so that 
preliminary COIN forces were able to play a meaningful role under favorable 
conditions.  
The second step to reduce adaptation costs was made by sending 
preliminary COIN forces before the dispatch of the major mission unit. South 
Korea sent softer troops, the Seohee and Jema units, in its attempt to make the 
Iraqi population maintain a favorable image of South Korean soldiers in Iraq in 
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general.
469
 These units served as an initiator for applying a population-centered 
approach. In contrast with the ROK military‟s enemy-oriented approach in the 
Vietnam conflict, South Korean forces adopted a population-centered approach, 
which stressed the protection of the local population and the construction of 
infrastructure in Iraq. Thus, the Seohee and Jema units (600 soldiers), arrived in 
Southern Iraq (a Shia dominant region) in 2003 to provide the Iraqi population 
with reconstruction-related help and medical services. Seohee and Jema unit 
soldiers were professionally trained particularly focusing on population assistance.  
The third step was initiated by sending the advisory team to the Iraqi 
battleground to figure out the role of the upcoming division level unit in the 
region. The first advisory team was dispatched on September 24, 2003. This team 
was composed of 12 personnel from the Republic of Korea Ministry of National 
Defense (ROKMN), the Republic of Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
(ROKMFAT), and civilian organizations. The second advisory team, led by two 
star Army General Ki-seok Song, arrived at the battleground on April 11, 2004, 
and discussed the upcoming division unit‟s mission with the COIN leading 
country‟s military, the U.S. military.470 In addition to these governmental teams, 
the ROK National Assembly also dispatched its mission study team to Iraq.
471
 In 
particular, the advisory team from the National Assembly suggested the dispatch 
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of an independent unit in December 2003.
472
 Thus, the multi-layered investigation 
allowed the ROK COIN forces to fully understand their mission and the 
battleground situation.  
After promoting a favorable climate to minimize adaptation costs, as the 
last phase of engaging the COIN mission, the ROK military sent a division – the 
Zaytun (meaning olive in Arabic, symbolizing peace) division – to Arbil in 
northern Iraq, which was assigned by the COIN leading country.
473
 The most 
important assignment in this step was for the main unit to safely move to Arbil. 
The safe movement of troops from Kuwait to Arbil was crucial because if South 
Korean forces had been attacked or damaged, their mission would have ended in 
failure before it began. Adapted to battleground situations through gradual 
mission studies, the ROK military successfully moved from Kuwait to Arbil 
without casualties or damage in September 2004.
474
  
The examination of the ROK willingness variable clearly shows how 
importantly the nature of the mission affects their high degree of enthusiasm for 
mission success. The aforementioned expected gains for South Korea through the 
mission in Iraq increased the ROK troops‟ eagerness for mission success, and by 
confirms hypothesis 1B. The eagerness of the ROK COIN forces was converted 
into a high degree of capability required for COIN success in Arbil by allowing 
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them to choose their own COIN methods, making mission organizations workable, 
and dispatching the best trained soldiers to Iraq.  
V. The Function of Unusual Mission II: Capability 
A. A COIN Approach Adoption 
1. Evaluation: The Degree of Insurgent Activities 
One of the most crucial capabilities for the ROK COIN forces was their 
capacity to choose an appropriate approach. They chose a population-centered 
approach as the optimal strategy because Arbil, which was assigned to them, was 
less dominated by insurgents than other areas in Iraq.  
There was no domestic central authority in Iraq after OIF was completed on 
May 1, 2004. Thus, political chaos existed particularly at the time of the general 
election on January 29, 2005. There was a political struggle between Shia and 
Sunni ethnic groups in the process of regaining domestic order. Thus, a variety of 
insurgent groups – Sunni, Shia, and later al-Qaeda – started to rise in the different 
regions of Iraq.  
In the meantime, insurgent groups were relatively less dominant in the 
Kurdistan autonomous area than other areas. In this region, there was a central 
political authority, which was the KRG, and 53,000 KRG security forces were 
playing their role in securing the region.
475
 In addition, two major political parties 
in the region – KDP (Kurdistan Democratic Party) and PUK (Patriotic Union of 
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Kurdistan) – were sharing power in the region. One province of this Kurdistan 
autonomous region, Arbil, was assigned to the ROK COIN forces. Taking 
advantage of the low degree of insurgent activities in this area, the ROK COIN 
forces adopted a population-centered approach as the key COIN method.  
What made the adoption of a population-centered approach favorable to 
South Korean forces‟ success? The strongest point was the optimal use of 
resources. COIN requires a lot of money and other resources. In this vein, the 
appropriate COIN method‟s adoption allowed the ROK COIN forces to use their 
resources with maximum effectiveness. They spent most of their resources on 
civil affairs operations rather than military operations by adopting a population-
centered approach after carefully evaluating the Arbil battleground.  
2. Adopted “Hearts and Minds” Tactics 
While the ROK COIN forces in Vietnam adopted the company-led tactical 
base as their key tactic for an enemy-oriented approach, the ROK forces in Iraq 
developed their own creative tactic by adopting the Green Angel program as a 
population-centered approach. On a tactical level, this program was intended to 
help marginalized rural village residents through support from the ROK civil-
military operation team, including medical treatment, electronics repairs, and road 
pavement.
476
 What was important was that the Zaytun soldiers visited the local 
residents in marginalized villages, rather than making the local residents come to 
the Zaytun division. In other words, they helped the local residents before those 
residents asked for a help.  
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On a strategic level, the Green Angel program was aimed at building a 
friendly and cooperative network system with the local population through three 
steps: stabilization, settlement, and development.
477
 Under this operation, Korean 
soldiers and local Iraqis played sports together and shared cultural activities, such 
as traditional dance. For example, the Zaytun division hosted a friendship day 
between South Koreans and Kurds under the slogan of “We are Friends, Peace of 
Kurdish.”478 It also provided the local people with more opportunity to experience 
benefits from the COIN force. This program helped the local population to 
recognize the COIN forces as an aid program rather than an occupying force.
479
  
3. Actions: Infrastructure Building 
A population-centered approach was realized through a variety of 
infrastructure building projects. The Zaytun division built infrastructure as a way 
to separate the local population from insurgents. For example, the Zaytun division 
constructed 280 new facilities.
480
 Therefore, the population-centered approach 
yielded: political, security, economic, and social gains (see Table 18).  
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Table 18 
The ROK COIN Forces‟ Infrastructure Building in Iraq 
Types Key Contents 
Political  
infrastructure  
Cooperation with KRG, KDP, and KNA 
The support for general election  
Security  
infrastructure  
 
The construction of security facilities 
The removal of land mines 
Indigenous security forces training: IA brigade, ING 
Joint inspection sites 
Economic  
infrastructure 
RRT 
The new village movement  
Sewerage facility renovation / road‟s repair 
A step-by-step support by KOICA  
Societal 
infrastructure 
Civil health 
Education 
Job market 
Civil welfare 
 
First, political infrastructure building was made under various organizations, 
such as the Civil Military Center (CIMIC). The CIMIC offered a venue to 
evaluate the soft COIN methods and listen to the requests of the KRG and the 
local people. The ROK COIN forces also cooperated with local political leaders, 
such as Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and KNA (Kurdistan parliament). The 
establishment of legitimate local leadership or government is crucial to weaken an 
insurgency. Thus, the COIN forces supported operations for stabilizing the 
general election process. 
Second, the ROK COIN forces also paid attention to building the security 
infrastructure in Arbil. The ROK forces were in a supporting role for security 
forces rather than direct engagements so that the KRG used its own security 
troops. This indirect role was more effective because indigenous security forces in 
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Arbil were stronger than in other areas in Iraq. Furthermore, the supporting role 
was important for winning the hearts and minds of the local residents because 
Kurds had wanted their own authority. As part of its indirect role, ROK forces 
provided local security forces key items, such as communications systems.
481
 As 
of 2007, the ROK COIN team provided 15,000 items.
482
 They also constructed 
and repaired security facilities, such as key military facilities and inspection posts, 
so that local security forces were able to effectively play their role in protecting 
the local population. For example, the Zaytun division provided the Iraqi Army 
(IA) brigade in Arbil with a new intelligence department building in April 
2006.
483
 Furthermore, the Zaytun division soldiers removed land mines to protect 
local people in coordination with the IKMAC (Iraqi Kurdistan mine action center), 
who were the primary actor.  
More important, the Zaytun Division trained indigenous security forces – 
police forces and military forces, such as the IA brigade and ING (Iraqi National 
Guard).
484
 The unit of MiTT in the Zaytun was in charge of education for military 
forces, whereas the unit of PAT supported education for police forces.
485
 In 
particular, the Zaytun division trained police forces in Arbil through the P3 
(Police-Partnership-Program) plan. It published a Kurdish language textbook for 
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police training, and then it intensively trained police forces in small classes (20-30 
persons per class).
486
 In addition, one of the most original methods by South 
Korean soldiers to train security forces was the Taekwondo school for security 
forces to increase their individual capability in martial arts.
487
 
Third, the ROK COIN forces built economic infrastructure. Cooperating 
with the COIN leading country (the U.S.), the ROK COIN forces developed 
economic structure under the RRT (Regional Reconstruction Team) project. They 
cooperated with KOICA (Korea International Cooperation Agency). They 
repaired roads and renovated sewage facilities under this economic infrastructure 
building project.
488
 Furthermore, they redesigned 20 villages. As of 2007, South 
Korean soldiers paved roads and constructed facilities for electronic generators in 
46 places.
489
 
Lastly, the Zaytun division launched societal infrastructure building 
projects. Society cohesion can collapse in a war-stricken country, which inhibits 
COIN forces from winning the hearts and minds of the local population. The 
ROK COIN forces saw the rebuilding of societal infrastructure in Arbil as 
imperative. Thus, they focused on increasing key societal assets that made society 
work in Arbil: civil health, education, job markets, and civil welfare.  
Above all, as soon as the ROK COIN forces arrived at their assigned area, 
Arbil, they provided the local Iraqi population with the best medical treatment in 
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an effort to promote civil health. The Zaytun hospital, which opened on 
November 27, 2004, provided medical treatment to more than 88,000 Iraqis as of 
2008.
490
 In particular, the Zaytun hospital was regarded as one of the best 
hospitals that gave them emotional treatment as well as physical treatment, and 
thus, it became the most popular hospital in the area. In an effort to show local 
residents South Korean soldiers‟ concern, they operated shuttle buses for local 
residents to the Zaytun hospital.
491
 This hospital became very popular. Due to 
increasing demand from the local population, it was difficult to give all patients 
treatment. Thus, the ROK soldiers had to ask them to bring a document from 
other hospitals which showed that they needed treatment. Encouraged by the 
Zaytun hospital‟s popularity, South Korean forces gave medical treatment tickets 
particularly to Iraqis who provided assistance for ROK forces‟ infrastructure 
building.
492
 These tickets were regarded as one of the best gifts to the local 
residents.  
In addition to offering medical care, the ROK COIN forces encouraged 
local Iraqis to actively engage in societal improvement by training new Iraqi 
medics through an 8-week internship program.
493
 This program was successful 
and popular. For example, on November 8, 2007, one Iraqi medical student, who 
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completed an internship program, said that “South Koreans‟ inherent kindness 
and Jung culture encouraged me to join this program.”494 
The second sector for societal infrastructure was education. The role of 
education was important because it provides children with the opportunities to 
know their own history and culture. To begin with, the ROK COIN forces focused 
on constructing or repairing schools which had to be closed frequently when it 
rained or was cold because the school buildings were in a state of general 
disrepair. They established or repaired around 395 classrooms in schools.
495
 After 
repairing schools, they established a sisterhood relationship with them. The 
literacy rate was just 50 percent in Arbil before South Korean soldiers‟ arrival, 
and thus the ROK COIN forces offered residents a Kurdish language class.
496
 The 
class, which began under the concept of capacity building for residents, became 
popular, and thus, the number of classes was increased from 8 in 2004 to 85 in 
2005.
497
 A total of 7,256 residents took the Kurdish language class during the 
Zaytun division‟s COIN operations.498  
Third, ROK COIN forces activated job markets. This sector displayed by 
two trajectories: hiring local residents and offering vocational training. The ROK 
COIN forces hired local residents as interpreters for their civil-military operations. 
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In addition to interpreters, they hired teachers, Taekwondo instructors, and facility 
personnel. Hiring local residents contributed to increasing constructive 
communication between COIN forces and the local population in a synergistic 
way.
499
 To put it another way, local interpreters played a bridging role between 
the ROK forces and the local residents as well as increasing job opportunities in 
Arbil.  
The ROK COIN forces also provided local residents with vocational 
training. A vocational training center provided uneducated local people with an 
opportunity to learn job-related skills.
500
 About 2,300 local residents took 
vocational training, and graduates who completed this program were guaranteed 
employment.
501
 This became very popular with the local population, as reflected 
in the fact that there were about 7 applicants for each available position.
502
 
Students, who completed this training and then got jobs sent their South Korean 
instructors “thank you” letters.503 The American force, stimulated by the big 
success of the ROK forces‟ vocational training center, started to establish its own 
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vocational centers in October 2007.
504
 U.S. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld told 
MNF-I General Chiarelli that the ROK vocational training center should be 
benchmarked by U.S. forces.
505
  
The last sector that the ROK COIN troops focused on for societal 
infrastructure building was civil welfare. Arbil lacked space for residents to enjoy 
their spare time. Thus, South Korean soldiers constructed a civil park, which was 
equipped with a playground for children and displayed Korean traditional 
architectures. The other big project to enhance civil welfare was the construction 
of a library. This was intended to make local residents see South Korean soldiers 
as friends from a neighboring society rather than an opposing society. This library 
was named the Zaytun library.
506
 The Zaytun library which was completed on 
October 22, 2008 was state-of-the-art in the Kurdistan region and became a 
symbol of civic welfare.  
By the adoption of a population-centered approach the ROK COIN forces 
won the hearts and minds of the local population, confirming hypothesis 2A (the 
hypothesis of COIN method-adoption hypothesis). Just like the ROK soldiers in 
Vietnam were called “Dai Han” by the local Vietnamese, who showed their 
friendly attitude as a consequence of the adoption of a population-based method 
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in the second phase, the ROK soldiers in Iraq were called “Kuri” by the local 
Kurds, illustrative of the overall success of the population-centered approach.
507
  
B. Organizational Flexibility and Training 
The ROK military used to focus on hierarchical and inflexible organization 
because its organization had been developed against a conventional threat, North 
Korea‟s traditional military force. The troops to be sent to Iraq, however, required 
more flexibility to deal with unconventional missions. Thus, the ROK military 
started to make the COIN organization in Iraq more flexible and adaptable to the 
situation.  
What did the ROK COIN forces do for organizational flexibility as part of 
making it possible for a population-centered approach to succeed? First, the 
planning unit of the Zaytun division was established on January 12, 2004 to make 
the mission organization fully effective. This planning unit played a key role in 
preparing for the dispatch of the Zaytun.
508
 The ROK military gave the Zaytun 
soldiers intensive physical training so that they were able to adjust to the desert 
climate.
509
 More importantly, along with the physical training, the ROK military 
attempted to change soldiers‟ conventional warfare-oriented minds. To that end, 
all deployed soldiers took mandatory courses in Islamic culture and the local 
language.  
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Since the ROK military knew the importance of cultural background for 
COIN soldiers, training of COIN soldiers took much longer than normal soldiers‟. 
South Korean men, who are mandatorily conscripted, typically received five 
weeks of military training. In addition to that normal training, the ROK military 
gave the Zaytun soldiers, who had already completed the five weeks mandatory 
training, another six weeks training. Thus, the six-weeks training of South Korean 
soldiers for the Iraq mission was much longer than Americans‟ 16 day training.510 
Moreover, the first group of soldiers deployed in the Zaytun received a full six-
months training for this special mission‟s success. This longer and intensive 
training made it possible for the Zaytun to function as COIN forces within a 
population-centered approach.  
Equally important, the ROK military made a substantial organizational 
change. Based on the Vietnam War experience, ROK COIN forces knew that a 
population-centered method requires flexible organization because it covers non-
military affairs as well as military affairs. Thus, they tried to make mission 
organizations flexible and workable for the stabilization operations by 
establishing necessary sub-organizations. Workable organizations had been made 
in three contexts: Cooperation Committee, POL-MIL, and CIMIC.  
First, the Cooperation Committee was designed to offer a cooperating arena 
between the Zaytun division and the KRG. This Committee has been very active 
ever since it was first established in September 2004. As part of this committee, 
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Zaytun division personnel visited the Arbil government office building, and both 
sides together discussed how to prioritize construction projects.
511
 This 
Committee made construction projects seen as the common work of South Korean 
troops and a regional government rather than as the Zaytun‟s own work. 
Second, the ROK military sought to deal with various dynamics in COIN 
by establishing a sub-organization combining the political sector and military 
sectors. The role of POL-MIL (Political-Military) – a caucus between non-
military leaders and military leaders – guided the COIN organization in its 
unconventional mission. Seoul recognized that the mission in Iraq was more than 
just a simple military operation. Thus, it established POL-MIL on October 26, 
2004 to share information across agencies and discuss better ways to deal with 
this mission.
512
 The POL-MIL is composed of the Zaytun general, South Korean 
ambassador in Iraq, agents of the ROKMFAT, and other governmental 
representatives. If Korean civilians were to be attacked, the domestic population 
might ask the ROK troops to be withdrawn. In this regard, the caucus dealt with 
ways to protect and effectively control Korean civilians who worked on 
reconstruction projects. The Korea Center in the Zaytun Division also played an 
important role in protecting Korean civilians. It served as an organization to 
integrate and process various types of intelligence and information, which 
contributed to protecting Korean soldiers from insurgent attack.  
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Finally, the ROK military established CIMIC (Civil Military Cooperation 
Center) under the command of the Zaytun Division. Participants in CIMIC were 
drawn from various representatives from military officers to NGO (Non-
Governmental Organization) personnel to the representatives from the local Iraqi 
community.
513
 The CIMIC served as the key organization for the entire civil 
affairs operations.  
All of the above organizations contributed to a population-centered 
approach, which required various dimensions beyond simply a military one, 
confirming hypothesis 2B (the hypothesis of organizational flexibility). These 
organizations had become more effective by being operated by the best trainees 
and the most effective soldiers.  
C. Effective Resources 
1. The Best Unit: Appropriate Size and Cultivating Elite Unit 
It is important to take into account the size of mission units depending on 
battleground situations. If too many soldiers with heavily armed weapons are sent 
to areas where insurgents are less dominant, the local population is more likely to 
see them as occupiers, leading to the failure of winning their hearts and minds. At 
the same time, if only military engineers are dispatched to the areas, the COIN 
forces would be vulnerable to insurgent attacks, and furthermore, they would be 
incapable of offering the local people physical security.  
The selection of an appropriate size was one of the most important 
processes for the ROK‟s mission‟s success. The ROK military decided on the 
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division unit as the appropriate size so that the COIN forces were able to carry out 
their own independent operations in Arbil while preventing the unit size from 
being too large. Since Iraqi local forces were in charge of security, the ROK 
COIN forces were designed to focus more on reconstruction operations.  
The Zaytun division was composed of two civil-military brigades (1,000 
special operation soldiers), engineer/medical units (600 soldiers), security forces 
(500 special operation soldiers, 200 soldiers of an armored company, and 100 
Marines), and other troops (1,200 soldiers).
514
 In particular, the Marines, which 
were dispatched to Vietnam for the first time in the history of the ROK military‟s 
overseas operations, were responsible for force protection.
515
 One company size 
of Marines was sent to carry out security patrol missions for the Zaytun division‟s 
protection. What mattered the most was that 1,000 soldiers from special operation 
units were in charge of civil-military operations. Thus, they were good at 
protecting themselves from insurgent attacks as well as conducting civil-military 
operations.  
2. The Best Soldiers: Cultivating Elite Fighters 
Stimulated by a tactical success in Vietnam based on the dispatch of elite 
soldiers, the ROK military chose elite officers and highly-disciplined soldiers as 
its COIN force. Similar to Vietnam, since it was considered an honor to be 
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selected, the competition rate to become Zaytun soldiers was high, with as many 
as 14.8 applicants for each position.
516
 Non-commissioned officer Sueng-ki Sung 
said in 2007 that since he was selected under a high competition, he felt 
honored.
517
 Through careful examination, the ROK military finally selected 3,494 
soldiers as mission warriors. Rotating soldiers were selected with high standards 
as well. The ROK military continued to select the best soldiers by putting an 
announcement about the selection of the Zaytun soldiers in The Korea Defense 
Daily. Candidates who experienced overseas operations and had the local 
language ability were more likely to be selected as mission soldiers.  
The ROK military chose not only volunteers and qualified soldiers as the 
Iraqi COIN fighters but also paid a tremendous attention to making its troops the 
most optimal units with players who effectively dealt with a population-centered 
approach. Since the population-centered approach was adopted, the most 
important elite soldiers in this mission were engineers and medics. Thus, 
professional and voluntary engineers and medical personnel were dispatched for 
the mission. The ROK military also recognized the importance of interpreters, and 
by doing so, selected 46 soldiers who already were good at Arabic and then 
trained them for 12 weeks.
518
 Furthermore, it hired 41 civilians as its 
interpreters.
519
 At the same time, since they were sent to the most dangerous 
battleground, half of them were soldiers from special operation forces and the 
                                                 
516
 The ROK Ministry of National Defense, “Haeoe p„abyŏng hwaltong (Overseas 
operations of South Korean military)” February 13, 2007, 9.  
517
 The Korea Defense Daily, March 8, 2007, 1. 
518
 Ibid. 
519
 Ibid.  
  207 
Marine Corps. Thus, the Zaytun division had a capacity to not only deal with 
civil-military operations but also protect themselves in case insurgents attacked 
them.  
The ROK military provided selected soldiers with mission training in two 
trajectories: mission proficiency and Iraqi cultural education. In particular, the 
first step of mission proficiency element focused on force-protection and its 
second step highlighted civil-military operations by increasing their ability to 
repair machines and electric items and speak the local language.
520
 Furthermore, 
the ROK military published its own field manual called “P„abyŏng ilji 
(Dispatching Daily Log)” for dispatching soldiers in March 2004 so that they 
would be familiar with civil affairs operations as well as military operations.
521
 
Through this process, the Zaytun division was composed of the best soldiers for 
the application of a population-centered approach in Iraq.
522
  
3. Assets Used by COIN Troops 
Since the ROK military adopted a population-centered method for the 
COIN mission in Iraq, the most important assets that the Zaytun division required 
were equipment to construct buildings and repair electronics and soldiers‟ abilities 
to do these works rather than physical fighting assets, such as weapons. Thus, the 
Zaytun division sought construction equipment, such as trucks to build economic 
and societal infrastructure in Arbil. In addition, the Zatyun division acquired non-
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military assets, such as chalkboards and chalks. These non-military assets were 
very useful for the Arbil mission. For example, in January 2008 when the Zaytun 
division built the 53rd school in Arbil, the Zaytun division had already provided 
Arbil schools with 29,000 school-related items, which contributed to the 
enhancement of children‟s educational capacity.523  
In a similar vein, as noted earlier, the ROK military trained soldiers to 
repair facilities and electronics in the training session before being deployed to 
Iraq. In addition, the ROK military also sent them to South Korean civilian 
companies, such as Samsung and LG, for more professional electronics‟ repair 
training.
524
 Furthermore, when the Zaytun division needed more spares to repair 
electronics of the local population on the battlefield, it was supported by the 
civilian companies. For example, Local branches of the aforementioned South 
Korean civilian companies in UAE provided the Zaytun division with spares.  
The ROK COIN division in Iraq was equipped with more professional and 
effective soldiers because South Korea sent the best soldiers to the special 
battlegrounds. Furthermore, these soldiers were equipped with COIN assets rather 
than kinetic assets so that its mission was more achievable. The above 
examination of soldiers‟ qualification and division‟s assets confirm hypothesis 2C 
(the hypothesis of the best units/assets).  
VI. The Political/Socio-Cultural Function in the ROK Iraq COIN 
A. Material Environments: The ROK‟s Political Assets 
                                                 
523
 The ROK Defense Media Agency, “Gŭllobŏl kukkun (Global South Korean 
forces),” The National Defense Journal, No. 410 (February, 2008), 79. 
524
 The Korea Defense Daily, May 24, 2004, 7. 
  209 
1. Non-great Power Experiences 
Similar to the mission in Vietnam, the non-great power experiences of 
South Korea made its COIN forces appropriate for mission success in Iraq. These 
advantages can be traced by four trajectories: historical experience of nation 
building, COIN experiences in Vietnam, its own experience of economic 
development, and its structural status as an outside player with an equal 
partnership.  
First, the South Koreans‟ in historical trajectory contributed to better 
understand the Iraqi local population. South Korea, which was devastated in the 
1950s after the Korean War, had to receive much aid from foreign powers, 
particularly the U.S. It took a lot of perspiration and time to build the war-torn 
country. In their nation building process, they understood what the local Iraqi 
population needed. Thus, their hardship experiences in the 1950-60s helped their 
COIN forces in Iraq reduce adaptation tempo. Sam-yeol Jang, coordination group 
commander of South Korean forces in MNF-I, noted in 2006 that Koreans‟ own 
painful experiences after the Korean War was the driver for ROK forces in Iraq to 
achieve success in Arbil.
525
  
Second, South Koreans‟ COIN experiences in Vietnam also helped 
accelerate adaptation tempo. Although the ROK COIN in Vietnam was based on 
an enemy-oriented approach, a population-based method was also introduced in 
the second phase. As has been noted earlier, the ROKFV Commander Chae knew 
the importance of winning the hearts and minds of the local population in COIN. 
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His experience was transferred to the Zaytun division during training before the 
deployment. General Chae gave the Zaytun soldiers who were being trained a 
special lecture about his experience in Vietnam on March 27, 2004; in this lecture 
he stressed that “you should never be arrogant and treat the local people with your 
hearts.”526 The ROK military also published a book about lessons in Vietnam so 
that the Zaytun division soldiers were able to understand various features of 
irregular fighting before they went to the battlefields.
527
  
The ROK COIN experience in Vietnam contributed to reducing adaptation 
tempo for the ROK COIN forces in Iraq. In particular, some population-based 
methods in Vietnam served as a spring board for a population-centered approach 
in Iraq through infrastructure building projects. For example, the vocational 
training that the ROK forces developed in Vietnam was transferred to vocational 
training in Iraq. Similarly, the Mobil Hospital in Vietnam was transferred to the 
Zaytun division in Iraq.  
Third, similar to the ROK military‟s COIN in Vietnam, South Koreans‟ 
own experience in economic development contributed to economic infrastructure 
building in Iraq. South Korea‟s experiences developing a poor state in the 1970‟s 
helped the COIN forces build their tactics. Under President Park, all Koreans 
conducted the new village movement (Saemaŭl undong) together with the aim of 
living better. This movement was very successful, and thus, South Korea became 
the 10th largest economy in the world.  
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South Koreans‟ experience in economic development was particularly 
advantageous for Iraq COIN operations because the economic situation in Arbil 
was similar to South Koreans‟ situations in the 1970s.528 The ROK military taught 
deploying officers the new village movement so that they were able to apply this 
movement to the Kurdish area.
529
 Accordingly, the COIN forces applied this 
movement to twenty Iraqi villages when they arrived in Arbil, which led to the 
minimization of adaptation costs.
530
 The new village movement was aimed at 
teaching how to catch fish, rather than just giving fish.
531
 Two villages – Bahirka 
and Sebiran – were selected as demonstration villages in the first phase.532 
Furthermore, similar to what South Korean did in the 1970s, the Zaytun division 
provided village leaders, who would lead this new village movement, with a 
leadership program.
533
  
The Zaytun division also taught local residents farming techniques as part 
of the new village movement. One of the most successful examples was to teach 
local farmers green house techniques. These techniques contributed to the income 
growth of local residents. One of the local farmers who was successful in 
cucumber farming based on a green house technique said in 2008 that “our 
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farmers are grateful to South Koreans who give us hope.”534 Based on the concept 
of this new village movement, the Zaytun Division encouraged the local people to 
participate in the project rather than simply putting money toward it.  
Lastly, South Koreans who experienced foreign rules fully understood the 
desire of the local Kurdish residents towards independence. Similarly, when 
South Koreans needed some help from great powers, they wanted outside powers 
to be equal players, not superior or controlling ones, with them. Thus, South 
Korean COIN forces helped the Kurdistan region in Arbil function as an 
autonomous area under the concept of equal partners.
535
 All in all, the 
aforementioned four dimensions driven by South Korea‟s position as a non-great 
power served as advantages for the Iraq COIN.  
2. Structural Position of South Korea: Power Symmetry 
         A significant power gap between countries tends to see the great power as 
an occupier when their military forces conduct COIN on a foreign soil. Put simply, 
huge power asymmetry is less advantageous for winning the hearts and minds of 
the local population. This power gap can be investigated by two dimensions: 
economic and military capacity. There was a huge power gap between the U.S. 
and Iraq in 2002. The GDP of the U.S. was about 10.4 trillion dollars which was 
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more than one fourth of the world GDP in 2002.
536
 By contrast, the GDP of Iraq 
was just 18 billion dollars in 2002 which was 500 times smaller than the U.S. 
There was also a huge military gap between the two countries.
537
 In 2002, armed 
forces personnel of Iraq were about 432,000, whereas armed forces personnel of 
the U.S. were around 1,420,000 which were three times larger than Iraq‟s.538 
When it came to military expenditure, the U.S. spent 3.93 percent of its GDP in 
2004, and Iraq spent 2.38 of its GDP in the same year.
539
 In a situation where the 
U.S. had a 500 times bigger GDP than Iraq, there was a huge gap between the two 
countries in terms of military expenditure as well. Furthermore, the U.S. military 
was equipped with a number of nuclear weapons and kinetic weapons which the 
Iraqi military did not possess. 
By contrast, power asymmetry between South Korea and Iraq was 
relatively small. In an economic sense, the GDP of South Korea was 575 billion 
dollars in 2002 which was 30 times bigger than Iraq.
540
 In a military sense, the 
power gap between the two countries was much smaller. Armed forces personnel 
of South Korea were about 690,000 in 2002 which was a little larger than 
Iraq‟s.541 Military expenditure was similar with each other in terms of a percent of 
GDP because South Korea spent 2.47 percent of its GDP for the military.
542
 
Furthermore, unlike the U.S., South Korea was not a great power equipped with 
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kinetic weapons against a great power. Nor was there a huge gap of military 
power between the two countries; rather, Iraq was two times larger than South 
Korea in terms of territory.   
These relatively small differences between South Korea and Iraq made the 
ROK forces less likely to be seen as occupying forces. By contrast, citizens from 
non-great powers, Iraqis, are worried about the use of great powers‟ kinetic forces. 
In this vein, a structural position of South Korea as a non-great power made the 
ROK forces COIN operations in Iraq more acceptable than the U.S. forces.  
3. Familiarity with Terrain and Geography 
     There was a difference between South Korea and Iraq in terms of physical 
terrain and geography. While South Korea is mountainous and has four distinct 
seasons, Iraq is surrounded by a wide range of deserts. However, there was a 
similarity between them in terms of security terrain. The DMZ on the Korean 
peninsula has been one of the most tense military terrains in the world ever since 
the Korean War. Many South Korean soldiers had been well-trained about how to 
secure this highest alert area and protect themselves for a long-time.  
     This familiarity with high alert security terrain allowed the ROK COIN forces 
to accelerate adaptation tempo. One of the most important preconditions for civil-
military operations was to guarantee ROK base security because it served as 
headquarters of all operations. As soon as the Zaytun division arrived on the Iraqi 
battlefields, it established an effective base-protection system, the five-steps-
based inspection system. Jin-sub Jo, the Korea Defense reporter, stated in 2005 
that the Zaytun division tightly carried out surveillance operations on a similar 
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level of alert status to the DMZ.
543
 In particular, Visitors Control Center (VCC) 
soldiers were in charge of the security check at the entrance of the Zaytun division. 
They checked visitors based on three steps: in-depth check by local security 
forces, name-list checking at check-point, and in-depth check by the Zaytun 
soldiers.
544
 This high alert system, inculcated in Korean soldiers before their 
dispatch, prevented insurgent groups from attacking the Zaytun division.  
4. The Organized Military of a Functioning State 
In 2004 when Seoul dispatched the Zaytun division, South Korea possessed 
the 10th largest military forces in the world. Encouraged by economic 
development, the ROK military forces were armed with the-state-of-the-art 
weapons and equipment. The ROK military already had 687,700 active soldiers in 
2004.
545
 The ROK Army was composed of 3 Field Army Commands, 1 Special 
Warfare Command, 1 Capital Command, and 1 Army Aviation Command.
546
 The 
ROK Navy was equipped with 43 surface combatant ships, 75 coastal combatant 
ships, 15 mine warfare ships, 10 amphibious ships, and 20 submarines.
547
 The 
ROK Marines were composed of 2 divisions and 1 brigade.
548
 The ROK Air 
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Force was equipped with 540 combat aircraft, 28 helicopters, and more than 100 
UAVs.
549
  
The ROK military provided the ROK COIN forces in Iraq with military 
equipment appropriate for their mission. One of the most technological equipment 
for their COIN mission was a multi-functional robot called ROBHAZ whose 
missions were explosive ordinance disposal, surveillance, and rescue.
550
 The ROK 
COIN forces were also equipped with a new armored-vehicle which was designed 
to protect soldiers from insurgents‟ attacks as well as a satellite-based equipment 
system that facilitated communications.
551
 This equipment gave ROK forces a 
similar capability to the U.S., the COIN leading country, at least from the 
perspective of COIN operations. What matters most was that these capabilities 
were not the ones that weak powers had.  
B. Non-material Environments: The ROK‟s Socio-Cultural Assets 
     The aforementioned material assets are related to political advantages because 
of South Korea‟s experience as a non-great power and its domestic military 
experience. South Korean troops were also advantaged in non-material terms. 
These non-material dimensions are closely related to socio-cultural advantages of 
South Korea.  
1. Socio-historical Position: Connections on a Societal Level 
First, similar to Vietnam, South Koreans‟ experience in seeking 
independence from a great power transferred to Iraq. Socio-historical 
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characteristics of South Korea had been centered on maintaining and regaining its 
sovereignty from neighboring powers. Through this historical struggle, South 
Korea has survived as an independent country for about 5,000 years.  
Embedded in this socio-historical trajectory, South Korean soldiers 
understood the Kurdish aspiration towards their substantial autonomy. Thus, the 
ROK COIN leaders immediately set up guidelines for soldiers to observe: their 
socio-historical positions reduced adaptation costs. The ROK military distributed 
to all soldiers selected for this mission the guidelines to conduct COIN operations 
(see Table 19).
552
  
Table 19 
Major Rules of the ROK Soldiers in Conducting COIN Missions in Iraq
553
 
1. We, as members of the Zaytun Division, are proud of conducting stabilization 
operations. 
3. Do not behave as an occupying force. 
9. Listen to local people‟s grievances. 
12. Do not be disappointed with the first phase of difficulty and do not hesitate. 
22. Stay away from violence and the use of force to local Iraqi people. 
Source: Hak-seung Ahn, Civil Military Operations/Rebuilding Support Arbil Vision in A series of  
overseas dispatch history of ROK armed forces. Vol. 1 (Seoul: The ROK Ministry of Defense,  
2006), 303-12. 
 
In particular, the Zaytun division distributed to soldiers a pocket-sized book 
so that they could check the rules at any time.
554
 The rules were designed to make 
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the Kurdish population recognize the ROK troops as supporting Kurdish 
autonomy. More importantly, ordinary soldiers on the spot fully observed the 
rules because the notion of sovereignty and autonomy was also important to them 
due to their country‟s socio-historical position.  
Second, Iraqi society preferred Korean electronic products, such as 
Samsung and LG before the Iraq War to other foreign products because they are 
cheap and durable. Similarly, many Iraqis drove Korean cars, such as Hyundae. 
South Korea already exported 86 million dollars of items to Iraq in 2002.
555
 This 
economic relationship increased societal communication as well. Thus, on a 
societal level, the Iraqi population recognized a neighboring country rather than a 
stranger who came from an enemy country.  
Third, soccer was popular in both South Korean and Iraqi societies. The 
ROK COIN forces recognized that when people played soccer together, they 
became friendlier. In order to maximize this advantage, the Zaytun division 
hosted soccer competitions from November 27 to December 12, 2004.
556
 This 
competition was transmitted all over the Kurdish region on TV and radio, and it 
made the Kurdish local population recognize South Korean forces as their friend. 
This positive outcome was possible because the Zaytun division made the best of 
societal similarity and public diplomacy.  
                                                                                                                                     
554
 The Republic of Korea Army, Zaytun Budae / Zaytun division (Daejeon: The 
ROK Army, 2009), 40.  
555
 The ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Irak„ŭ Kaehwang (The 
Outlook of Iraq), July, 2004, 147.  
556
 Ahn, “Civil Affairs Operations/Rebuilding Support Arbil Vision,” 374-5.  
  219 
Finally, both societies had a long history which traces back thousands of 
years. Thus, they treated national heritage as very important. South Koreans‟ 
aspiration to a national heritage allowed the Zaytun division to repair one of 
broken Iraqis‟ national heritages; thus, Iraqis were able to understand that South 
Korean soldiers honored their traditions and culture.
557
 By conducting Ello‟s 
Heaven operation, South Korean soldiers restored a fortress which was 
recognized as the most important traditional treasure in the region.
558
  
2. The Initial Response and the “Quick-Impact” Tactic 
Local people, mostly Kurds, wanted a high degree of autonomy from the 
central government as has been noted many times. They were suspicious about 
whether the ROK forces would weaken their autonomy. Moreover, the initial 
response of the local population was less friendly in Iraq than in Vietnam because 
South Koreans were Asians who were different from their ethnic groups. Yet at 
the same time, the Kurdish population was less hostile to foreign forces than other 
Iraqi ethnic groups. Furthermore, the Kurdish population did not see South 
Korean forces as occupying forces because South Korea was not seen as a great 
power or a colonial power. Best of all, the aforementioned socio-historical 
positions helped the Kurdish population quickly change their attitude toward the 
ROK forces from suspicion to friendship, which led to the success of ROK tactics. 
The governor of Arbil, Nawzad Hadi, maintained in 2007 that “when we saw you 
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[the Zaytun division] for the first time, we were suspicious of you because you are 
military soldiers […] However, you are not aliens any longer but one member of 
our society.”559  
The ROK COIN forces emphasized the first impressions – how Iraqis 
evaluated the COIN forces at first – and thus the ROK forces tried to impress the 
local Iraqis as soon as possible based on the “quick-impact” concept.560 The ROK 
COIN forces suggested ways for the local people in Arbil to improve the villages‟ 
condition together, but the population was apathetic to their suggestions. The 
ROK soldiers, however, started to clean foul-smelling villages by themselves. As 
time went by, villagers started to gather near working spots to help them and 
some villagers greeted them with “Hi, friends.”561 Encouraged by the Zaytun 
division‟s sincere efforts to help the Kurdish population, one Kurdish elementary 
school invited the Zaytun soldiers to its event which was made under the slogan of 
“We are friends” on April 11, 2005.562 Responding to their invitation, the Zaytun 
division also invited students of this school and gave them Korean traditional rice 
cakes and cookies which were made on the spot.
563
 
                                                 
559
 The ROK Defense Media Agency, “Taehanmin‟guk kanggun rip„ot„ŭ (The 
Report of the Powerful ROK military),” The National Defense Journal, No. 404 
(August, 2007), 95.  
560
 Ahn, “Civil Affairs Operations/Rebuilding Support Arbil Vision,” 243.  
561
 Ibid.  
562
 The ROK Defense Media Agency, “P„yŏnghwa hwaltong 7 kaewŏl „sŏnggong  
jŏk‟ (Successful 7 months of peace activities),” The National Defense Journal, No.  
377 (May, 2005), 47. 
563
 The ROK Defense Media Agency, “ Successful 7 months of peace activities,”  
47. 
  221 
The positive participation of the local people impressed the American 
Sergeant Major group, who inspected this area from Multi-National Force-Iraq 
(MNF-I) on May 11, 2006.
564
 Furthermore, Lieutenant Colonel Kwang-sik Jung 
in the Zaytun division recollects that when Iraqi children saw South Korean 
soldiers, they shouted “Kuri, number one.”565 
This “quick-impact” was a great success. When the ROK troops were 
preparing to withdraw, the local population wanted to stay with them longer. 
Iraqis in Arbil were wholeheartedly happy about the ROK National Assembly‟s 
decision to extend its troops longer in late 2007. For example, one local resident 
who served as an interpreter told the Zaytun soldiers that a real friend is supposed 
to be with us when we need real help.
566
 In addition, when it came to the complete 
withdrawal of South Korean troops, the Zaytun Commander Sun-woo Park said in 
November 29, 2008 that since the Zaytun soldiers respected the Kurdish people 
and were regarded as Kurdish citizens by them, they felt sad about the ROK 
forces‟ withdrawal.567 The KRG Prime Minister expressed his appreciation to the 
ROK military which was leaving Arbil by saying that our Kurds who have 
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struggled with suppression and death found some hope for our life due to the 
Zaytun division‟s help.568  
3. Cultural Position: Better Understanding of Battleground Culture  
Unlike Americans, South Koreans better understood battlefield culture 
based on their own community-oriented culture.
569
 The Kurds also had 
community-based culture, not an individualism-led culture. Thus, the ROK forces 
better understood local culture and used cultural advantage in a synergistic way. 
Better understanding of the local culture for the Zaytun division contributed to 
achieving peace in Arbil over time.  
More importantly, South Korea was equipped with its own approach to 
strong community culture, which was appropriate to gain the hearts and minds of 
the Kurdish population. The culture of Jung (affection or attachment) has been 
embedded in South Koreans. Jung stresses the importance of helping others and 
respecting neighborhoods based on non-materially-oriented closeness with others, 
not materially-driven calculation. It guides South Koreans to make friends with 
their hearts rather than with their interest.  
This embedded culture allowed South Korean soldiers to better understand 
the culture of the Iraqi population which is based on community tradition, not 
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individualism-oriented tradition.
570
 Lieutenant Colonel Kwang-sik Jung in the 
Zaytun division notes that South Korean soldiers‟ commitment to their own 
culture, Jung, allowed the local population to open their hearts.
571
 In particular, 
the Jung-led approach was perfectly applicable to the Kurdish culture because 
that culture similar to Jung was embedded in Kurds.
572
 By the same token, the 
ROK COIN forces paid attention to building respect towards the local culture 
under the slogan of “Korean Iraqi-Kurd Culture” to maximize advantages from 
their own community-based tradition.
573
 
The ROK COIN forces understood the function of community in Arbil. 
Above all, the function of religion was recognized by the ROK COIN forces. 
Thus, they had tried to respect the local population‟s devotion to the Islamic 
tradition before they came to Iraq. The ROK military thought that it is crucial to 
fully understand the religion of the local population. Thus, the ROK military sent 
soldiers who do not have religion to the Islam school under a Islamic mosque in 
Seoul so that some of its soldiers were able to have religious understanding of the 
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Iraqi local population.
574
 In addition, when they arrived, they supplied various 
items – around 5,100 – for mosques so that the local population recognized South 
Koreans‟ respect for their religion.575 They also offered the Islamic services on 
the Zaytun base which offered to Islamic South Korean soldiers and Iraqi 
residents working in the Zaytun division.
576
 
As South Korean forces did in Vietnam, they maintained good relations 
with religious leaders as well. They invited religious leaders to big events, such as 
the opening ceremony of the religious center.
577
 They also gave soldiers a 
direction that they should respect religious leaders.
578
 As a consequence, a 
friendly network with religious leaders was developed. For example, a religious 
leader from the biggest mosque in Arbil said that “the Kurdish region was able to 
be developed due to the Zaytun division which respected other culture [the 
Kurdish culture].”579 The consensus building with local religious leaders allowed 
Korean forces not to be seen as an occupying force. Furthermore, local religious 
leaders asked the Zaytun division to play a bigger role in helping local people.
580
 
Second, the community-based culture of South Korean society contributed 
to understanding the Kurdish community quickly, which led to the minimization 
of adaptation costs. There was a difference between the South Korean community 
                                                 
574
 The Korea Defense Daily, May 29, 2004, 11.  
575
 Ahn, “Civil Affairs Operations/Rebuilding Support Arbil Vision,” 382.  
576
 Ibid., 383.  
577
 The religious center was open on November 27, 2004. For more detail on its 
opening ceremony, see Lee, The spiritual fragrance of Zaytun, 91-2.  
578
 Ahn, “Civil Affairs Operations/Rebuilding Support Arbil Vision,” 307. 
579
 The Korea Defense Daily, October 2, 2010, 8.   
580
 Lee, The spiritual fragrance of Zaytun, 159. 
  225 
and Kurdish community in the sense that the former is driven by a wide range of 
communities, such as family, neighborhood, school, and company, whereas the 
latter is driven by tribes. However, both are similar in the sense that the function 
of community rather than the function of individualism-based ethics worked in 
each society. As a consequence, South Korean forces reduced the time required 
for understanding the community-based culture. In their attempt to make friendly 
relations with community leaders and show the local residents South Koreans‟ 
respect for their leaders, they did not criticize tribal leaders openly even when 
they behaved in a peculiar way.
581
 Rather, they made their best effort to respect 
local leaders. For example, before the ROK soldiers gave residents gifts or 
supplies, they mostly checked on local community ethics through local leaders.  
Third, the community culture of South Koreans accelerated the tempo of 
cultural communication and exchange between the ROK COIN soldiers and the 
local population. South Koreans‟ community tradition stresses a sincere greeting 
when they meet their neighbors. Along with this, South Korean soldiers gave the 
local population a sincere greeting particularly with the use of the local 
language.
582
 Likewise, Korean culture stresses the importance of friends and 
neighbors. Thus, by hosting Korea Day, the COIN forces offered an arena where 
Koreans and Iraqis could communicate culturally; it offered an opportunity for 
South Koreans and Iraqis to treat each other as real friends, not fake friends.
583
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In addition, similar to Vietnam COIN, the ROK COIN forces in Iraq used 
their martial arts – Taekwondo – to come closer to the local people. The Zaytun 
division gave locals Taekwondo classes in five areas and showed them 
Taekwondo team‟s colorful actions on a local stage.584 As time went by, Kurds in 
Arbil started to be interested in South Koreans‟ martial art, which contributed to 
making Kurds feel friendly to South Korean soldiers. Encouraged by a growing 
popularity of Taekwondo, the KRG established the Kurdistan Taekwondo 
Association within just two years of South Korean troops‟ arrival on December 4, 
2006.
585
 
The aforementioned community-oriented approach allowed the local 
population to call the Zaytun forces part of their community or brotherhood rather 
than hostile military soldiers.
586
 This clearly shows that only after COIN forces 
give their hearts to the local population, can they win the hearts and minds of the 
local population. In a nutshell, since the ROK soldiers better understood the local 
culture due to their own community-based culture, it was easier for South Korean 
soldiers to share and exchange culture and tradition with the local Kurds.
587
 All in 
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all, better understanding of the local culture led to winning the hearts and minds 
of the local residents.   
4. Intangible Resources: Non-material Role of Domestic Population 
The success of COIN also requires continuous support from the COIN 
country‟s domestic population. Support from the South Korean population was 
weaker in the Iraq COIN mission than the Vietnam COIN mission for two 
reasons: absence of ideological battles and enhanced civil society. First, the Iraq 
war was not a conflict between democracy and communism, unlike the Vietnam 
War. Thus, the ROK military‟s mission in Iraq was perceived to be less vital for 
their survival. Second, since South Korean civil society became stronger than ever 
due to consolidated democracy under President Roh Moo-hyun, it was reluctant to 
send South Korean combat troops to less vital missions for ROK survival. Thus, 
civil society had a strong voice against the use of violence.
588
 Because of a lack of 
perceived legitimate causes, the ROK domestic population was less willing to 
tolerate warfare on foreign soil by their forces. 
Nevertheless, South Koreans viewed this mission as important for their 
national prestige. Furthermore, when South Koreans recognized that their military 
would apply a population-centered approach with non-combat troops, they 
positively evaluated their soldiers‟ mission which was intended to help politically 
and economically deprived Iraqis. According to survey data reported by The 
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DongA Ilbo, 46 percent of Koreans disagreed with the dispatch of combat 
troops.
589
 Nevertheless, a survey conducted by KSOI (Korea Society Opinion 
Institute) reveals that 53 percent of surveyed Koreans supported the dispatch of 
troops whose mission was expected to help build infrastructure of a war-torn 
neighbor.
590
  
South Koreans recognized the importance of this mission, and they were 
satisfied with the mission trajectory which was based on the role of non-combat 
troops in stabilizing Iraq. As a consequence, the function of unusual mission 
worked again from the perspective of South Korea‟s domestic population as well. 
When South Koreans saw their soldiers successfully carry out missions to help 
people in need, they increased their support for the soldiers‟ mission. In a survey 
about the performance of the Zaytun division, about 56 percent of interviewed 
South Koreans answered “very good,” whereas only about 14 percent of them 
said “negatively.”591  
Best of all, the domestic population played its own role in winning the 
hearts and minds of Iraqi people. South Koreans tried to build a consensus with 
the Iraqi local population. Thus, Seoul and the domestic population sought to 
create a friendly relationship with the Iraqi people ahead of ROK deployments as 
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part of public diplomacy. They recognized that soccer was one of the Iraqi 
people‟s favorite team sports. Accordingly, South Korean people invited the Iraqi 
National Soccer Team to a match with the Korean national team on April 6, 2004. 
Many Iraqi people watched this match. After this match, some of them came to 
South Korean soldiers who were already there in the Seohee and Jema units, and 
they said to them “Koreans are our permanent friends.”592 To put it another way, 
this event led by the ROK COIN forces‟ home country actors enticed the Iraqi 
local population to recognize South Korean forces as friendly players, which was 
an important requirement for COIN success.  
The second societal action made by the South Korean domestic population 
was to provide specialized medical care to Iraqi patients in South Korea. For 
example, Kyung Hee University of South Korea operated on an Iraqi girl who 
suffered from chronic otitis media in April 2006.
593
 By the same token, the Korea 
Heart Foundation suggested that the Zaytun hospital find local Iraqi patients who 
needed a heart transplant so that it could give them medical treatment in South 
Korea. Under this program, the first five Iraqi patients visited South Korea for 
medical treatment in March, 2007.
594
 Similarly, South Korean COIN forces sent 
an Iraqi boy, who lost his legs in a bombing, to the ROK for medical treatment in 
December 2007. He was able to walk again with a new pair of artificial legs. 
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Mustafa Musa Taufik, charge d' affaire of the Iraqi Embassy in Seoul, said that 
this event rendered the relationship between Koreans and Iraqis more friendly.
595
  
Similar to the support of the ROK domestic population, Congressmen 
supported the South Korean soldiers‟ mission. When National Defense 
Committee Chairman, Jae-kun Yoo visited the Zaytun division in November 2005, 
he strongly supported the Zaytun division‟s efforts to help the Kurdish 
residents.
596
 Similarly, congressman Young-dal Jang who visited the Zaytun 
division with other three congressmen on July 9, 2007 said to its soldiers that “I 
am proud of you who represent South Korea as one member of international 
society and are so devoted to your missions for peace and reconstruction in 
Iraq.”597  
All in all, both material and non-material advantages drawn from the 
political/socio-cultural position of South Korea served as the second key driver 
for the Iraqi COIN, confirming hypothesis 3 (the hypothesis of political/socio-
cultural advantages).  
VII. Conclusion: Sufficient Condition of the ROK COIN Success in Iraq 
A. No Change of Willingness and Capability 
     What is interesting is that in contrast to the situation in Vietnam, the ROK 
soldiers‟ willingness and capability did not decrease over time, but rather their 
performance improved. One of the explanations could be their focus on civil 
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welfare through many projects, such as the Zaytun library which was constructed 
two months before the troops‟ withdrawal. Although the number of mission 
soldiers was reduced by 1000 – from 3000 in 2006 to 2000 in 2007 – the size of 
their construction projects – maintained similar levels from 63 projects in 2006 to 
56 projects in 2007.
598
 The Korea Defense Daily states on March 14, 2007 that 
despite the reduction of troops, the Zaytun soldiers‟ willingness to achieve their 
mission in Arbil was not weakened at all.
599
 What made South Korean soldiers 
keep their willingness and capability? Unlike the situation in Vietnam, the logic 
of unusual mission had functioned from 2003 to the end (2008). The COIN 
leading country, the U.S., was still conducting operations in Iraq when South 
Korean troops left. Moreover, a population-centered approach which was 
intended to help the poor neighbor was still an important mission to South Korean 
soldiers for their national prestige. For example, in an interview which was 
conducted two months before the withdrawal of South Korean troops, the Zaytun 
division commander Sun-woo Park said that “I hoped that the Zaytun division 
could stay longer [in Arbil] to maximize national interest.”600 
B. Sufficient Condition of COIN Success in Iraq 
Similar to the Vietnam COIN, the nature of special mission in Iraq 
generated ROK military enthusiasm for mission success. This enthusiasm was 
converted into effective COIN capability by guiding ROK forces to adopt a 
population-centered approach in Iraq. While the nature of mission served as one 
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axis for COIN success, South Korean political and socio-cultural advantages 
served as the other axis. Since South Korea historically had similar political 
situations to Iraq and has maintained socio-cultural harmony with Iraq, the ROK 
COIN forces were able to reduce adaptation costs. Accordingly, the nature of 
unusual mission and political/socio-cultural advantages of the COIN country, 
taken together, were sufficient conditions for the ROK COIN forces‟ success.  
VIII. Commonalities for Both COINs and Implications for General COIN 
A. Key Commonalities of the ROK COIN in Vietnam and Iraq 
It is important to analyze key commonalities for insights into general COIN 
(see Table 20). The first commonality is the nature of special missions. The ROK 
military‟s missions in both Vietnam and Iraq were special and unusual in the 
sense that the ROK military primarily focused on the threat from North Korean 
military forces before its dispatch for these missions. In addition, both missions 
were important for South Korea‟s domestic utility maximizations (economic 
development and/or security affairs) and its external utility maximization 
(national prestige in the world).  
The second commonalty is that the ROK forces adopted an effective COIN 
approach in both mission fields through in-depth studies of battleground situations. 
In Vietnam, they used the enemy-oriented approach supported by population-
based methods. By contrast, they adopted the population-centered approach in 
Iraq. Third, the ROK COIN troops‟ eagerness for mission success was high, and 
so, they focused primarily on in-depth mission study and step-by-step engagement. 
More importantly, they placed a high priority on winning approval for an 
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independent OPCON. Fourth, their eagerness for mission success was smoothly 
converted into effective COIN capability by sending the best soldiers/units to 
Vietnam and Iraq and developing creative tactics.  
Fifth, the ROK forces reduced adaptation costs through their home 
country‟s experience and made the best of cultural advantages in both Vietnam 
and Iraq. To put it another way, their home country‟s political/socio-cultural 
advantages helped them to become more effective COIN forces. In both COINs, 
the ROK forces also used their home country‟s traditional martial arts as a 
supporting asset of their COIN methods.  
Sixth, the adaptation tempo of the ROK forces was fast enough to 
effectively perform both COIN operations. In Vietnam, they quickly secured their 
assigned areas through combat while minimizing trial and error, and then they 
introduced a population-based method before the local population turned their 
backs on South Korean troops. In Iraq, they won the hearts and minds of the local 
residents in the first phase of their operations. Their success helped South Korean 
soldiers create an image as professional fighters and friendly helpers. South 
Korean soldiers were called “Dai Han,” in Vietnam, and they were called “Kuri” 
in Iraq. 
Table 20 
Commonalities of the ROK COIN in Vietnam and Iraq 
Contents Scope Vietnam Iraq 
Mission 
Nature 
Unusual/ 
Important 
The first overseas mission 
in the modern history 
The largest overseas 
mission after the Vietnam 
conflict 
Utilities Expected/ Security/economic scope Security scope 
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Achieved International scope International scope 
Adopted 
Remedy 
Appropriate 
(for situations) 
An enemy-based remedy 
(Supported by population-led 
tactics) 
A population-centered 
remedy 
Willingnes
s 
Very high In-depth Mission Study 
Step-by-step Engagement 
1. Advisory unit 
2. Non-combat unit 
3. Combat-unit 
Independent OPCON 
In-depth Mission Study 
Step-by-step Engagement 
1. Advisory unit 
2. Basic non-combat unit 
3. Major non-combat unit 
Independent Ops 
Capability Well-
Developed  
The creative tactics 
: Company-led tactical base 
Best units/soldiers 
: Voluntary/disciplined  
The creative tactics 
: Green Angel Program 
Best units/soldiers 
: Voluntary/disciplined 
Political/ 
Socio-
Cultural 
Advantage 
 
Embedded Its Own Experience 
- Anti-communist guerilla ops 
- Economic development 
Taekwondo 
Asian Culture 
(Confucius culture) 
Its Own Experience 
- COIN in Vietnam 
- Economic development 
Taekwondo 
Community-led culture 
(Jung culture) 
Adaptation 
Tempo 
Very fast Tight control of TAOR in 
the first phase  
The success of the quick-
impact scheme 
Soldiers‟ 
Image  
Professional 
/friendly 
Called as “Dai Han” Called as “Kuri” 
The Role Model  Fire-Base ZAYTUN CMO Handbook 
Mission 
Outcome 
Successful Securing Assigned Areas 
: Effective suppression of the 
Viet Cong 
Securing Assigned Areas 
: Gaining the hearts and minds 
of the local population 
 
Finally, since the ROK forces were substantial players, their COIN 
methods/tactics served as the role model for other Coalition forces. The ROK 
military‟s concept of a company-led tactical base was adopted by the U.S. forces 
under the name of Fire Base in Vietnam. The ROK military‟s concept of Green 
Angel was published under the title of ZAYTUN CMO Handbook, which was 
intended for other countries to learn the secret of South Korea‟s achievements. 
The aforementioned commonalities clearly show that the ROK forces were 
reliable and substantial players in COINs rather than simply symbolic players.  
B. Insights into General COIN 
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         The in-depth case studies of the ROK COIN in Vietnam and Iraq also shed 
light on key aspects for general COIN. First, the political and military position of 
the COIN leading country can affect the eagerness of other coalition COIN forces 
for mission success. Domestic movements in the COIN leading countries to 
withdraw their forces are a serious problem because such actions can undo the 
remarkable achievements of middle-power COIN forces rather than boosting their 
success in a synergistic way. For example, the U.S. forces‟ discussion of their 
withdrawal from Vietnam seriously weakened the ROK soldiers‟ willingness to 
sacrifice for COIN success.  
Second, it is imperative for a COIN leading country to guarantee other 
coalition COIN forces‟ authority for independent OPCON. This is particularly 
true when the COIN leading country struggles with COIN mission. The ROK 
forces‟ independent OPCON allowed COIN forces to develop creative tactics 
applicable to battleground situations. Moreover, it prevented the ROK COIN 
forces from being trapped in the vicious quagmire of the U.S. forces. Best of all, 
when the ROK troops had an independent OPCON, they were more enthusiastic 
about COIN missions.  
Third, gradual engagement in insurgent battlegrounds is more effective for 
COIN success than precipitous engagement. In this vein, the role of advisory 
teams is crucial to reduce adaptation costs. The ROK forces sent advisory teams 
to identify the battleground situations before COIN forces‟ engagement. By the 
same token, South Korea engaged in COIN missions in Vietnam and Iraq step-by-
step by sending the smallest unit in first rather than a full size unit.  
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Finally, the COIN leading country needs to seriously take into account 
which country is better able to play substantial roles for its COIN efforts. The 
COIN leading country should make the best use of the military forces of a country 
which maintains a cultural similarity with the insurgent country. In addition, it 
also needs to be supported by the military forces of a country which has historical 
experiences similar to the insurgent society. The use of military forces from these 
countries can help make battleground situations favorable to COIN forces by 
significantly reducing the adaptation costs.  
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CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION 
I. Introduction 
The study‟s findings, drawn from in-depth examinations of the ROK 
military‟s COIN successes in Vietnam and Iraq, have produced IR scholarly and 
regional/national security-policy implications. First, the findings guide us toward 
the development of a middle power COIN theory because the ROK force, as a 
middle power military, was a more substantial player in both the Vietnam COIN 
and the Iraq COIN than great powers expected. Accordingly, middle power COIN 
theory contributes to identifying the enhanced role of middle powers in the 
international arena.  
Second, the findings produce regional/national security-policy implications 
in two ways: Northeast Asian security and ROK military strategy. One of the 
most serious issues in Northeast Asian security is the potential collapse of the 
North Korean regime. If the Kim regime collapses, North Korea could experience 
an insurgency. The dissertation findings shed light on how to deal with this 
contingency through COIN doctrine. The other policy implication is that the 
findings guide South Korean military planners to doctrinal reform, particularly 
because international demands on the ROK military for international security 
keep growing. 
II. A Scholarly Implication: Middle Power COIN Theory 
The dissertation findings, drawn from the ROK COIN forces‟ achievements, 
help explain the theory about middle powers‟ roles in international security. In 
particular, middle powers can play a more substantial role in COIN than IR 
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scholars or military planners from great powers expect. In this vein, this 
dissertation contributes to scholarship in the field of IR, particularly international 
security and politics.  
A. The Middle Power and COIN 
The dissertation findings show that when COIN forces combine morale and 
capability, partly attributable to their political/socio-cultural advantages, success 
in COIN is more probable. COIN missions are appropriate for middle powers, 
unlike great powers, because middle powers rarely engage in security operations 
with large scale military forces. Thus, middle power fighters are more likely to be 
prepared for success when they have an opportunity to engage in COIN missions; 
this is particularly true because these missions also provide an opportunity to 
increase their national prestige in the international arena.  
In addition to this first driver, regional middle powers possess a political 
advantage in COIN operations because there is a smaller power gap between them 
and an insurgent country versus great powers and an insurgent country. This 
difference gives middle powers a better chance of winning the hearts and minds 
of the local population. Furthermore, these middle powers are also socio-
culturally advantaged because they are more familiar with the role of culture on 
the battlefield.  
B. Defining Middle Powers vis-à-vis COIN Mission 
How can middle powers be conceptualized in terms of dealing with COIN? 
The middle powers can be assessed through the following four dimensions. First, 
middle powers do not engage in great power politics in the international system. 
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They are not major actors in the anarchic international system. Thus, external 
missions of middle powers are not routine affairs. Instead, they recognize 
overseas missions as unusual and important for their prestige. 
Second, similar to the first characteristic of middle powers, they do not seek 
hard or soft balancing behaviors unlike the second tier countries, which challenge 
the status quo state or a hegemonic country in the international system. These 
balancing behaviors force great powers to engage in international affairs more 
often, and by doing so, their overseas missions become routine. By contrast, 
middle powers rarely engage in balancing behaviors, and thus, their overseas 
missions are seen as special, not routine.  
Third, middle powers do not have the experience as providers of world 
order that great powers have; rather some of them have a history of being 
colonized or ruled over, similar to weak powers. This history of subjugation 
contributes to middle powers‟ COIN success because it provides empathy for 
inhabitants of the countries middle powers assess. In this vein, Britain and Japan 
are not middle powers because they had experience as great powers. By contrast, 
South Korea had experience as a weak power in the post-World War II era.  
Finally, middle powers have enough resources to conduct overseas 
operations as well as to manage national security. Unlike weak powers, they have 
an organized military that can dispatch its troops for international security.  
The first two traits of middle powers help them recognize overseas COIN 
missions as unusual. The last two attributes address the material environment that 
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middle powers face. According to these four dimensions, South Korea, Australia, 
New Zealand, Israel, and Turkey can be classified as middle powers.  
Unusual missions and materially-driven advantages made the middle power 
Australian COIN forces more willing and capable to deal with insurgency in 
Vietnam. Earlier the Australian army successfully conducted COIN in Malaya in 
1955, an action that increased its national prestige.  
The Australian COIN was also particularly effective in the first phase of the 
Vietnam conflict from 1962 to 1965. Australia as a middle power participated in 
the Vietnam conflict as part of the Australia, New Zealand, United States Security 
Treaty (the AZNUS Treaty). Australia had already dispatched “a thirty man group 
of jungle warfare specialists” in the first phase of the Vietnam conflict.601 As time 
went by, Australian forces increased their engagement by expanding their initial 
role as assistants to more active civic action. They dispatched medical teams to 
support the Vietnamese local population under the Columbo Plan in 1964 and 
1965.
602
 Their willingness and capability made their first activities in Vietnam 
smooth and favorable to mission success. Australia‟s geographical location and 
organized military led to Australia‟s success at least in the first phase of the 
mission. 
Despite Australian forces‟ initial COIN effectiveness, in general, Australian 
forces were less efficient and durable than the ROK forces. What made Australian 
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forces different from South Korean forces in Vietnam? Australian forces did not 
enjoy non-materially-driven advantages (socio-cultural advantages). Local 
populations recognized them as quasi-American soldiers who came from the 
Western world and viewed them as occupiers. In essence, they lacked cultural ties 
with the Vietnamese. They did not understand the Confucius tradition that worked 
as an organizing principle in villages. They also rarely shared societal customs 
with the local population.  
In this vein, the distinction between general middle powers and regional 
middle powers should be made clear. The middle powers in general have greater 
willingness to engage in a COIN mission because they take into account its 
unusual nature as an important opportunity to raise their national profile. However, 
all middle powers are not uniformly effective for all types of COIN in the world. 
When middle powers have connections with an insurgency-host country, the 
effects can be synergistic. To put it another way, regional middle powers can 
enjoy a more favorable climate for COIN success than general middle powers.  
A regional middle power can be conceptualized in two different ways. First, 
a regional middle power can be defined as a country that is geographically 
bordering an insurgencies infected country. Second, it can be conceptualized as a 
country that is a little farther away geographically but has societal ties or cultural 
commonalities with the host country. Therefore, regional middle powers enjoy 
both material and non-material advantages, unlike general middle powers. Thus, 
in terms of socio-cultural advantages, the former is more advantageous in terms of 
three dimensions: moderating the local population‟s hatred of outsiders, 
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minimizing adaptation costs, and increasing the effectiveness of a first (initial) 
impression. Unlike Australian COIN forces, South Korean COIN forces enjoyed 
both material and non-material advantages, and thus, the ROK‟s Vietnam mission 
was more successful.  
C. International Politics, State‟s Position, and COIN Performance 
With the aforementioned insights in mind, the logic of the middle power 
COIN can be summarized in a clear way by comparing its advantages with other 
powers‟ caveats.603 First of all, COINs are routine missions for great powers. In 
general, great powers engage in many conventional warfare situations against 
other great powers, as can be seen in WW I and WW II. At the same time, great 
powers have been involved in unconventional warfare in foreign countries as part 
of their effort to play a major role in maintaining world order. Thus, soldiers from 
great powers tend to struggle with multiple missions before they go into new 
battles.  
More importantly, great powers know how hard it is to win unconventional 
warfare. The U.S. Army had already experienced overseas COIN missions in the 
Philippines during 1899-1902.
604
 It also had unconventional military involvement 
in many countries, such as Haiti in the 1920s.
605
 Thus, great power militaries tend 
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to prefer conventional fighting and are reluctant to engage in COIN. Great powers 
are apt to view COIN missions as another one of their unfavorable routine 
missions. Thus, they may be less willing to devote the necessary resources and 
planning for mission success.  
In terms of capability or resources to deal with COIN, great powers tend to 
be armed for conventional warfare. Great powers try to maximize their military 
capability and rely on worst case scenarios because they see power maximization 
as necessary for their survival in international politics. Thus, they tend to heavily 
arm themselves for a kinetic fight under a conventional warfare organization and 
preserve conventional military doctrine designed to deter other great powers.
606
 
Thus, the military organizational structure is designed to survive in great power 
politics, which is rarely appropriate to deal with small wars. This conventional 
organization prevents them from becoming sufficiently flexible to deal with 
COIN.  
By the same token, great powers have more resources than those necessary 
to win small wars. Thus, they tend to respond to COIN by using their 
conventional heavy weapons or technological weapons, such as state-of-the-art 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). Accordingly, great powers‟ conventional 
approach is less effective in dealing with unconventional missions. The U.S. has 
developed advanced fighters, such as F-14, 15, 16, 18, 22 and 35 JSF in its 
attempt to retain its status as a superpower in the world. These fighters, however, 
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are less effective for unconventional warfare. Field commanders who engage in 
COIN require old-fashioned helicopters, or at most UAVs, rather than the 
aforementioned advanced fighters.
607
 Likewise, although the U.S. has the largest 
aircraft carriers in the world, they are the least useful for COIN. Rather, 
multifunctional ships are more effective for COIN as they can support armies 
from nearby coastal areas.  
However, great powers like the U.S cannot abandon these heavy weapons. 
They believe that disarmament, or even the reduction of their military capacity, 
can pose a serious threat to the maintenance of their position in the world. For 
example, the U.S. cannot reduce its heavy military armaments in a situation where 
China continues to expand its military as well as its economy. The spiraling logic 
of great powers who seek relative gain prevents them from seeking organizational 
flexibility required for COIN success. Thus, great powers tend to intervene in 
overseas COIN missions in order to gain an advantage in great power politics, 
rather than to achieve a key goal of COIN, which is based on gaining security on 
the battlefield. The U.S. sent its troops to Vietnam in an attempt to gain the upper 
hand in great power politics against the Soviet Union, the leader of the communist 
bloc. This led to strategic failure.  
In addition to the kinetic nature of the military forces of great powers, their 
presence on unconventional battlefields creates tension with the local population. 
Many people on insurgent battlefields had harsh experiences under great powers‟ 
colonialism. Their painful experiences are the outcome of power asymmetry 
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between great powers and insurgent countries. Thus, great power intervention in 
COIN tends to make the local population more likely to see them as occupiers 
than as liberators. When the U.S. forces arrived on the Vietnamese battlefield, 
they were easily recognized as occupiers by the local population due to power 
asymmetry and their painful experiences in the colonial era. To put it another way, 
great powers do not enjoy structural advantages that middle fighters have.  
To make matters worse, great powers‟ over-armament in small warfare 
pushes the local population to avoid them. Since the U.S. forces intervened in 
Vietnamese affairs as part of great power politics, they rarely reformed their 
military organization needed to succeed in unconventional warfare at the first 
stage. By contrast, the ROK forces came to the Vietnamese battlefield to conduct 
a special mission of overseas COIN, rather than to engage in great power politics. 
In a nutshell, great power COIN forces‟ willingness and capacity, as well as their 
structural standing, make them less likely to succeed in COIN.  
If great powers are ineffective in COIN missions, are weak powers effective 
in COIN missions? Weak powers are more willing to engage in overseas missions 
than great powers because they view these missions as more important. Moreover, 
fighters from weak powers are more likely to fight harder because they see this 
unusual mission as an opportunity to maximize their countries‟ stature in the 
world. In addition, weak powers are better in COINs because when they border 
insurgent battlegrounds, they frequently have political/socio-cultural similarities. 
Since there is little power asymmetry between neighboring weak powers and the 
local population‟s mother countries, the local population is less likely to see 
  246 
fighters from weak powers as occupiers. Furthermore, they are more familiar with 
terrain, climate, and even culture on the battlegrounds.  
While weak powers‟ assets are useful for COIN from the viewpoint of non-
material dimensions, particularly socio-cultural assets, they may be disadvantaged 
by fewer material assets and a small military. Thus, COIN missions are rarely 
assigned to fighters from weak powers. When these missions are assigned to them, 
they are more likely to engage in them only symbolically due to a lack of military 
capacity. In a nutshell, weak powers in COIN missions suffer from a lack of 
resources and organized military.  
By contrast, middle power fighters are the optimal forces to deal with 
COIN because they not only possess a high degree of willingness and capability 
to fulfill this unusual mission but also political/socio-cultural advantages (see 
Table 21).  
Table 21 
Types of State Strength and Expected COIN Outcomes 
Types 
COIN forces 
Positional 
effects 
Expected 
outcome 
Willingness Capacity 
/ resources 
Great power 
(Heavy fighters) 
Low 
(Usual mission) 
Overly armed 
(Conventional) 
Few  Less favorable  
to success 
Middle power 
(Middle fighters) 
High 
(Rare mission) 
Eligible  
(Flexible) 
Many Optimal  
Weak power 
High 
(Rare mission) 
Under armed 
(Unable) 
Many Less favorable  
to success 
 
Middle countries are not trapped in great power politics, and thus do not 
have to heavily arm themselves. They are most likely to focus on the 
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accomplishments of special missions with the use of appropriate weapons for 
COIN. In addition, their willingness is converted into COIN capability by making 
their military organization flexible enough to deal with small unit fighting, not 
kinetic fighting. At the same time, similar to great powers, they have organized 
militaries and disciplined/non-corrupt soldiers. Finally, similar to weak powers, 
middle powers are advantaged by a small power gap with a COIN-stricken 
country and better socio-cultural understanding. All in all, middle power fighters 
possess the merits of both great and weak powers. At the same time, they avoid 
the disadvantages of great and weak powers.  
III. A Policy Implication I: Northeast Asian Security 
A. The Collapse of the Kim Regime and Possible Response Scenarios 
Lessons the ROK forces learned in Vietnam and Iraq can shed light on a 
plan to deal with situations led by the collapse of the Kim regime.
608
 Before this 
insight is discussed, two dimensions need to be addressed regarding the post-Kim 
regime situations: possible situations in North Korea followed by the Kim 
regime‟s collapse and scenarios of external actors‟ intervention.  
To begin with, when the Kim regime collapses, what situations would 
follow in North Korea? The first possible scenario is that specific groups in North 
Korea could acquire chemical or nuclear weapons that the Kim regime managed. 
These groups have the potential to use these catastrophic weapons irrationally or 
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make money by exporting them to transnational terrorist groups, such as al-Qaeda. 
Thus, this scenario needs to be seriously considered not only for regional security 
but also international security.  
The second scenario is that a large number of North Koreans could flee to 
South Korea or China. A massive number of refugees could disrupt South Korea 
and China and lead to political and economic instability. Accordingly, a 
manageable plan to deal with North Korean refugees needs to be carefully 
developed.  
The third scenario is that as soon as the Kim regime collapses, the North 
Korean military could attempt to take over North Korea. In this case, loyalists of 
the Kim regime could fight against the military coup group, heading to a civil war 
in North Korea. If this situation happens, the next question would be whether 
outside actors intervene, similar to situations in the Middle East, such as Libya in 
2011.  
The final scenario is that external actors, such as South Korea or the U.N., 
could be responsible for governance in North Korea. In this case, various 
insurgent groups could rise in North Korea to overthrow an interim government 
managed by these external actors. I discuss this final scenario in this dissertation 
because the aforementioned three scenarios are reported to be already dealt with 
by South Korea and the U.S. through OPLAN 5029, but this last insurgency 
scenario is rarely discussed.
609
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Scenarios about types of external actors which intervene after the collapse 
of the Kim regime also need to be mentioned. First of all, when the Kim regime 
collapses, the U.N. might attempt to intervene in North Korea. In this scenario, 
the U.N. would serve as an arena where neighboring countries and regional 
powers discuss how to deal with the situation. U.N-led peacekeeping forces or 
international coalition forces could become responsible for restoring stability in 
North Korea.  
However, if U.N.-led efforts fail, individual countries with security 
concerns might then intervene. China would be a probable intervener. This is 
particularly true because China sees the DPRK as buffer zone between China and 
Western powers-led political democracy. China is also concerned about the 
collapse of the North Korean regime because it might trigger a massive number of 
North Korean refugees. In this scenario, China‟s intervention could be followed 
by many other countries‟ engagement, which could destabilize Northeast Asia.  
The third scenario is that the U.S. intervenes in a North Korean situation as 
a major player with the use of the U.S. forces stationed in South Korea before 
China intervenes. In this scenario, the U.S. intervention might be designed to 
expand its sphere of influence in the Korean peninsula. However, direct U.S. 
intervention would lead to military friction with China, similar to the second 
scenario.  
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The final scenario is that South Korea intervenes in a North Korean 
situation. This case is particularly plausible because South Korea would see a 
North Korean collapse as an opportunity to reunify the peninsula. I focus on this 
scenario because this dissertation deals with the effectiveness of regional military 
forces on COIN.  
In the following section, I provide policy implications based on the 
aforementioned two scenarios: the rise of insurgent groups and South Korea‟s 
direct intervention to achieve stability on the Korean peninsula.  
B. Future Insurgencies in North Korea 
Insurgencies in North Korea seem plausible because three interconnected 
situations increase the degree of instability in the North: unexpected blowback to 
the DPRK caused by nuclear-seeking behaviors, a leaderless regime situation, and 
the increase of North Korean defections.
610
 To start with, although the Kim 
regime has developed nuclear weapons designed for nuclear deterrence or regime 
survival under Juche ideology: Juche might lead to an internal regime struggle 
with unexpected blowback, such as worsening economic poverty, food crisis, and 
the rise of social unrest.  
Moreover, North Korea is most likely to be in a situation of leaderlessness 
in the coming years due to the Kim Jong Il‟s poor physical condition and 
unaddressed issues about a successor. Power transition may not be smooth. The 
Korea Herald reports that “North Korea may face anarchy after the death of its 
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leader, Kim Jong-il, due to a lack of a clearly powerful successor despite reports 
that Kim has appointed one of his sons as heir.”611 Likewise, The Economist 
(December 4, 2010) states that “on the death of the Dear Leader [Kim Jong Il], 
North Korea descends into anarchy or lashes out, as it did in the island attack last 
month that killed South Korean servicemen and civilians.”612 In a similar vein, 
The Economist (May 29, 2010) argues that “opposing factions loyal to different 
members of Mr Kim‟s family” might lead to a crisis in North Korea.613 
Furthermore, North Korea recently started idolizing Kim Jung-Un, the third son 
of Kim Jong-Il, as a part of the efforts to transfer political power. Thus, South 
Korea and the U.S. included “unstable situations” referring to contingency in 
North Korea in the joint statement of the 42nd SCM on October 8, 2010.
614
 
Most importantly, the number of people who defected from North Korea to 
the ROK‟s democracy has significantly increased. The Korea Times reports that 
“about 16,500 North Koreans have fled to the South up to late June [2009] […] 
the number of defectors has steadily increased by more than 10 percent every year, 
and this year‟s total is expected to reach 3,000.”615 More recently, The Korea 
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Herald states that “Until September this year [2010], about 20,000 North Koreans 
have taken asylum here [to South Korea], fleeing from hunger and political 
suppression in the communist state.”616 Increasing numbers might be just the 
starting point for the future influx of massive refugees.
617
 The increase of 
defection reflects the North Korean regime‟s failure. Regime change by foreign 
intervention might not be feasible.
618
 Internal regime failure, however, seems to 
be only a matter of time; particularly societal and economic instability may lead 
to a weakening regime and finally regime failure (However, it should be noted 
that North Korea‟s demise has been predicted for three decades, and has not yet 
occurred). 
The aforementioned situations could lead to various insurgencies against an 
unstable local government that will serve as one local branch of the South Korea-
led unified government on the Korean peninsula.
619
 One insurgent group could 
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spring from ex-political leaders, or Kim Jong Il‟s family members. This group 
will want to regain political power and reestablish a communist regime in the 
North. Insurgencies driven by this group will be physically intense. Second, ex-
military leaders would promote insurgencies to regain their superior positions. It 
will be easier for them to gain access to military weapons that communist North 
Korea has built up for more than 60 years. Thus, their insurgencies will rely on 
military weapons intensively. These two groups are most likely to be supported 
by China because they have historically enjoyed a good relationship with Chinese 
political and military leaders.  
The third scenario is an insurgency by anti-Kim Jong Il groups that had 
grievances under the Kim regime. This group will include political prisoners or 
military leaders who tried coups against the Kim regime. Even though they 
wanted to overthrow the Kim regime, they will want to address a power vacuum 
on their own, not by foreign actors. Fourth, economically deprived societal groups 
might become insurgents. The power vacuum will weaken the control of the 
border and thus South and North Koreans are most likely to confront each other. 
North Koreans, who did not enjoy democracy and capitalism, will feel frustrated 
due to economic gaps with South Koreans – gaps between “haves” and “have-
nots.” They will not want to be second-class citizens. Accordingly, they are more 
likely to seek nation-rebuilding in their own way, which may not be democratic.  
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The final insurgency might spring from the clash of ideologies. The longest 
cold war in the world has been on the Korean peninsula; extended tension 
between democracy in the South and communism in the North has existed over 60 
years. North Koreans have been ruled under one family, whereas South Koreans 
have enjoyed pluralism. The long-lasting gaps could make ideologically-armed 
North Koreans become insurgents against South Koreans. In this case, the COIN 
forces need to employ societal appeals to decrease the ideological gaps. The 
organizations will include democracy-seeking groups in the North as well as 
religious groups, human rights groups, and charity groups in the South. 
In particular, the COIN forces will have to build and maintain a strong 
connection with democracy-seeking North Korean groups as well as share 
information with them. Some North Koreans have started to gain information 
regarding South Korea‟s enhanced political and economic development. They will 
want the North to become a democracy, stimulated by South Korea‟s success 
story. Thus, this group is most likely to be aligned with the ROK‟s COIN forces. 
The ROK‟s COIN forces will have to cooperate with this group to reestablish 
order in the region in a democratic way. However, what matters most regardless 
of types of groups is that the COIN force should have strong support from neutral 
or ordinary local North Koreans for strategic success in future COIN. All in all, 
the “demand” vis-à-vis COIN will necessarily emerge.  
C. A Leading COIN Player in North Korea 
When the North Korean insurgency becomes reality in the process of the 
Kim regime breakdown, who should be a major player in its attempt to secure the 
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Korean peninsula? There will be no place for weak powers in this mission 
because they do not have the resources to conduct this mission. Furthermore, 
there are no regional weak powers in Northeast Asian geopolitics.  
By contrast, great powers will be interested in this mission as an attempt to 
extend and maintain their sphere of influence in the region. When the last 
battleground of the Cold War disappears in the Korean peninsula, they will utilize 
this mission as an opportunity to maintain or increase their influence as they have 
done since the end of WW II.
620
 The U.S. could be an influential player with the 
use of American troops stationed in South Korea in an attempt to prevent China 
from increasing its influence. China might become an active player to minimize a 
security threat driven by the elimination of the buffer zone between the 
democracy bloc and the communist bloc and by a massive influx of refugees on 
China‟s border.  
Thus, if both powers intervene, the Korean peninsula will become trapped 
in the quagmire of great power politics. In this situation, the nature of the mission 
will be unintentionally changed from gaining regional security (a key objective of 
COIN) to maximizing the influence of great powers. If that happens, the mission 
will be longer and success will be hardly achievable.  
More importantly, as has been noted earlier, security management by great 
powers is less successful because they will see the mission of COIN in the Korean 
peninsula as one of the usual missions for great powers as they did in the past, not 
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as an unusual mission. Thus, the perception of routine missions will make them 
both less willing and capable of achieving mission success. Kinetic fighters from 
the U.S. and China are less likely to fight with COIN in mind; rather they are 
more likely to rely on traditional fighting methods related to great power politics. 
Inflexibility of American or Chinese military organizations developed under the 
logic of great power politics in an anarchic world will be the least effective. 
Furthermore, they will be less interested in making their organizations flexible for 
this mission because each will pay more attention to conventional threats as great 
powers.  
These great powers also lack political/socio-cultural advantages with 
respect to the local population‟s culture, the first impression, their status as 
outsiders, and adaptation costs. North Koreans have seen Americans as the most 
hostile or evil enemy in the world for more than sixty years. Thus, when the U.S. 
military takes over this COIN mission, it will struggle from the beginning, 
particularly due to the local population‟s strong hatred. By the same token, 
American intervention as a major player will stimulate North Korean bystanders 
to join insurgent groups, and by doing so, it will create a mobilization logic 
favorable to insurgent groups. Second, in a situation where the level of the local 
population‟s hatred of Americans is so high, the first impression strategy of U.S. 
COIN forces will be futile.   
Third, since the U.S. neither shares culture/traditions with North Korea nor 
is a neighboring country, its status as an outsider will dominate. Finally, U.S. 
forces will have massive adaptation costs because it is less familiar with both 
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material environments and non-material environments. American COIN forces 
are less familiar with mountainous guerillas‟ activities. They are also less familiar 
with the non-material environment of North Korea, such as language, local 
traditions, or informal rules of villages.  
Considering a traditional alliance between China and North Korea, China‟s 
forces will be better positioned than U.S. forces, but they also lack political and 
socio-cultural advantages. North Koreans may have less hatred towards Chinese 
than Americans, and by doing so, China‟s COIN forces may be better positioned 
for a more favorable first impression. However, China‟s status as an outsider is 
still high because Chinese culture and traditions are different from Korean. 
Moreover, historically, China has been a foe rather than a friend before the 
modern state came to be. Thus, when the Kim regime collapses, North Koreans‟ 
friendliness to the Chinese will significantly decrease. Similar to U.S. forces, 
China‟s forces that speak a different language and do not understand Korean 
informal traditions and culture will have massive adaptation costs.  
While there is no place for weak powers in this mission and great powers 
are less effective for its achievement, the South Korean military will be the most 
efficient entity to cope with North Korean insurgencies and secure the Korean 
peninsula. South Korean forces will have even more potential to successfully deal 
with this once in a lifetime mission (the most special mission) – in more detail, a 
singular mission for unification – than their successes in Vietnam and Iraq.  
First of all, the nature of this unusual mission will make the South Korean 
military much more enthusiastic and capable. Since this mission will serve as the 
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only opportunity for reunification between South and North Korea in a 
democratic way, South Korean fighters will display a high degree of morale and 
pride. Their mission will be recognized as the most important: to increase national 
prestige as a unified state. Accordingly, similar to South Korean COIN troops‟ 
fast organizational adaptation in Vietnam and Iraq, they will make COIN 
organizations flexible enough to increase their capacity for this mission. In 
addition to this military capacity, COIN forces require economic capacity in the 
sense that it is very important to help build an economic infrastructure for North 
Koreans. South Korea, a growing middle power and a chair of G-20 in 2010, has 
the economic resources for this infrastructure building.
621
  
Second and of equal importance, South Korean forces have significant 
political and socio-cultural advantages. The level of North Koreans‟ hatred of 
South Korean troops will be the lowest among possible troops because they are 
the same and only ethnic group in the world.
622
 Thus, the ROK forces will be 
positioned as the best troops to create a first impression. The ROK COIN forces 
will not be seen as outsiders. This is particularly true because they are the most 
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familiar with material and non-material environments in the Northern region of 
the Korean peninsula. When it comes to material environments, the terrain, 
climate, and geography of North Korea are similar to or almost the same as those 
in South Korea. In this vein, South Korean troops are already prepared for the 
mission on this terrain because they have been trained in terrain similar to North 
Korea. Furthermore, South Korean troops have already experienced guerilla 
warfare in mountainous terrains. In addition, the ROK forces are also best 
positioned because South Koreans share language, culture, and traditions with 
North Koreans. Thus, these advantages of the ROK forces will minimize 
adaptation costs. All in all, the nature of the COIN mission and political/socio-
cultural advantages of South Korea, taken together, should serve to provide 
success of COIN in North Korea. 
D. The Role of the U.S. Military 
As has been noted, the use of American forces will evoke hatred from 
North Koreans because they have been taught that the U.S. is their evil enemy. 
Thus, the COIN operations will face a quagmire from the beginning if the U.S. 
military plays a leading role. American forces, however, need to play another 
important role in North Korea.  
A specific mission needs to be given to U.S. forces. While the ROK 
military forces play a major role in dealing with this unusual mission, the U.S. 
needs to play a supporting role. It will have to play a supporting role while it stays 
in South Korea as a backup in case that foreign forces, such as China and Russia, 
support the insurgencies. In particular, China will attempt to exert its influence in 
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a power vacuum North Korea. The Economist reports that when the Kim regime 
collapses, China will not like “America or South Korea to assert control over the 
North [and] in the long run, China may expect to regain the sort of influence over 
a unified Korea.”623 Thus, while American forces stay in South Korean areas, they 
should be able to deter China from intervening in the ROK military‟s efforts to 
reestablish order in the North. The major role of Seoul and the minor role of 
Washington will prevent this mission from being trapped in great power politics 
between the U.S. and China.   
Historically, China has intervened in the Korean peninsula. China‟s effort 
to influence the Korean peninsula has not been exceptional in modern history. 
China has strongly opposed foreign forces‟ interventions in the Korean peninsula 
because China has historically attempted to maintain its influence there. China 
intervened in the Korean War in 1950. Chinese leader Mao Zedong perceived 
American troops as the biggest threat to China in 1950 when the Korean War 
broke out.
624
 More importantly, China strategically saw North Korea‟s survival as 
crucially important for its own survival. Thus, China sent its troops to the Korean 
peninsula in order to support its Communist ally during the Korean War. This 
                                                 
623
 The Economist, “Friends, or else: Living with China‟s rise will test America‟s 
diplomacy as never before,” December 4, 2010, 14. 
624
 As opposed to one leader-oriented analysis, Scobell argues that Chinese 
civilian leaders were more hawkish, but Chinese military leaders were more 
dovish by examining civil-military relations in 1950. Andrew Scobell, “Soldiers, 
Statesmen, Strategic Culture, and China‟s 1950 Intervention in Korea,” in 
Suisheng Zhao eds., Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behavior 
(New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), 107-127.  
  261 
notion and expectation from China have not been totally wiped out in the present 
era.  
China still intervenes in current affairs related to the Korean peninsula. 
China has played a leading role in addressing North Korea‟s nuclear issue. At the 
same time, China serves as a blood ally to North Korea. When the ROK Cheonan 
sinking incident led by North Korea in March 2010 was referred to the United 
Nations Security Council in July, 2010, North Korea was not listed as an attacker 
on the UNSC statement due to China‟s strong opposition.625 The Economist states 
that “In March, when the North sank a South Korean warship, killing 46 soldiers, 
China failed to issue any condemnation.”626 In a similar vein, even when the 
North Korean military shelled South Korean sovereign territory, Yeonpyeong 
Island, in November 2010, China did not condemn North Korea, unlike other 
countries, such as the U.S., Japan, and even Russia. The Economist reports that 
“when North Korea shelled a South Korean island last month, China was 
characteristically reluctant to condemn it [North Korea].”627 
Considering China‟s extreme interest in the Korean peninsula, China‟s 
interference in a North Korean collapse is more than probable in its efforts to 
increase its sphere of influence and guarantee its national security. The North 
Korean refugee issue has also been one of the major concerns for China, and it 
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will become more serious if the Kim regime collapses. The Economist reports that 
a refugee crisis led by a collapse in North Korea is one of China‟s biggest 
concerns.
628
 
When China intervenes in this situation, the U.S. has to be responsible for 
great power politics, focusing on deterring China from being militarily aggressive 
on the Korean peninsula. The Economist analyzes this possibility. It states that 
when North Korea collapses, “there is even a risk that China and America would 
find themselves supporting opposing sides in a conflict that could involve nuclear 
weapons.”629 Thus, the deterrent role of the U.S. military is crucial for the ROK 
military to effectively deal with COIN in North Korea. In a nutshell, while the 
South Korean military plays a major role in COIN operations in North Korea, 
American forces must convince China to refrain from a heavy military 
engagement.  
E. How to Deal with Contingent Situations
630
 
The past always provides important opportunities for teaching the present 
and future ROK military. What lessons can the ROK military, as a necessary 
major player in a North Korean collapse, learn from COIN missions in Vietnam 
and Iraq? How would the ROK military have to cope with a possible North 
Korean insurgency? We need to identify the dynamics based on the interplay 
between four actors in order to effectively deal with possible upcoming 
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insurgencies in North Korea.
631
 The identification offers an answer in terms of 
how to do this. To start with, South Korean domestic population will be very 
unwilling to militarily fight against North Koreans because they are the same 
Korean ethnic group and share 5,000 years of history. Furthermore, the strong 
civic society, led by the high degree of democracy, will even more discourage the 
use of mass-violence.  
Second, when it comes to the role of North Koreans, the local population, a 
non-political dynamic will dominate the first phase of insurgencies because North 
Koreans have been armed with an extreme religious level of Juche ideology. 
North Koreans are rarely exposed to the outside world. They have been 
conditioned to believe that they live in the happiest country in the world, rather 
than the worst. This extremist ideology of the local North Korean population will 
make them vigorously resist the presence of outside forces.  
The above insights from the two actors show that a population-oriented 
approach should be prescribed ahead of an enemy-based approach.
632
 Along with 
a population-based approach from the COIN force, the domestic population can 
boost their effectiveness by helping North Korean refugees leave their homeland 
for more stable and freer areas of South Korea. Just as the South Korean 
population helped Iraqis, they can also boost the effectiveness of COIN in North 
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Korea by helping North Korean refugees and casualties on South Korean home 
ground.  
It will not be easier to separate the local population from insurgents than 
COIN forces anticipate. Many experiences in Iraq, however, offer an insight into 
how to deal with them. The COIN forces will have to conduct friendship 
programs, such as the Green Angel, at the first phase of a population-oriented 
COIN approach. When quick-impact is working under the friendship program, it 
needs to focus on infrastructure building in four ways: security, political, 
economic, and social.  
Yet at the same time, when a population-based approach is beginning to 
work, an enemy-based method should be considered and introduced due to an 
underlying dynamic of another actor in COIN: a variety of North Korean 
insurgent groups. North Koreans had conducted guerilla warfare and have been 
trained to a high standard for sixty years. North Korea is surrounded by 
mountainous terrain, and this will offer insurgents a favorable condition for 
guerrilla warfare. Based on experiences in Vietnam, an enemy-based COIN 
method should be aimed at preventing guerrillas from controlling mountainous or 
rural areas. In order to achieve these aims, the company-led tactical base, which 
was effective in Vietnam, would work to deal with North Korean insurgents as 
well. To that end, the ROK military needs to analyze the terrain in North Korea‟s 
mountains prior to any involvement.  
In addition, an enemy-based COIN also needs to be aimed at safely 
controlling the biological and nuclear weapons that the Kim regime possesses. An 
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enemy-based COIN has to focus primarily on preventing the transfer of Weapons 
of Mass Destruction (WMD) to insurgent groups. If insurgent groups possess 
WMDs, the ROK COIN forces will be trapped by insurgent groups‟ psychological 
tactics. Insurgent groups with WMDs will attempt to make domestic populations 
fearful under nuclear brinkmanship tactics. Thus, the WMD aspect should be 
considered important for enemy-based COIN operations.  
Seoul also needs to make use of the remaining North Korean soldiers as 
local security forces instead of decommissioning them to prevent insurgent groups 
from easily mobilizing them. The former soldiers who were kicked out of the 
military are likely to be strong insurgents, as we can see in Iraq. The use of local 
soldiers for regional security would not only weaken the insurgents‟ power, but 
also make the local community more autonomous.  
The last actor, the COIN force, needs to make its organization flexible and 
adaptable to the mission. To that end, as I noted earlier, the COIN force should be 
composed of Korean soldiers rather than external soldiers because South Korean 
soldiers would be regarded less as occupiers than Western soldiers. In addition, 
the ROK military has better cultural understanding of the North Korean situation. 
South Koreans speak the same language as North Koreans, and they both share 
traditional customs on a societal level. Thus, the ROK military will have the 
strongest cultural advantages on the battleground among possible military forces.     
The ROK military also will have to choose officers and soldiers based on 
high standards. Special forces and/or soldiers experienced in unconventional 
missions are desirable. The COIN force should establish sub-organizations, 
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particularly focused on civil-military missions as part of a population-based 
approach. Under this remedy, Seoul needs to provide the local North Korean 
community with some degree of autonomy from the central government and 
establish legitimate local government. It also should keep the balance between 
centralization and decentralization to strengthen an enemy-based COIN capability. 
A tactical success in one area or village achieved by the COIN force should lead 
to success in other areas by increasing the number of secured areas; the positive 
domino effect will work under these mixed remedies between a population-led 
method and an enemy-led method. When the North Korean population enjoys 
more freedom under democracy, has more stable economic lives, and feels like a 
united Korea over time as a result of the above strategy, they will stay away from 
North Korean insurgent groups rather than help them.  
As the ROK COIN troops achieve short-term outcomes, a Korean unified 
government needs to step up its efforts to attain a long-term outcome, a fully 
integrated democratic society. As the Hanawon Center did, it should teach newly 
integrated North Koreans how to make their living on their own, rather than 
relying on government. In this process, government needs to insure Northerners 
are not treated as second class citizens by offering them specific benefits, such as 
financial stipends needed to resettle in a democratic society.  
In addition to this economic focus, a unified government should focus on a 
political dimension as well. In the political process, it needs to prevent 
Northerners from being marginalized by offering them advantages in the electoral 
process. One possibility for political integration would be to stipulate only 
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Northerners may be political candidates for local government positions in specific 
parts of the North. Education is crucial to help Northerners understand a 
democratic political process. Thus, a unified government needs to establish 
various institutes to educate Northerners about democratic politics and teach them 
their rights in a democratic society. Similarly, schools should be set up where 
children from both the South and North can study together to reduce societal gaps 
between the two groups. The aforementioned economic, political, and societal 
integration efforts will lead to a unified government and hopefully, a fully 
integrated stable peninsula.  
IV. Policy Implication II: The ROK Military Strategy 
A. The ROK Military Strategy and Organization: Today 
          The ROK military strategy has paid much attention to conventional warfare 
against the North Korean Army. Conventional wisdom presupposes that the 
ROK‟s military strategy should be developed and advanced according to North 
Korea‟s military threat, such as its military capabilities and strategy. By the same 
token, the conventional analyses focus mostly on the current capability of the 
North Korean regime/military, and therefore, they rarely explore possible future 
contingencies that the military will have to manage. 
         Thus, valuable lessons learned from Vietnam and Iraq vis-à-vis COIN have 
not been integrated into the military strategy. In the non-mission period, 
unconventional warfare tends to be marginalized in the military strategy. As such, 
the ROK military organization is rarely intended to deal with unconventional 
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warfare. This explains why its military organization tends towards a traditional 
structure to manage conventional threats.  
Likewise, the ROK‟s military organization has been framed under the military‟s 
adoption of conventional military strategy, as opposed to balanced military 
strategy. The ROK Ministry of Defense pays less attention to the establishment of 
a special office or command that controls unconventional missions (see Figure 7). 
The Military PKO (Peacekeeping Operation) Center, a very small organization, 
has taken charge of developing a doctrine for overseas missions and the training 
of soldiers. 
Figure 7 
The ROK Major Military Organizations 
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missions. There are no exercises to deal with COIN or pre-war and post-war 
management.  
It is important that crisis management is embedded in unconventional 
missions, such as COIN, before and/or after battles. Unconventional missions 
require interplay among various factors: political, economic, cultural, foreign 
affairs, and military. For example, the agencies‟ cooperation is crucial for 
effective COIN. COIN is not simply military operations but also various conflict 
management plans, such as civil operations. Section 6 of Chapter 5 in the Defense 
White Paper stresses the importance of the military overseas missions and 
identifies the importance of coordination with other agencies to effectively carry 
out unconventional missions
633
: 
MND (the Ministry of National Defense) is making an effort to establish a 
legal and systemic basis in order to expand Korean participation in PKO 
and also enhance military capabilities […] first, in coordination with the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT), there are now plans to 
enact the PKO participation ACT (provisional name) to simplify the 
domestic procedure to dispatch troops.     
 
Table 22  
The ROK Military Major Training and Exercises 
Type Name Contents Nature 
ROK-US 
Forces 
Ulchi-Freedom (UFG) Exercise Theater-level operation C 
Key Resolve/Foal Eagle 
Exercise 
Proficiency for war campaign 
C 
Joint 
Exercises 
Taegeuk Exercise Theater-level CP exercise C 
Hoguk Exercise Large scale joint exercise C 
Other 
Exercises 
Combined counter-terror 
exercise 
ROK, US, and Russia 
U 
Rim of Pacific Exercise 
(RIMPAC) 
Large scale sea exercise 
(ROK, US, Australia, Japan, etc) 
C 
Search and Rescue Exercise Basic sea exercise (ROK and U 
                                                 
633
 The ROKMND, The Defense White Paper, 142.  
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Japan) 
Pacific Reach 
Submarine Rescue Exercise 
(ROK, US, Australia, etc) 
C 
West Pacific Countermine 
Warfare 
Exercise (MCMEX) 
Mine Search / Sweep 
(ROK, Japan, Australia, etc) C 
Anti-Submarine Warfare 
Exercise 
ROK and US 
C 
Combined Landing Operation 
Exercise 
Amphibious operations  
(ROK and US) 
C 
Combined Large Force 
Employment (CLFE) 
Mid-altitude infiltration training  
(ROK and US) 
C 
Cooperative Cope Thunder Air infiltration  
(ROK, Japan, UK, France, etc) 
C 
Source: The Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense, The Defense White Paper 2008, 
362-3. 
* C: Exercise against conventional threat, U: Exercise against unconventional threat 
 
Cooperation among agencies, however, is limited to the procedure of 
sending troops overseas in a tactical and temporary sense. Particularly, two 
ministries – MND and MOFAT – need to be strongly coordinated before, during, 
and after conducting COIN for possible insurgencies in the North as well as for 
overseas missions. The process of strengthening agencies relations need to be 
accelerated in various areas by developing a better balanced military strategy. It is 
about time that the ROK military grasps the need to successfully achieve the 
unconventional missions for the future as well as for the present. A balanced 
strategy for the ROK military will make it feasible by bolstering military 
organizational adaptation and investing more time into unconventional warfare-
led exercises. In a nutshell, the current military organization and the scope of 
exercises in South Korea show that the military strategy adheres to the 
conventional posture despite its effort to support the outward national strategy of 
Global Korea.  
B. The ROK Military Strategy and Organization: Future 
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As has been noted earlier, COIN is different from conventional warfare. 
Thus, there is a debate over the future strategy of the military in the United States 
based on four different schools: traditionalist, non-traditionalist, hybridist, and 
division of labor.
634
 The traditionalist school stresses the importance of 
conventional warfare. Although traditionalists do not entirely neglect the presence 
of unconventional warfare in the world, they see a massive scale of conventional 
warfare as the most important mission for the military forces. Thus, they are 
mostly opposed to the U.S. military‟s heavy involvement in COIN.  
The non-traditionalist school highlights the importance of unconventional 
missions in the world. Non-traditionalists stress the emergence of small scale 
military disputes, asymmetric warfare, and COIN. They also pay attention to the 
growing potential for future unconventional warfare, particularly in a situation 
where failing states, ungoverned states, and non-state actors are growing in the 
international environment.
635
 Thus, they recommend that policy makers design 
the future military to deal with unconventional missions.  
The hybridist school maintains that the military force has to effectively deal 
with all types of warfare, involving conventional and unconventional warfare. 
Hybridists often maintain that the U.S. military needs to “win all wars.”636 They 
avoid dichotomous preference in regards to conventional or unconventional 
                                                 
634
 In particular, when it comes to the debate between traditionalists and non-
traditionalists, see Michael C. Horowitz and Dan A. Shalmon, “The Future of War 
and American Military Strategy,” Orbis 53, no. 2(2009), 303-308.  
635
 General Petraeus and General McChrystal represent this school.  
636
 For this school‟s position, see Gian P. Gentile, “Let‟s Build an Army to Win All 
Wars,” Joint Force Quarterly 52, no. 1 (2009), 27-33.  
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warfare. Instead, this school insists that military forces should be able to do every 
mission. The problem with this school is that a tremendous amount of budget is 
required for the military to have dual capabilities.  
Lastly, the division of labor school argues that military forces should be 
professionalized according to two career tracks – conventional officers and 
unconventional officers. The problem is that the-division-of-labor military can 
encounter a lack of flexibility in terms of the transition from unconventional 
warfare track soldiers to conventional track soldiers when more conventional 
forces are required for contingent situations. Furthermore, a large number of 
soldiers are needed to keep two professional tracks.  
         What would be the best military strategy for the future of South Korea? In 
terms of the aforementioned four schools, the future ROK military strategy could 
have three options: status-quo (a conventional strategy), an unconventional 
strategy, and a balanced strategy between the two. These three are particularly 
true because the third and fourth schools‟ views look better but less realistic due 
to budget and troop size issues.  
Seoul should choose the third option. The first option is meaningful itself in 
the sense that the Korean peninsula remains the last-remnant battleground of the 
Cold War between democratic South Korea and communist North Korea. 
However, the status-quo strategy will be insufficient to deal with future 
unconventional missions. The second option, an unconventional strategy, is more 
effective for futuristic missions, but its focus might undermine the capacity to 
cope with a conventional threat from the North Korean Army.  
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In contrast to the first two options, the third option, a balanced strategy, has 
the capacity to cope with current and future missions alike.
637
 The balanced 
strategy serves as the middle ground between the hybridist school and the division 
of labor school. Hybridist-based strategy requires a massive military budget, and 
thus, it is unrealistic and ineffective. Nevertheless, it is valuable for the military 
force to enhance its capacity vis-à-vis a variety of missions. The division of labor 
school requires large military forces to make each military branch divisible over 
special careers.
638
 Considering the current size of ROK military forces, the 
division of labor is unrealistic. However, it is valuable because it increases the 
military forces‟ proficiency in their areas. The balanced strategy needs to be 
developed to reflect advantages from both schools because conventional and 
unconventional missions are equally important to the ROK military and require 
proficiency from the military forces. According to the balanced strategy, the ROK 
military forces should be designed to establish flexible organizations so that they 
can deal with all of these different missions with adapted proficiency.  
                                                 
637
 South Korean military needs to adopt the balanced strategy on a 
comprehensive level. For example, operations at sea also require the balanced 
strategy for the future. For more information on the balanced strategy for the navy, 
see Kil-Joo Ban, “The Clash of David and Goliath at Sea: The USS Cole 
Bombing as Sea Insurgency and Lessons for the ROK Navy,” Asian Politics & 
Policy 2/3 (2010), 463-85. 
638
 Jong-ha Kim and Jae-yup Kim support the division of labor school for the 
future ROK military strategy. Jong-ha Kim and Jae-yup Kim, “Pok„ap jŏk 
kunsawihyŏbe taeŭnghagi wihan kunsalyŏk kŏnsŏlui panghyang (The trajectory of 
the military construction to respond to complex military threats)” Journal of 
National Defense Studies, 53, no. 2 (2010), 47-50. 
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Why is a transition from the current conventional strategy to the balanced 
strategy required now and for the future? It springs from a growing demand for 
unconventional warfare: internal and external alike.  
1. A Growing Demand for Unconventional Missions 
          As mentioned earlier, insurgency in North Korea is getting closer to a 
reality, due to regime leader succession, a devastated economy, and international 
isolation in North Korea. Thus, a potential for a COIN mission on the Korean 
peninsula is growing.  
          In addition to a national level of demand vis-à-vis an unconventional 
military mission, an international demand is also growing due to two factors: the 
changing international environment and the domestic power growth of South 
Korea. To start with, we need to identify the rapidly changing international 
security environment. Two dynamics center around international environments: 
the low frequency of wars between state actors and the rapid emergence of non-
state threats in the post-Cold War era. There have been no physical wars between 
the great powers since WW II. The low frequency of conventional great wars has 
tended to moderate even wars between small states. War has become obsolescent 
among modernized states because cultural change has shifted the way to evaluate 
war.
639
  
                                                 
639
 Mueller‟s key explanatory variable is a cultural change that makes wars 
“unthinkable.” Mueller also differentiates between declining war and remaining 
war. The former refers to major war among developed countries or “conventional 
civil war,” whereas the latter concerns “unconventional civil war” among non-
developed countries, or “policing wars” by developed countries. John Mueller. 
The Remnants of War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004).  
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Second, the transformation of the international environment from a bipolar 
to a unipolar system after the collapse of the Soviet Union forces encourages 
many more asymmetric threats to rapidly emerge. In this vein, the 9/11 attacks 
offer the most dramatic case. Non-state actors (e.g., al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and 
maritime pirates) have been dominant in a unipolar system. New actors operate 
and dominate across international boundaries in changed international security 
environments: Jema‟ah Islamiyah, the Afghan Taliban, Hizballah, and al-
Qaeda.
640
 The United States is struggling with two critical unconventional wars in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. Small states as well as big states have started to place 
global insurgents, namely al-Qaeda, at their center vis-à-vis their security and 
interest. Under US hegemony, failing or failed states keep rising, which requires 
non-traditional missions by the military.
641
 In a nutshell, the demise of the other 
superpower created “the new world disorder” by spreading violence.642  
Growing unconventional warfare does not mean that all states in the world 
can afford to play a role in international security against non-state actors. A 
country needs to be equipped with a certain amount of capacity to deal with 
overseas missions. In this vein, the domestic power growth of South Korea allows 
                                                 
640
 David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst 
of a Big One (New York: Oxford University Press), 5-7.   
641
 As of 2010, there are a potential large number of countries for failed states. 
Somalia is ranked as the country with the highest index score of failed states, 
followed by Chad, Sudan, and Zimbabwe. The Economist, “Failed States: Where 
life is cheap and talk is loose,” March 19, 2011, 68.  
642
 The Economist, “After the Soviet Union: A globe redrawn,” November 7, 2009, 
26-7. 
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its military to respond to unconventional missions that keep growing under the 
changing international environment.  
As neoclassical realists noted, a state‟s capacity to extract resources affects 
its outward behavior.
643
 Seoul has increased its economic performance through 
the Vietnam War and the 1988 Olympic Games.
644
 Due to its enhanced economy, 
Seoul has increased its military power.
645
 In the 1990s, when Seoul started to 
build enough resources, it began to be concerned with affairs beyond the 
peninsula. Seoul has dispatched its military for a variety of overseas missions, 
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 Neoclassical realists examine the effects of intervening variables, such as 
leaders‟ perception and the state‟s strength relative to society, as well as an 
independent variable (the distribution of capability). By adding less-structural 
variables, neoclassical realists attempt to incorporate both dimensions – external 
(international systemic) and internal (individual). The ROK‟s behavior can be 
explained by extending neoclassical realism into the middle-level range states, 
because security is important not only for Great Powers, but also for small states. 
The typical neoclassical realists are Zakaria (1998) and Christensen (1996). 
Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America‟s world 
Role (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998); Thomas J. Christensen, Useful 
Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 
1947-1958 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996). 
644
 The ROK economic strength started to rapidly grow through two critical  
events. The ROK‟s involvement in the Vietnam War offered South Korea an  
opportunity to increase its economy; Seoul was able to have a massive amount of  
economic assistance from the U.S. through its commitment in the Vietnam War.  
Furthermore, after the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games, the ROK economy rapidly  
increased. According to World Economic Outlook Database, IMF (International  
Monetary Fund), the size of its GDP in 1990 was about four times the size of the  
GDP in 1980. International Monetary Fund, World Economy Outlook Database,  
http://www.imf.org/external/index.htm (Accessed March 10, 2010).   
645
 The ROK military‟s modernization has been taken for granted by Korean  
society because it had to secure itself against the biggest threat since the Korean  
War, the North Korean Army. This condition has allowed Seoul to extract  
resources from society more easily than others. Political party rivals have not  
affected the ROK‟s behavior vis-à-vis an outward national strategy since the early  
1990s regardless of administrations‟ ideological positions (liberal or conservative). 
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starting with sending 314 soldiers to the Gulf War in 1991.
646
 The internal growth, 
on the other hand, is a necessary but not sufficient condition for its changing 
strategy from inward to outward. As most realists argue, it is difficult for non-
Great Powers to jump into the international arena where even Great Powers are 
struggling with each other.  
The rapidly changing environment, which is difficult for one superpower to 
manage alone, offers the middle-level states, which have enough resources to go 
outward, a window of opportunity to engage in international affairs.
647
 As a 
consequence, the “demand” vis-à-vis unconventional warfare has been increasing 
both internally and externally.  
2. Tracing Outward Posture of South Korea 
The South Korean government has consciously developed an outward 
national strategy. Nevertheless, it did not formalize this strategy until the Lee 
Myung-Bak administration‟s adoption of the national strategy of Global Korea in 
2008. South Korea has altered its behavior from inward posture to outward 
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 The ROK military has engaged in multiple overseas missions ever since 1991:  
1) Gulf War in 1991, 2) Peacekeeping Operations from 1993 to the present (e.g.,  
Somalia, Western Sahara, Georgia, Angola, East Timor, and Lebanon etc), 3)  
counterinsurgency in Iraq from 2003 to 2008, and 4) maritime asymmetric  
operation (anti-piracy) off Somalia from 2009 to the present. The ROK Ministry  
of National Defense, International Peacekeeping Operations,  
http://www.mnd.go.kr/mndEng_2009/DefensePolicy/Policy12/Policy12_2/index.j  
(Accessed March 1, 2010). When Seoul decided to send its troops to the Gulf War, 
it enjoyed rapidly growing economic power, followed by joining in OECD 
(Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development). Enough national 
resources made national leaders perceive Korea as a “quasi-Great Power.” 
647
 The changing environment forces states with sufficient resources, such as  
South Korea, to play a proper role in making “supply” meet “demand” for  
emerging unconventional missions. 
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posture depending on its internal resources and the international environment. It 
was crucial for Seoul to adopt an inward national strategy after the Korean War 
due to its devastated domestic infrastructure. Likewise, the presence of an enemy 
just across the border, the North Korean army, caused the ROK military to adopt 
an inward-seeking military strategy, which focused on how to prepare for 
conventional war against it. Thus, in the post-Korean War period, South Korea 
aligned its national strategy with its peninsula military strategy, which focused on 
domestic affairs.   
In the 1960s, however, President Park Chung Hee adopted an ad-hoc 
outward seeking national strategy, such as an export-driven economy, in his 
attempt to enhance domestic economy. The ROK military also engaged in an ad-
hoc outward mission in Vietnam. As a result, in the Vietnam War era, both 
national and military strategies were inherently inward-looking but temporarily 
outward-looking. This period can be defined as a critical juncture because an 
inward-looking middle state engaged in a tactical outward mission. The ROK 
outward mission against the Viet Cong guerrillas offered its military an 
opportunity to differentiate between conventional and unconventional fighting. 
That being said, from the Korean War to the Vietnam War period, the balance 
between national and military strategies in South Korea was well-maintained.  
In the post-Vietnam War era, however, South Korea rapidly increased its 
domestic economic strength; leading to strategic imbalance between the nation-
state and its military over time. South Korea became a middle-level state due to 
its enhanced economy particularly during the early 1990s, and in doing so, joined 
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the OECD in 1996. Thus, Seoul started to adopt an outward-seeking national 
posture in the early 1990s on a strategic level in economic and security areas. 
Seoul has sought more global economic engagements such as in the G-20 meeting. 
South Korea has also engaged in international security affairs, such as UN-led 
Peace Keeping Operations (PKO), War on Terrorism (e.g., Iraq War), and war on 
bandits (e.g., anti-piracy operations off Somalia), which extend beyond simple 
national security (see Table 23). Boosted by the ROK outward strategy, MBC 
News reported on October 22, 2009 that Seoul plans to establish foreign dispatch-
ready troops in its attempt to systemically engage in international affairs.
648
 
Table 23 
The ROK Military‟s Conflict Involvement after the Korean War 
Period Event Forces / Size Nature 
Mar 10, 1965 –  
Mar 23, 1973  
Vietnam War Two Army divisions and One Marines brigade 
About 310,000 soldiers 
U 
Jan 24 – Apr 
10,  
1991 
Gulf War Medics and Air Force transportation corps 
314 soldiers U 
Jul 30, 1993 –  
Mar 18, 1994  
Somalia Engineer battalion, 516  
U 
Aug 9, 1994 –  
May 15, 2006 
Western 
Sahara 
Medics, 542 
U 
Oct 6, 1994 –  
Jul 9, 2009  
Georgia  Observers, 135 
U 
Mar 3, 1997 –  
Mar 31, 1996 
India and  
Pakistan 
Observers, 135 
U 
Oct 5, 1995 –  
Dec 13, 1996 
Angola  Engineer battalion, 600 
U 
Jun 15, 1999 The NLL  
of Korea 
Navy ships (PKM/PCC class)  
/ 1
st
 navy clash between South and North 
Korea 
S 
Oct 4, 1999 –  East Timor Infantry battalion (3,328)  U 
                                                 
648
 MBC News reported that Seoul is trying to upgrade its military level of PKO  
center to the national level and to establish 1,000 ready troops for professional  
foreign missions under the Special Forces Command. MBC News, October  
22, 2009, http://imnews.imbc.com/news/2009/deplom/article/2474945_5625.html  
(Accessed March 21, 2010). 
  280 
Jun 4, 2004 Staff and Liaison officers (45)  
Dec 21, 2001 –  
Dec 14, 2007 
Afghanistan Navy ship (l LST),  
Air Force transportation corps (2 C-130, 446) 
Medics (780), Engineers troops (1,330) 
U 
Jan 4, 2002 –  
Dec 23, 2003 
Cyprus Commander (1) 
U 
Jun 29, 2002 The NLL  
of Korea 
Navy ships (PKM/PCC class)  
/ 2
nd
 navy clash between South and North 
Korea 
S 
Apr 30, 2003 –  
Dec 17, 2008 
Iraq The reconstruction troops (around 20,000) 
U 
Mar 25, 2003 –  Djibouti Staff officers (11) U 
Oct 18, 2003 – Liberia Observers (12) U 
Sep 15, 2004 –  
Dec 11, 2006 
Burundi Observers (4)  
U 
Nov 25, 2005 – Sudan Observers (33) U 
Mar 12, 2007 – Nepal Observers (9)  U 
Jan 16, 2007 – Lebanon Infantry battalion (1,747), Staffs (22) U 
Jan 16, 2008 – Somalia Navy ships (3 DDH, about 900), Staffs (7) U 
Jul 29, 2009 – Cote d‟Ivoire Peacekeeping groups (2)  U 
Jul 29, 2009 – Western 
Sahara 
Observers (2) 
U 
Nov 10, 2009 The NLL  
of Korea 
Navy ships (PKM/PCC class)  
/ 3
rd
 navy clash between South and North 
Korea 
S 
Mar 26, 2010 The NLL The ROKN Cheonan sinking incident U 
Source: The Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense at 
http://www.mnd.go.kr/mndPolicy/globalArmy/globalPeace/globalPeace_3/index.jsp?topMenuNo
=2&leftNum=16 
* S: Symmetric engagement, U: Unconventional mission / Asymmetric engagement 
 
All ROK presidents, regardless of their ideological positions, have 
gradually sought the outgoing posture under two conditions (national growth and 
international changing environment) ever since 1991, when South Korea‟s 
economic performance began to consolidate. The Kim Young-Sam administration 
(Conservative) started to send ROK troops on overseas missions as part of 
peacekeeping operations in 1993. Kim Dae-Joong‟s administration (Liberal) 
dispatched the Ever Green Unit to East Timor in 1999. Roh Moo-hyun‟s 
administration (Liberal) sent the Zaytun Division to Iraq, which aimed at 
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stabilization operations and counterinsurgency (COIN).
649
 Due to greater national 
resources
650
 and more demand vis-à-vis unconventional missions, under the Lee 
Myung-Bak administration (Conservative), Seoul has sought an outward national 
strategy, represented by “Global Korea,” making use of the military.651 In sum, 
these developments clearly show that the ROK‟s economic growth promotes its 
outgoing strategy.
652
 While South Korea‟s national strategy is outward-oriented, 
its military strategy is inward-oriented, focusing on the North Korean 
conventional threat.  
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 President Roh sought to play a mediating role in peace and stability for  
Northeast Asian security, boosted by a growing economy. Zhiqun Zhu, “Small  
Power, Big Ambition: South Korea‟s Role in Northeast Asian Security under  
President Roh Moo-hyun,” Asian Affairs Vol. 34, No. 2 (Summer 2007), 67-86.   
650
 The Global Competitiveness index shows that the ROK ranked 11th out of 131  
during 2007-2008, 13th during 2008-2009, and 19th during 2009-2010; the ROK  
is currently a highly competitive state on the world stage. The World Economic  
Forum, The Global Competitiveness Report 2009-2010, http://www.weforum.org/  
(Accessed February 27, 2010), 190.   
651
 For example, The Defense White Paper 2008 states “Global Korea” as Korea‟s  
national strategy. The ROKMND, The Defense White Paper, 44-5. By the same  
token, in the World Ocean Forum (WOF), on November 11, 2009, President Lee  
Myung-Bak stated that “South Korea, as the a chair state of G-20 meeting in 2010,  
will play a leading role in making the world actively respond to climate change  
along with both developed and developing countries.” The Office of the President  
(Cheong Wa Dae), President Speeches, November 11, 2009,  
http://www.president.go.kr/kr/president/speech/speech_list.php?board_no=P04&s 
earch_key=&search_value=&search_cate_code=&order_key1=1&order_key2=1 
&view_type=&cur_year=2009&cur_month=11 (Accessed March 29, 2010).  
652
 The ROK currently is the 10th largest economy in the world. Similarly, the  
World Factbook shows that, in 2008, South Korea ranked 15th in economic power  
ingross domestic product (GDP). The enhanced economy allowed Seoul to seek  
more global engagement. As a part of more global engagement, Seoul hosted the  
G-20 meeting in 2010 as a chair state. The World Factbook 2009. Available at  
https://www.cia.gov/ library/publications/ the-world- factbook/rankorder/  
rankorderguide.html (Accessed February 13, 2010). The GFP (Global Fire Power) 
data shows that South Korea has the 12th largest military in the world. The GFP, 
“GlobalFirePower.com: Strength in Numbers,” http://www.globalfirepower.com/ 
(Accessed February 26, 2010).  
  282 
3. Required Alignment  
Thus, aligning the military strategy with the national strategy is crucially 
important. How can the ROK military attain this? The answer is simple, the 
balanced strategy. This imbalance was accidental, not intentional; Seoul started to 
possess enough resources to go abroad within a very short amount of time, but 
three particular situations have prevented its recognition of the quickly changing 
warfare environment in the world. Three foundations have driven the ROK 
military‟s overemphasis on conventional war: a historical foundation (the 
experience of the Korean War), a structural foundation (the last frontier of the 
Cold War), and a military organizational culture (officers‟ overemphasis on 
conventional war).  
First, the two Koreas experienced a harsh symmetric war during the Korean 
War. The Korean War led to about 2.5 million casualties. Korean society had to 
struggle to rebuild its post-war infrastructure. Thus, this historic event pushed its 
military to see conventional war as the most important mission. Second, despite 
the official end of the Cold War in 1991, the Korean peninsula is still a part of the 
structure established by the Cold War.
653
 Third, more important, the historical and 
structural factors forced the ROK military to create a modern conventional 
organization, which can deter conventional war against North Korea and defeat it 
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 Democratic South Korea and Communist North Korea are still fighting with 
each other in the last-remnant battlefield of the Cold War. In this vein, the longest 
cold war in the world has been on the Korean peninsula; long tension between 
democracy in the South and communism in the North has existed for over 60 
years. This structure embedded the conventional way of fighting logic in Korean 
society. 
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if it occurs. Thus, the conventional way of fighting experienced in the Korean 
War is firmly embedded in the ROK military organizational culture.
654
 In a 
similar vein, the military organizational culture has ignored the quickly changing 
environment. More important, it takes a long time to innovate in its organizational 
culture, particularly because the ROK military has been under the above three 
situations for sixty years. 
There was a tactical balance between national and military postures in 
Vietnam. Now is the time that there should be a strategic balance between them. 
Moreover, the balanced strategy kills two birds with one stone. It will allow the 
ROK military to effectively deal with possible unconventional missions as well as 
a conventional threat, the former being North Korean insurgencies caused by the 
Kim Regime collapse in the coming years. Military officers who have 
experienced unconventional missions, as well as insightful planners, would be the 
major players who together might lead this innovation. 
Both COINs in Vietnam and Iraq caused a new generation of military 
officers to raise their voice that unconventional warfare is becoming important, if 
not more important than traditional warfare. As shown in table 12, the ROK 
military officers can be broken down into four generations based on their 
experiences. In the first generation of the post-Korean War, the most important 
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 Korean officers prefer the study of traditional war and see asymmetric warfare 
as secondary. Their Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) is based on the 
traditional North Korean threat and they resist the current SOP‟s innovation. This 
conventional-war-oriented posture of the ROK military organization causes the 
inward military strategy to continue to dominate, and in doing so, it clashes with 
the ROK outward national strategy.    
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issue was to build the modern regular army to support an independent country. In 
this generation, the military developed the traditional strategy to prepare for 
conventional war between South and North Korea. In the process of military 
building, the ROK military often had to fight against local guerrillas in a divided 
Korea. Thus, some of them experienced guerilla warfare on the Korean peninsula 
to fight against communist partisan groups. Nevertheless, the Korean War showed 
how important it was for the military to possess modern regular armed forces. 
Accordingly, this group of officers has seen conventional warfare missions as the 
most important.  
The second generation was inspired by the ROK military‟s participation in 
the Vietnam War. The experience with unconventional warfare by some of the 
first generation of officers provided the ROK military with an opportunity to 
better deal with non-state actors, such as Vietcong guerrillas. Driven by 
experiences from fights against North Korean communist guerrillas, the ROK 
military fought against Vietcong physically with hard weapons. The learning 
process was led by professional officers who had guerrilla warfare experience in 
the first generation, not by systemic doctrine. Although officers were insightful in 
winning COIN in Vietnam, the ROK‟s success did not lead to organizational 
change on a comprehensive level. Also, despite its big fights against non-state 
actors, the military retained the conventional strategy due to the threat from North 
Korea, a state actor.    
Table 24 
Four Generations of the ROK Military 
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Generation Nature Major events 
The First Period (1945-1963) The traditional military building 
Conventional missions 
Fight against communist  
partisan groups 
The Second Period (1964-
1992) 
The military development 
Overseas guerilla warfare 
experiences  
Vietnam War 
The Third Period (1993-
2008) 
The military modernization 
Overseas stabilization experiences 
Iraq War 
The Fourth Period (2009-) The balanced strategy or not 
* Transitional period 
 
  
The third generation was stimulated by participation in overseas 
peacekeeping operations that started in 1993. The enhanced economic power 
encouraged the military to play an outgoing role in international security beyond 
national security on the Korean peninsula. The most crucial event was the ROK‟s 
military participation in the Iraq War. The second generation officers‟ experiences 
illuminated the third generation officers vis-à-vis how to better manage local 
unconventional warfare, or COIN. The second group of officers‟ success in 
Vietnam helped the Zaytun division (the third generation) achieve success in Iraq.  
In the third generation, changes started to be made on an organizational 
level, represented by Defense Reform 2020. This organizational change, however, 
does not reflect the balanced strategy. Thus, the current strategic road map still 
overemphasizes traditional threats. Thus, this period guided the transitional period 
(the fourth generation) to emerge in the sense that the new form of military 
operations in Iraq offered insight into future operations. In this regard, the ROK 
military in the fourth generation stands at a critical juncture on whether the 
military goes back to the conventional strategy or goes forward to an innovative 
strategy or balanced strategy. An innovative military strategy should be able to 
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manage both possible contingencies in North Korea and overseas military 
missions simultaneously.  
4. How to Articulate the ROK Military Strategy  
It is crucial that the military strategy should be developed to deal with 
future challenges, such as the possible instability of North Korea‟s regime as well 
as the contemporary global security needs. Thus, the ROK military should prepare 
for an unconventional threat (post North-Korean regime) as well as a 
conventional threat (present North-Korean regime). Accordingly, the flexible 
strategy, which is applicable not only to the former but also to the latter, is highly 
recommended.  
The South Korean military will confront two conundrums in its effort to 
proceed to the flexible strategy: tension between traditional and non-traditional 
warfare, and organizational transformation. The former is related to military 
organizational culture, which places traditional kinetic warfare at its main mission. 
It is difficult to transform operational mindsets, particularly in a big 
organization.
655
 Thus, the fixed mindset of the ROK military toward conventional 
war should be reoriented in a more flexible way.  
The latter, productive organizational transformation, would encourage 
military generals and officers to change their inflexible mindsets. This would play 
an influential role in reducing the amount of time required for the changing 
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 Legro (1994) claims that “it can be difficult and expensive to reorient 
operational philosophy, especially in a large and complex organization.” Jeffrey W. 
Legro, “Military Culture and Inadvertent Escalation in World War II.” 
International Security, 18, no. 4 (1994), 117. 
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process. It would be highly recommended to establish an Unconventional Warfare 
Department, under the Ministry of National Defense (MND), to deal with 
unconventional warfare professionally.  
The Unconventional Warfare Department will play a role in bridging the 
gap between centralized and decentralized postures. This Department would be 
composed of two centers: a land force unconventional warfare center and a 
maritime unconventional warfare center. The first center will mostly be in charge 
of COIN – both within and beyond the peninsula. To put it another way, it will 
play a leading role in the necessary COIN operations in North Korea as well as 
global peacekeeping missions. The present Peacekeeping Center would be merged 
with the land force unconventional warfare center.  
The maritime unconventional warfare center would be responsible for 
maritime-based missions, such as anti-Piracy operations, SLOC (Sea Lanes of 
Communication) protection, or possible PSI (Proliferation Security Initiative) 
operations. As Biddle (2006) reminds us, “proficiency” in the conventional 
mission does not automatically lead to “proficiency” in the unconventional 
mission without an appropriate flexible strategy.
656
 Seoul should be a master of 
both missions for regional security.  
The above organizational transformation will allow the ROK military to 
pave the way for achieving “proficiency” in unconventional missions as well as 
conventional missions. To that end, what does the land force unconventional 
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warfare center have to prepare for in order deal with insurgency in North Korea? 
First, it has to “Know the Enemy.” The insurgents, armed with Juche ideology, 
will be the remnants of the communist regime and may very well “miss” the old 
regime. Thus, they will use tactics similar to the communist partisan guerilla, 
conducted in the Korean War period. One of important lessons vis-à-vis the ROK 
forces in Vietnam is that they achieved tactical success because they had already 
identified the Vietcong‟s tactics before they were dispatched to the battleground. 
The ROK forces were able to reduce casualties and losses caused by trial and 
error and more importantly learning. The center has to develop detailed tactics by 
analyzing the tactics from communist partisan guerrilla warfare in Korea and the 
Vietcong guerrilla warfare and teach COIN forces the effective tactics.  
Second, the center should continue to examine the ROK military‟s 
experience in dealing with guerillas or not-state actors (e.g., company-based 
tactical base in Vietnam) and integrate these lessons into field manuals or 
formalized tactics. Third, in addition to the above enemy-based methods, it also 
needs to keep improving options for population-based methods, which were very 
effective in Iraq. Fourth, the center has to establish a database with insightful and 
productive lessons from past unconventional operations that were conducted 
during the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Iraq War. Fifth, as we can see 
in the Vietnam War, the roles and abilities of individual soldiers – martial arts 
capability, a high degree of marksmanship, and special operations‟ capability – is 
crucial. Thus, COIN operations need to be led by the Marines or special forces of 
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each military branch, and they should be trained to prepare for unconventional 
warfare in peace time.  
Finally, the land force unconventional center should command its own 
troops – a professional standing force for stabilization operations – which play a 
central role in non-traditional operations internally as well as abroad. Timing is 
crucial for stabilization operations, and thus, the military should reduce the time 
required to reorganize its force. In other words, COIN forces have to try their 
utmost to minimize adaptation costs.  
The standing force, which will have accumulated experiences in terms of 
unconventional warfare, will already be prepared for this mission and thus 
minimize the time for preparation and organizational reorientation. While placing 
this force at its core for mission preparation, other soldiers selected with high 
standards will have to be dispatched to this organization for support and actual 
application of effective COIN. In this vein, the establishment of the Onnuri unit 
on July 1, 2010, whose mission will be exclusively overseas operations, will serve 
as the starting point to change the ROK military organization.
657
  
What matters most is that professionally developed strategies and standing 
forces allow the ROK military to effectively achieve its mission even in a 
situation where their missions will become more specialized than routine tasks. 
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This is why lessons from Vietnam and Iraq need to be integrated into the strategic 
level for the future.  
It is about time for the ROK military to take into account future strategy 
due to the growing potential for unconventional missions in North Korea and the 
increasing demand for unconventional missions abroad. These missions will 
become more frequent and will require greater military attention. Only after a 
country prepares for the worst, can it guarantee its security and achieve the best 
outcome.
658
  
V. Future Research Directions 
Further research is required in four areas: the extended role of middle 
powers in international security, the process of COIN, the transition from tactical 
success to strategic success, and more intensive studies to link the ROK military‟s 
mission in Vietnam and Iraq with the potential of North Korean insurgency. 
First of all, future questions need to be focused more on how a changing 
international environment in the post-9/11 era will affect the role of non-great 
powers in international security, particularly the middle powers. The U.S. struggle 
with COIN in Afghanistan and Iraq, initiated as part of the response to the attacks 
of September 11, 2001, has encouraged both scholars and policy makers to pay 
more attention to unconventional warfare.
659
 What is problematic, however, is 
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 The U.S. military‟s struggle in Iraq and Afghanistan reflects the difficult nature 
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that despite America‟s greatest efforts, the al-Qaeda threat has not been 
dismantled, rather it has become much more globalized, aligning with more of its 
sub-local branches.
660
 What is implied here is that unconventional fights take 
longer and are more costly. In the twenty first century, unconventional warfare, 
defined by fighting against non-state actors, such as insurgents, terrorists, or 
maritime pirates, became the center of regional and international security. This 
trend has also served as an opportunity for even middle powers to recognize the 
                                                                                                                                     
campaigns is problematic. For example, Desker and Acharya (2006) argue that 
huge violence from Islamic extremism, such as the 9/11 attacks, is just a 
beginning for further violence, and the U.S. military-led remedies caused the 
increase of radical terrorists attacks. For example, the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars 
under the Bush administration have prompted the U.S. to lose the War on Terror; 
the U.S.‟s harsh response to the 9/11 attacks was what Bin Laden really wanted to 
achieve through his attacks. The U.S. military-led response made the global 
Islamic community perceive America as a threat to the existence of Islam. They 
further argue that the U.S. did not identify al-Qaeda‟s global scale 
interconnectivity and recruiting dynamics. They claim that the U.S. has to utilize 
the moderate Islamic community in order to deal with the radical Islamic 
influence. Desker and Acharya, “Countering the Global Islamist Threat,” 59-83. 
660
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importance of unconventional warfare in a changing international arena. Future 
research needs to examine the extended role of middle powers in this new trend.  
This dissertation should be recognized as a small contribution for 
explaining and understanding how effectively non-great powers can contribute to 
international security. Further case studies will be required besides the South 
Korean case. Other middle powers, such as Australia, New Zealand, India, Israel 
or Turkey, would serve as good cases to further explore middle powers‟ military 
effectiveness.  
Second, besides an enemy-centered approach followed by the population-
based method or a population-centered approach supported by professional troops 
to deter enemy actions, there could be more questions about the process of COIN. 
Are there several layers of reversal processes, such as enemy-population-enemy 
approaches? Is the combination of enemy-based and population-based methods 
always necessary? These questions should be asked by tracing other cases.  
Third, questions about a strategic success need to be addressed. If the ROK 
COIN forces were successful on a tactical level in Vietnam and Iraq, why did 
their success fail to be transferred to a strategic level of success? One possible 
answer could be a lack of coordination among all COIN forces. The strategic 
success requires combined operations between all participating COIN forces 
across countries. They should be coordinated and collaborative regardless of their 
TAOR. What matters is that the degree of prescription – enemy or population-
oriented methods on a strategic level – should be coordinated and consistent 
across all COIN forces. The lack of coordination or consistency in terms of the 
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degree of a mission approach can be easily detected in current COIN efforts.
661
 
The biggest efforts to win “the hearts and minds” in one region can be easily 
spoiled by the outcomes of the other forces‟ hard remedy-led overreaction, 
leading to civilian casualties. Under a consolidated coordination, all COIN forces 
should share the know-how of tactical success in one specific COIN force with 
each other. Thus, coordination among all COIN forces needs to be examined as a 
part of linking a tactical success with a strategic success.  
Finally, future research needs to ask how many lessons from the ROK 
military‟s success overseas have been integrated into the development of a 
military strategy. The unconventional battleground situations in Vietnam and Iraq 
need to be professionally compared with the future of the unconventional 
battleground in North Korea. This is just a small step toward the analysis of 
linking lessons learned from overseas COINs with possible North Korean COIN. 
This research should continue to be conducted since it is crucial for future 
regional and national security.  
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